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Overview
This doctoral thesis aims at contributing to the study of two aspects of
European economic and monetary integration: exchange rate stabilization
between Countries that have not adopted the euro yet and the Euro Area,
and real and nominal convergence of Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries (CEECs). Each Chapter is self-contained, and covers these aspects
of European integration from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.
Each part of this research is made up of a theoretical framework, which I
have tried to keep as straightforward as possible, and a more structured
empirical part.
In particular, the first two chapters deal with the issue of exchange rate
stabilization between the euro area and non-euro Europe. In principle, we
can think of several possible sources of reduction in exchange rate volatility:
broadly speaking, extensive use of foreign exchange reserves and credit lines
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), direct interest rate intervention, for example
changing the policy interest rate in step with the anchor country, or ”invol-
untary” exchange rate stabilization, for example as the result of increased
business cycle convergence (Giavazzi and Mishkin, 2007). Chapter 3 dis-
cusses the issue of real convergence of CEECs from an original perspective:
by testing which macro sector has been driving wage determination in a
country, we can detect potential sources of international imbalances arising
in the process of catching up.
Chapter 1 discusses nominal exchange rate stabilization in Europe from
the point of view of the de jure vs. de facto flexibility literature. In particu-
lar, it reviews measures of de facto exchange rate flexibility as developed by
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Frankel and Wei (2008) and applies them to
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14 european countries. Since the end of the 1990s, due to several crises of
fixed exchange rate arrangements, we could witness a polarization of de facto
exchange rate regimes in the world: either fully flexible exchange rates, cou-
pled with inflation targeting, or strict pegs and currency unions. However,
previous studies (Fischer, 2004) have challenged this view, and in the 2000s
a literature has flourished on measures of de facto exchange rate flexibility:
in other words, in order to assess the relative merits of alternative exchange
rate arrangements it is important to know what countries are actually doing,
rather than what they declare. Since a regime of managed floating, such as a
narrow band or crawling peg, can be prone to speculative attacks even when
there are no credibility problems on the Central Bank’s side, Central Banks
may have the incentive to declare they are floating and then deviate from
their official statements. The rationale for exchange rate management in
disguise is at least twofold: first, a depreciated exchange rate can be used as
a mean of protection of domestic industries (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
2007); second, if the country’s debt is denominated in a foreign currency,
the dominant currency is potentially a good anchor (Svensson, 2003).
For European countries that have not (yet) joined the EMU, there may
be another potential reason for managing the exchange rate vis a` vis the
euro: the creation of a large neighboring currency union, with which they
are highly economically and financially integrated, in 1999 may have pro-
vided these countries a natural anchor. Indeed, while the polarization of de
facto exchange rate regimes has occurred in Europe as well, exchange rate
volatility (as measured by the mean absolute deviation) has decreased in the
last decade with respect to the past. Was that the result of smaller foreign
exchange and macroeconomic shocks or active exchange rate management?
At the basis of the literature on fear of floating there is the idea that,
in order to detect the actual regime that a country is pursuing, one should
not look at movements in asset prices and reserves. In fact, on average,
the higher the level of flexibility, the higher the volatility of the exchange
rate and the lower the volatility of reserves should be. The paper by Calvo
and Reinhart (2002) introduced the use of priors to measure such volatil-
ity. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) opened the way to a large set of empirical
works proposing alternative approaches to detect de facto exchange rate
regimes. This strand of literature can be divided into two groups: one,
larger, attempting to classify exchange rate regimes based on the degree
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of flexibility (a subsample containing Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Ghosh et
al., 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003,
2005 and 2007; Ball and Reyes, 2008), and one smaller, aimed at estimating
weights in currency baskets when a country is known to follow a basket peg
(for example Frankel and Wei, 1994; Be´nassy and Que´re´, 1999; Ohno, 1999;
Frankel, 2008; Frankel and Wei, 2008).
In the first chapter of this doctoral thesis I begin by showing, by means
of a stylized theoretical framework, how priors on the policy interest rate,
the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves can be informative on the
de facto exchange rate policy pursued by the central Bank. I then review
the works of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Frankel and Wei (2008) and
apply them to 14 European non-euro countries, as opposed to a small group
of benchmark floaters (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States and
Japan). I use monthly data from 1980 until 2009 (when available; for former
communist countries the starting date is after 1993), a sample period when
most of these countries have adopted different monetary policy regimes char-
acterized by varying degrees of de facto exchange rate flexibility.
In order to be more precise in the comparison of different exchange rate
arrangements, unlike Calvo and Reinhart I classify Inflation Targeting (IT)
as a separate regime. In fact, several studies (Svensson, 2000; Clarida, 2001;
Gali and Monacelli, 2005) have shown that CPI Inflation Targeting tends to
reduce exchange rate fluctuations: the Central Bank responds to changes in
the real exchange rate indirectly, because they affect inflation. As a result,
CPI Inflation Targeting may be observationally equivalent to managed float-
ing if we only looked at exchange rate volatility. We show this by a stylized
theoretical model and, to avoid this confusion, we list IT separately from
free floats. Using exchange rate flexibility measures and estimating weights
in currency baskets allows us to (i) detect potential cases of fear of floating,
i.e. exchange rate management in disguise; (ii) measure the implicit weight
that was placed on the euro by the non-euro countries, with respect to other
international reserve currencies; (iii) investigate whether such alternative
approaches do in fact give consistent results.
Chapter 2 discusses the issue of exchange rate stabilization coming from
interest rate intervention. In particular, as we will see below, I propose an
approach for the estimation of the Central Bank interest rate rule in a small
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open economy explicitly taking into account the case of ”fear of floating”.
The country of interest is Sweden, which is also included in the sample in
Chapter 1, since it is one of the countries for which we could observe the
most striking exchange rate stabilization vis a` vis the euro since 1999 (see
Chapter 1). As it was discussed above, a regime of Inflation Targeting can
have the side effect of stabilizing the exchange rate and thus be observa-
tionally equivalent to a managed float (Clarida, 2001). It is still discussed
in the literature whether an Inflation Targeter should keep an eye on the
exchange rate. In principle, exchange rate movements should only matter
indirectly, since, depending on the degree of exchange rate pass through,
they have an impact on inflation. According to Svensson (2003), there is no
reason for separate exchange rate objectives in the Central Bank’s objective
function; moreover, using the nominal exchange rate or money growth as an
intermediate target is suboptimal with respect to forecasted CPI inflation
as it causes higher output and inflation volatility (Svensson, 1996).
Targeting the exchange rate using the policy interest rate would also
determine, according to Taylor (2001) and Edwards (2006) excessive inter-
est rate volatility, which is not observed in practice. Since, however, we
have seen that a large strand of literature has shown that deviations from
de facto flexible exchange rate regimes are indeed present, we might ask
whether fear of floating can occur through interest rate intervention. In
the case of European non-euro countries, moreover, the large degree of real
and financial integration may make sure that Central Banks in small open
economies are not masters in their own house: Reade and Volz (2009) have
shown using a Cointegrated VAR that Swedish market interest rates (the
Stibor) are driven by Euro area interest rates (Euribor); in this sense, euro
area monetary policy spills over on Sweden. There is a large literature that
estimates interest rate rules using the so-called Taylor (1993) Rule; however,
the coefficients in this rule are not identified since they are convolutions of
structural and preference parameters (Svensson, 1996), and therefore they
cannot be interpreted as describing the weight of alternative macroeconomic
variables in the loss function of the Central Bank. For this reason, alter-
native approaches have been proposed in the literature to estimate central
bank preferences. Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimate the relative weights on
output and inflation variability in the Central Bank’s objective function
that minimize the distance between the estimated and the optimal interest
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rate response to structural economic shocks; such shocks are, in turn, identi-
fied within a SVAR model. Favero and Rovelli (2003) solve the optimization
problem of the Central Bank in the case of the U.S., subject to the structure
of the economy as defined by an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand
equation; a similar approach is followed by Collins and Siklos (2004). I fol-
low Favero and Rovelli and extend their model to the case of a Small Open
Economy: therefore, in Chapter 2, I estimate the preferences of the Swedish
Riksbank solving the Central Bank’s optimization problem subject to an
aggregate demand curve, an aggregate supply curve and an equation for the
real exchange rate, under alternative Inflation Targeting regimes: Strict IT
(i.e. only inflation is in the loss function), Flexible IT (the output gap is in-
cluded), IT with interest rate stabilization and smoothing, Fear of Floating
(exchange rate smoothing appears in the loss function). Within a stylized
model, I also show that even in strict (CPI) Inflation Targeting the Cen-
tral Bank will respond to output and real exchange rate fluctuations; thus,
even if the response to these variables in the case of Flexible IT and Fear of
Floating is larger, we cannot say anything on preference weights unless we
estimate separately the parameters describing the structure of the economy
and those describing Central Bank’s preferences.
Chapter 2 discusses two further issues related to the estimation of Cen-
tral Bank preferences: the relevance of interest rate smoothing and the use
of real time vs. revised data. Empirical works estimating interest rate rules
consistently find a large coefficient on the previous period interest rate, gen-
erally above 0.8. This finding has generally been interpreted as the Central
Bank indirectly targeting output fluctuations. However, the importance
of interest rate smoothing as a monetary policy objective per se has been
criticized by Cecchetti (2000); more recently, Consolo and Favero (2009)
suggested that the large coefficient on interest rate smoothing is the result
of a weak instrument problem in the GMM estimation of Forward-Looking
Taylor Rules. As far as the use of real time vs. revised data is concerned,
Orphanides (2001) suggests that, since macroeconomic data are subject to
large revisions, estimating the monetary policy rules using revised data may
be misleading. Since in the case of Sweden Central Bank forecasts (which
are, by definition, real-time), are available, I use them to estimate preference
weights, while I use revised data to estimate the structural model.
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Chapter 3 investigates the issue of real and nominal convergence of Cen-
tral and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) from the point of view of
the labor market. In particular, this chapter tests the validity of one of
the crucial assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, namely that
the traded sector is the leader in wage determination. More precisely, the-
oretical models of spillovers in wage determination (for example, Aukrust
(1977)’s Scandinavian Model of Inflation) assume that wages in the traded
sector (T) grow in step with productivity; since there is free inter-sectoral
labor mobility wages, then, equalize across sectors. In countries that are in
the process of catching up, productivity growth in the traded goods sector
is higher, and therefore the non-traded sector (N) firms will have to increase
prices and the overall price level will rise, a result which is in line with the
so-called internal version of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (Froot and
Rogoff, 1995). The increase in the CPI due to the process of convergence
will, in turn, determine a real exchange rate appreciation (the so-called ex-
ternal version of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis). The issue of real and
nominal convergence in CEECs is especially relevant because those countries
that are members of the E.U. will eventually adopt the euro, if they haven’t
already, and structural excess inflation resulting from the process of con-
vergence will influence the outcome of monetary policy and the Maastricht
convergence criteria.
As we have stated above, according to Balassa (1964), since developing
countries start with a depreciated exchange rate and a lower price level,
during the process of convergence they will experience excess inflation and
an increasing real exchange rate. Such appreciation should not, in principle,
harm international competitiveness, as long as wages in T do not grow ahead
of productivity. But is it necessarily the case that T is the leader in wage
determination, or we can think of alternative feedback effects across sectors?
In fact, if N or the public sector is actually the leader in wage setting, then
convergence may be accompanied by excessive wage growth and therefore
competitiveness loss. During the last decade, a large empirical literature has
investigated the relevance of the Balassa-Samuelson effect for CEECs (just
to name a few, Egert (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2010); Egert et al. (2006), Cori-
celli and Jazbec (2004); Fischer (2004), Mihaljek and Klau (2003)), and the
result is generally that, on one hand, the B-S effect itself can only account
for a small part of the excess inflation and real exchange rate appreciation
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witnessed in those countries; on the other hand, other factors might be at
play, for example the shift in consumption towards higher quality goods (i.e.
Engel’s Law, see Egert (2007)) and an increase in the share of services in the
consumption basket. According to Fischer (2004), the investment demand
channel has also played an important role: in particular, rising productivity
in any sector raises the equilibrium capital stock in the economy and thus
raises investment demand; this, in turn, pushed prices up.
Quite surprisingly, the literature on the B-S effect has so far put con-
siderably little attention on testing the model hypotheses, except for the
issue of the composition effect of the consumption basket in Egert (2007).
In particular, no work to date tests the assumption that the traded sector
leads wage setting, while for example Egert (2002) only focuses on relative
wage developments, i.e. discusses how the wage ratio across the two sec-
tors seems to have remained constant, and thus wage equalization seems to
hold. However, there are at least two arguments against the assumption
that T leads wage setting. On one hand, firms in N are not subject to in-
ternational competition and therefore can increase prices following a rise in
the real producer wage (i.e. the labor cost). Thus, in a sense, unions have
more bargaining power in N and can extract a mark-up in the wage over
productivity (Friberg, 2007); this, in turn, may spill over to wages in T. On
the other hand, wage setting in the public sector is influenced by political
considerations (Demekas and Kontolemis, 2000) rather than productivity;
public sector wages can also be assumed to be exogenous with respect to
the business economy (Ardagna, 2007). If the public sector leads wage de-
termination and envy externalities and other forms of social comparisons
are present (Oswald, 1979), then wages in the business economy may grow
above productivity, pushing the price level up. Overall, there is limited
empirical literature on the issue of spillovers in wage determination. Lamo
et al. (2008) investigate wage leadership between the private and public
sector in 18 OECD countries and find that, while the results are ultimately
country-dependent, private sector wages seem to exert stronger effect on
public wages than the reverse; prices play an important role in the trans-
mission mechanism. Friberg (2007) does not find evidence in favor of the
so-called ”Scandinavian Model” of wage determination, that postulates the
wage leadership of the traded sector, in the case of Sweden, while Demekas
and Kontolemis (2000) show that in Greece public sector wages were weakly
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exogenous with respect to private wages, while Christou et al. (2007) find
bi-directional causality in the case of Romania.
The objective of Chapter 3 is to test the assumption of wage leadership in
the case of CEECs from a broader perspective, that is including traded, non-
traded and public sector wages. Since CEECs are in the process of catching
up, spillovers in wage determination may cause wage costs to grow ahead of
productivity, and thus the catching-up process may occur at the cost of large
international imbalances. This can be amplified in countries that are in a
fixed exchange rate arrangement, or have already adopted the euro, because
the nominal exchange rate cannot correct for the excess inflation. The anal-
ysis is performed by means of a Cointegrated VAR (CVAR): the models of
wage determination that I will sketch make precise and testable assumptions
on the relationships we discussed: constancy of the wage ratio (which would
imply free inter-sectoral labor mobility), which sector has been driving wage
determination, i.e. was weakly exogenous, and whether there was a stronger
form of wage leadership, with absence of short-run effects coming from the
other sectors. All of these assumptions can be conveniently tested within a
Cointegrated VAR framework. Finally, I analyze the process of adjustment
after a shock to the leading sector’s wage using Impulse Response Analysis.
Overview
0.1 References
Ardagna, S. (2007), Fiscal Policy in unionized labor markets, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, pp. 1498-1534.
Aukrust, O. (1977), Inflation in the open economy: a Norwegian Model,
Statistisk Sentralbyra, Artikler no. 96.
Balassa, B. (1964), The purchasing power parity doctrine: a reappraisal,
Journal of Political Economy, 72(6), pp. 584-96.
Ball, C. P. and Reyes, J. (2008), Inflation Targeting or Fear of Float-
ing in Disguise? A Broader Perspective, Journal of Macroeconomics 30,
pp.308-326.
Calvo, G.A. and Reinhart, C.M. (2002), Fear of Floating, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118(2), pp. 379-407.
Cecchetti, S.G. (2000), Making Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 16(4), pp. 43-59.
Cecchetti, S.G., McConnell, M.M. and Perez-Quiros, G. (2002), Policy-
makers’ revealed preferences and the output-inflation variability trade-off:
implications for the European System of Central Banks, The Manchester
School 70(4), pp.596-618.
Clarida, R.H. (2001), The empirics of monetary policy rules in open
economies, International Journal of Finance & Economics, 6, pp. 315-323.
Clarida,R., Gali, J. and M. Gertler (1998), Monetary Policy Rules in
Practice. Some International Evidence, European Economic Review 42,
pp.1033-1067.
Collins, S. and Siklos, P. (2004), Optimal Monetary Policy Rules and
Inflation Targets: are Australia, Canada and New Zealand different from
the U.S.?, Open Economies Review 15(4), pp.347-362.
Overview
Consolo, A. and C.A. Favero (2009), Monetary Policy inertia. More a
fiction than a fact? Journal of Monetary Economics 56, pp.900-906.
Coricelli, F. and Jazbec, B. (2004), Real Exchange Rate dynamics in
transition economies, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 15, pp.83-
100.
Demekas, D.G. and Kontolemis, Z.G. (2000), Government employment
and wages and labour market performance, Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics 62(3), pp.391-415.
Edwards, S. (2006), The relationship between Exchange Rates and In-
flation Targeting revisited, NBER Working Paper No. 12163.
Egert, B. (2002) Investigating the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in the
transition, Economics of Transition 10(2), pp. 273-309.
Egert, B. Drine, I., Lommatzsch, I. and Rault, C. (2003), The Balassa-
Samuelson effect in Central and Eastern Europe: myth or reality?, Journal
of Comparative Economics 31(3), pp. 552-72.
Egert, B. (2007), Real convergence, Price level convergence and Inflation
in Europe, Bruegel Working Paper N◦ 2007/2.
Favero, C.A. and Rovelli, R. (2003), Macroeconomic Stability and the
preferences of the FED. A formal analysis, 1961-98, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 35(4) pp. 545 - 556.
Fischer, C. (2004), Real Currency Appreciation in Accession Countries:
Balassa-Samuelson and Investment Demand, Review of World Economics
140(2) pp.179-210.
Fischer, S. (2004), Exchange Rate Regimes: is the bipolar view correct?
in Fischer, S. (ed.) IMF Essays from a time of crisis: the International
Financial System, Stabilization, and Development. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Overview
MA.
Frankel, J. and Wei, S.J. (1994), Yen Bloc or Dollar Bloc? Exchange
Rate policies of East Asian economies, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger
(eds.),Macroeconomic Linkages: Savings, exchange rates and capital flows,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 295-329.
Frankel, J. , Fajnzylber, E., Schmuckler, S. and Serve´n, L. (2001), Ver-
ifying Exchange Rate Regimes, Journal of Development Economics, 66(2),
pp. 351-386.
Frankel, J. and Wei, S.J. (2008), Estimation of de facto exchange rate
regimes: synthesis of the techniques for inferring flexibility and basket weights,
IMF Staff Papers 55(3).
Friberg, K. (2007), Intersectoral Wage Linkages: the case of Sweden,
Empirical Economics 32 pp. 161-184.
Froot, K. and Rogoff, K. (1995), Perspectives on PPP and Long-Run
Real Exchange Rates, in G. Grossman and K.Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of
International Economics 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Gali, J. and Monacelli, T. (2005), Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate
volatility in a Small Open Economy, Review of Economic Studies 72, pp.
707-734.
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A.M. and Wolf, H. (2002), Currency Boards: More
than a Quick Fix? Economic Policy, 31, pp. 270-335.
Giavazzi, F. and Mishkin, F. S. (2006), An Evaluation of Swedish Mon-
etary Policy between 1995 and 2005, Sveriges Riksbank.
Lamo, A., Perez, J.J. and Schuknecht, L. (2008), Public and Private
sector wages. Co-Movement and Causality, ECB Working Paper No. 963.
Levy-Yeyati, E. and Sturzenegger, F. (2003), To Float or to Fix: Evi-
Overview
dence on the impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on growth, American Eco-
nomic Review 93(4), pp. 1173-1193.
Levy-Yeyati, E. and Sturzenegger, F. (2005) Classifying Exchange Rate
Regimes: Deeds vs. Words, European Economic Review 49, pp. 1603-1635.
Levy-Yeyati, E. and Sturzenegger, F. (2007), Fear of Appreciation, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4387.
Mihaljek, D. and Klau, M. (2003), The Balassa-Samuelson effect in cen-
tral Europe: a disaggregated analysis, BIS Working Paper No. 143.
Oswald, A.J. (1979), Wage determination in an economy with many
trade unions, Oxford Economic Papers 31.
Quadrini, V. and Trigari, A. (2007), Public Employment and the Busi-
ness Cycle, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109 (4), pp. 723-742.
Reade, J.J. And U. Volz (2009), Too much to lose, or more to gain?
Should Sweden Join the Euro? University of Oxford - Dept. of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 442.
Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.S. (2004), The Modern History of Ex-
change Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 119(1), pp. 1-48.
Additional material on http://terpconnect.umd.edu/ creinhar.
Samuelson P.A. (1964), Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems, The Re-
view of Economics and Statistics 46(2), pp.145-154.
Strom, B. (1995), Envy, Fairness and Political Influence in local govern-
ment wage determination: evidence from Norway, Economica 62, N.247
pp. 389-409.
Svensson, L.E.O. (1997) ”Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and
monitoring inflation targets” European Economic Review 41, pp. 111 - 1146.
Overview
Svensson, L.E.O. (2000), Open Economy Inflation Targeting, Journal of
International Economics 50(1), pp. 155-183.
Svensson, L.E.O. (2003), What is wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judg-
ment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules, Journal of Economic
Literature 41(2) pp.426-477.
Taylor, J. (2001), The role of the exchange rate in Monetary-Policy






The question behind this chapter is the following: did the introduction of
the euro influence exchange rate policy in the European countries outside
the EMU? In other terms, we want to gain insight on the de facto exchange
rate regimes of European countries that did not adopt the euro, in order to
assess whether Central Banks have deviated from their official statements
and put some weight on the stabilization of the euro exchange rate instead.
To this end, we will employ methods recently developed by the literature on
de facto exchange rate regime classification and the estimation of weights
in currency baskets, in particular Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Frankel
and Wei (2008), over alternative de jure regimes that were adopted in the
period 1980-2009, and compare the results we get with those of five bench-
mark floaters: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the U.S.
Since the 1990s, a gradual polarization of official (de jure) exchange rate
regimes characterized the international monetary system, with intermediate
regimes gradually disappearing as countries were increasingly lying on two
extremes: either full flexibility and Inflation Targeting, or strict pegs and
currency unions. However, previous works (for example, Frankel (1999) and
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)) showed that, from a de facto point
of view, the majority of countries still lies in the shaded area between these
extremes.
2 Chapter 1
The introduction of the euro in 1999 might have influenced exchange
rate policies outside the euro area for two main reasons, one voluntary and
one involuntary. In the former case, the rationale for stabilizing the ex-
change rate vis a` vis the euro might be the high degree of economic and
financial integration with the EMU, so that by minimizing exchange rate
volatility a base for lower output and inflation volatility is created at home
too. In the latter case, the non-euro country might find itself following the
monetary policy of the ECB, either because the business cycles in the two
areas are highly correlated (Giavazzi and Mishkin, 2007) or home market
interest rates are driven by euro area interest rates (Reade and Volz, 2009)
and exchange rate stabilization is therefore, in a sense, unintentional.
Using regime classification methods allows us to approach this issue in
two ways. First, for those countries which experienced a regime switch in
the corresponding sample period, we can find whether the behavior of re-
serves and exchange rates was actually different across the alternative official
regimes. On the other hand, the Frankel and Wei (2008) method for esti-
mating currency weights makes it possible to detect the importance of the
euro as an informal anchor with respect to other international reserve cur-
rencies. For countries that did not experience an official regime switch, we
can employ de facto classification schemes to detect whether the exchange
rate regime was indeed stable and consistent with what announced.
The main results of this paper are the following. First of all, the move to
inflation targeting in Europe has brought about higher exchange rate flexi-
bility, but up to a level that is not comparable to non-european benchmark
countries. Second, the Euro has acquired a relevant role as an informal
reference currency even for non-european countries, more than the sum of
its main constituent currencies. Third, among the intermediate regimes,
various forms of managed floating have on average been more costly (i.e.
characterized by higher exchange rate and reserves volatility) than member-
ship of ERM and ERM II. These results point to the same direction as Van
Dijk et al. (2011) who have shown, using dynamic conditional correlations,
that the correlation between the US Dollar exchange rate of four European
currencies, namely the Swedish Krona, the Swiss Franc, the U.K. Pound
and the Norwegian Krone and the euro has increased both after the launch
of the euro at the end of 1996 and its formal introduction in 1999. Following
this result, the authors state that
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[. . .] non-euro countries may wish to gain maximum positive spill-
over effects by keeping their currencies more in line with the euro1
so that the benefits of lower exchange rate variability are achieved without
the drawbacks of joining the Monetary Union (namely the loss of monetary
policy independence). Moreover, in the case of Switzerland, Reynard (2008)
has pointed out the stabilization role of the euro, which has reduced the
fluctuations of the Swiss Franc against the U.S. Dollar.
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief review of the literature
on exchange rate regimes classification, in Section 3 I present the theoretical
framework of reference; Section 4 introduces the data; in Section 5, con-
sistent with the theoretical framework, several theoretical priors are tested
empirically using the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) approach. The weights at-
tached to the main international reserve currencies are estimated in Section
6 using Frankel and Wei (2008)’s approach. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Review of the Literature on Exchange Rate
Regimes Classification
The relative advantages and disadvantages of flexible and fixed exchange
rate regimes are still widely discussed. On one hand, under a peg, the lack of
nominal exchange rate adjustment can result in price distortions and misal-
location of resources; the need to defend a peg in case of speculative attacks
can result in costly real interest rate spikes (Calvo, 1999); there is some
evidence as well that output volatility is higher and output growth tends to
be lower (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003) 2. On the other hand, by
reducing relative price volatility, a peg is likely to stimulate investments and
trade, and this can have a positive impact on growth.
For small open economies, since the 1990s the move towards flexible ex-
change rates was coupled to the adoption of Inflation Targeting (in U.K.,
Sweden, Chile, New Zealand, Israel, to name but a few). When we consider
Inflation Targeting - and indeed the majority of the countries in the sample
1Van Dijk et al. p. 20.
2Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) find evidence of significantly lower GDP growth
in the case of pegs for developing countries, but the same result does not hold for industrial
countries.
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that will be introduced in Section 4 is currently Inflation Targeting -, due
to the pass-through effect of the exchange rate on prices, one might ask
whether the Central Bank should control exchange rate movements directly.
More precisely, a Central Bank should keep an eye on exchange rate devel-
opments if it has the objective of keeping inflation low and stabilize output,
because (real) exchange rate movements have an impact on the price of im-
ported goods and on aggregate output. Svensson (2000) showed within a
small open economy model that flexible CPI inflation targeting can in fact
reduce the volatility of output and the real exchange rate while keeping in-
flation under control, a result that is shared with Gali and Monacelli (2005).
Svensson (2003) acknowledges that it is possible for Central Banks to engage
in exchange rate smoothing, i.e. to use the monetary policy instrument in
order to limit the volatility of the exchange rate or stabilize the real ex-
change rate to some ”potential level” . In his model, this would mean that
deviations of the exchange rate from target are in the loss function of the
Central Bank together with inflation deviation from target and the output
gap. However, he also suggests that there should be no reason for Central
Banks in advanced economies to have separate exchange rate and inflation
objectives in setting their monetary policy. Exchange rate smoothing result-
ing from IT would therefore only be a side effect and depend on the degree
of exchange rate pass-through and the share of imported final goods. These
results are in agreement with Clarida (2001), who states that
in practice, a monetary policy aimed at achieving only domestic
objectives may also serve to stabilize the exchange rate,[· · · ] and thus
be difficult to distinguish from a policy of maintaining the exchange
rate within a band. 3
In other words, if we only looked at exchange rate volatility, Inflation Tar-
geting may be observationally equivalent to a managed float.
It has been discussed in the literature why a Central Bank would pursue
an exchange rate policy that is different from what is officially declared. One
reason is that an exchange rate band or a peg is prone to speculative attacks
when the markets perceive that the commitment to maintain the parity is
no longer credible; in order to defend the parity, the Central Bank may thus
be forced to engage in costly interest rate spikes. Such speculative attacks
can occur even when there is no credibility problem on the Central Bank’s
3Clarida (2001), p.15.
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side, making the prophecy of the abandonment of the parity self-fulfilling.
An additional reason, for highly dollarized (or euroized) economies where
a large share of domestic credit is denominated in foreign currency, mone-
tary policy is de facto constrained due to the relevance of the exchange rate
channel in affecting the value of loans.
Exchange rate regimes can be classified according to a de jure or de
facto scheme: the former says what countries claim they are doing, the lat-
ter is based on empirical analysis of the behavior of exchange rates, reserves,
money supply and so on. In recent years there has been a growing empirical
literature, on which the present paper draws, aimed at estimating the degree
of exchange rate flexibility, and thus distinguishing de facto exchange rate
regimes from de jure regimes. Indeed, many countries that announce the
intention to float actually informally manage the exchange rate in order to
avoid excessive volatility: research on exchange rate flexibility is based on
the idea that, rather than the official label of the regime, what countries do
can be better described by movements in asset prices and foreign exchange
reserves. It is important to stress that these studies do not focus on ex-
change rate volatility alone: the bilateral exchange rate of country A may
be less volatile than that of country B only because country A was subject
to smaller macroeconomic shocks 4.For this reason, the focus is on both ex-
change rates and reserves.
According to the IMF classification, there are four exchange rate ar-
rangements: Floating, Fixed, Managed Float and Limited Flexibility. Until
1997, the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Ex-
change Restrictions was completed asking each country to self-report their
exchange rate regime: this is the de jure classification scheme. Such clas-
sification method was upgraded in 1997 and the Report now follows a new
approach that is closer to the de facto classification schemes presented be-
low. Appendix 1 reports a Chronology of de jure exchange rate regimes in
Europe, where we also included Inflation Targeting as a separate regime.
The view that the world is moving towards a polarization of exchange
rate regimes (i.e. either strict pegs/currency unions or freely floating) has
been proved to be not correct, among others, by Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Many countries actually lie in between; the
fact that countries put in place an exchange rate policy that is different from
4As we will see in Section 5, this was the case of Canada in the last decade.
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what they officially claim has been labeled Fear of Floating by Calvo and
Reinhart (henceforth CR); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007), however,
argue that in most of the cases it is a fear of appreciation. The motivation
behind such exchange rate management in disguise would be the view of a
depreciated exchange rate as a means of protection for domestic industries
5.
As we have argued above, from an official point of view there are four
types of exchange rate regimes: fixed or peg, limited flexibility, managed
floating and freely floating. Limited flexibility includes exchange rate ar-
rangements in Europe during the ERM era, while a peg is a stricter com-
mitment towards fixed rates, such as currency board arrangements. The CR
classification scheme is based on several priors on the behaviour of exchange
rates and reserves under different exchange rate regimes: in particular, pegs
should be characterized by higher reserve and lower exchange rate volatility
than floats. How is volatility defined in this literature? CR define it as the
probability that the monthly percentage change exceeds some threshold: if
a country’s exchange rate and reserves behave significantly differently from
the benchmark countries, this is a sign of ”Fear of Floating”. We will outline
in detail and apply CR’s methodology in Section 5.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (henceforth RR) reclassified exchange rate
arrangements for 153 countries from the end of World War II to 2001, find-
ing that, in the large majority of cases, the de facto exchange rate regime
was different from the de jure regime. All of the countries in our sample
were also in Reinhart and Rogoff’s. In particular, they use monthly ob-
servations of the absolute percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate
vis a` vis a reference currency, calculating the probability that the exchange
rate remains within a one, two or 5 percent band. A country is classified
as a peg if it is officially pegging and a dominant reference currency can
be identified. If inflation is larger than 40%, RR classify the corresponding
country as ”freely falling” or ”hyperfloat”. Their approach allows them to
identify de facto pegs/crawling pegs, de facto narrow bands, free floats and,
as a residual regime, managed floats.
5Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger (2007), p.4
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Ball and Reyes (2008) criticized CR’s approach on the ground that it
does not identify Inflation Targeting (IT) as a separate regime. In fact, they
argue that CR’s methodology can be misleading with IT regimes since CPI
Inflation Targeting can have the side effect of reducing exchange rate volatil-
ity, and therefore honest inflation targeters might incorrectly be classified
as fear of floaters. With respect to pegs, IT regimes should exhibit higher
correlation between inflation and the real interest rate and lower correla-
tion between the real interest rate and the exchange rate: for this reason,
to detect fear of floating, they use simple OLS to test whether the move to
higher flexibility in current IT regimes did bring about such change in corre-
lations. However, from the point of view of the correlation between the real
interest rate and the exchange rate, their approach does not provide clear
results, since out of 17 Inflation Targeters only Brazil and Chile appeared
to have had a lower correlation after adopting IT. For these reasons, we will
nevertheless employ CR’s methodology, but taking Ball and Reyes’ critique
seriously by classifying IT as a separate regime.
As discussed by CR, it is preferable to use priors in place of descriptive
statistics such as the mean absolute deviation, since the former avoid the
problem of outliers, which give excessive weight to observations correspond-
ing to large devaluations 6. Descriptive statistics are, however, used by Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005 and 2007): the classification criteria
they employed are in fact based on three variables: ”exchange rate volatil-
ity”, measured as the average of absolute monthly percentage change in the
nominal exchange rate relative to the relevant anchor currency; ”volatility
of exchange rate changes”, measured as the standard deviation of monthly
percentage changes in the exchange rate; ”volatility of reserves”, that is
the average of the absolute monthly change in dollar-denominated foreign
exchange reserves relative to the monetary base. The strand of literature
that we discussed so far is aimed at estimating the degree of exchange rate
flexibility when the relevant anchor currency for the country at hand is
known or can be easily identified. The limit of these approaches is therefore
that, on one hand, if a country is officially a floater or IT, the choice of the
bilateral exchange rate to take into account is, to some extent, arbitrary;
on the other hand, the results may be misleading if the regime is in fact
6Calvo, Reinhart (2002), p. 384.
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a (strict or flexible) basket peg. A different approach has been set up by
Frankel and Wei (1994) to estimate the weights in a currency basket: when
a country adopts a basket peg, it seldom announces which currencies are
included in the basket and their weights. If we regress the change in the
value of a currency (expressed as its SDR exchange rate 7) on the change in
the value of some international reserve currencies, we can derive the weights
in the basket. In case of a strict peg, OLS is especially appropriate since
the model is linear and yields an almost perfect fit. However, it is less on
firm grounds and potentially not correctly specified if the basket peg allows
for some flexibility (for example, it has a band or moving band). Therefore,
it could not be used to disentangle Fear of Floating episodes. In order to
merge the techniques to infer exchange rate flexibility and those to estimate
the weights in a currency basket Frankel and Wei (2008) (henceforth FW)
extended their original approach, including an ”exchange market pressure”
(emp) variable in the regression which accounts for reserves and exchange
rate variability. The coefficient on emp is zero in the case of a strict peg,
and increases up to one as exchange rate flexibility increases.
A caveat regarding the limit of regime classification literature is nec-
essary. These approaches are not structural analyses of the determinants
of exchange rate movements; rather, they detect empirical regularities that
allow one to distinguish between ”pure floaters” and different levels of ex-
change rate management or pegging, regardless of how the exchange regime
is officially classified. They are not aimed at estimating the policy weight
attached by the Central Bank to exchange rate stabilization: nevertheless,
they can tell us whether the country at hand has indeed changed its mone-
tary policy when it announced a regime switch, and whether such change was
consistent with the announcement, or, alternatively, whether its exchange
rate policy remained stable as it was announced.
1.3 Detecting the de facto exchange rate regime
In principle, a Central Bank can control exchange rate movements in
at least two ways: either through the policy interest rate, changing it in
step with the anchor country (an example in this sense is Denmark) or by
7See Frankel and Wei (2008) for a discussion on the choice of the SDR as definition of
value of a currency.
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direct intervention using foreign exchange reserves or credit lines. We will
outline two simple and stylized models to derive priors on the behavior of
reserves, interest rates and exchange rates across alternative regimes. The
first one relies on Taylor Rules (Taylor, 1992) as a means of estimating the
interest rate rule of a Central Bank; the second one is known as the monetary
approach (see Frenkel, 1976). Assume we have only two countries: a home
country and a foreign country (F) and that the evolution of the domestic
output gap, x, is described by the Aggregate Demand curve:
x = αx · xF − αr(r − r) + αq ·∆q + ϑ (1.1)
where the domestic output gap depends on net foreign demand for domestic
goods (which, in turn, would depend on the foreign business cycle), the gap
between the real interest rate and the target rate, and the change in the
real effective exchange rate q; ϑ is an excess demand shock as in Svensson
(2003).
CPI inflation, by definition, depends on domestic inflation and imported
inflation:
pic = ξ · (piF + δ ·∆q) + (1− ξ) · pi (1.2)
where ξ is the share of imported goods in the CPI, δ is the degree of exchange
rate pass-through and pi is domestic inflation. Domestic inflation, in turn,
depends on the output gap:
pi = φx · x+ ν (1.3)
where ν is a cost-push shock as in Svensson (2000, 2003). Both ν and ϑ are
zero-mean with variance respectively equal to σ2ν and σ
2
ϑ. The evolution of
CPI inflation can thus be described by an Aggregate Supply curve like:
pic = βx · x+ ξ · (piF + δ ·∆q) + η (1.4)
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where βx = φx · (1− ξ).
Monetary policy is described by a Forward-Looking Taylor Rule: 8
i = r + pi + γpiE[(pi
c − pi)|Ω] + γxE[x|Ω] + γq∆q (1.5)
i.e. the level of the policy rate set by the central bank depends on the target
real interest rate, the inflation target (the sum of the two can be interpreted
as the target nominal interest rate) and is higher when inflation is above
target and/or there is a positive output gap, or when the effective exchange
rate weakens (q increases). By simply projecting the AS and AD curves,
which form the Central Bank’s information set, in (1.5), the following result
is obtained:
i =r + pi + γpi[(1− ξ) · pi + ξ(piF + δ∆q)− pi] + γx[αxxF−
− αr(r − r) + αq∆q] + γq∆q
(1.6)
Given this very general rule, we can see that a central bank can use the
policy interest rate to react to exchange rate changes directly, via the last
term in (1.6), and indirectly, since the exchange rate affects CPI inflation
via imported inflation and the output gap via resource utilization. In order
to maintain price determinacy it must also be that γpi > 1 (see Woodford,
2003). Notice that Inflation Targeting should focus on the real exchange
rate, while managed floats, pegs and limited flexibility regimes focus on a
target level of nominal (bilateral) exchange rate. From this point of view,
we can see why a policy in an IT country aimed directly at stabilizing the
nominal exchange rate would be evidence of fear of floating.
In particular, we can use (1.6) to write the policy rules of central banks
following different monetary and exchange rate policy strategies. For a coun-
try that is in a Fixed, Managed Float or Limited Flexibility regime, the rule
becomes:
i = i+ γs∆s
9 (1.7)
s is the nominal exchange rate vis a` vis the reference currency and γs > 0.
8This rule is as general as possible, within this simple model, since we haven’t said
anything specific on the monetary policy rule. Below we will insert the appropriate re-
strictions.
9By UIP reasoning, the target level of the nominal interest rate is equal to the reference
country’s target plus a risk premium.
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The policy rate is thus equal to the target nominal interest rate (which,
with free capital mobility, is equal to the foreign interest rate), and tends
to be higher when the currency weakens and lower otherwise. This policy is
clearly described, for example, in the Danmarks Nationalbank’s Introduction
to Monetary and Fixed Exchange Rate Policy. Denmark has a fixed exchange
rate vis a` vis the euro area, and the DNB states that
[· · · ] when the foreign-exchange market is calm, the fixed-exchange-
rate policy means that Danmarks Nationalbank adjusts its interest
rates in step with the ECB’s adjustments. In a situation with upward
or downward pressure on the krone or a sustained inflow or outflow
of foreign currency, Danmarks Nationalbank unilaterally changes its
interest rates in order to stabilise the krone.
The monetary policy regime that is most common in non-euro Europe is
Inflation Targeting. All IT Central Banks follow flexible forms of Inflation
Targeting, where some weight in the objective function is attached to output
stabilization as well. Ball and Reyes (2008) ignore flexible inflation targeting,
stating that they treat IT in their study
[· · · ] to mean strict and honest IT. [· · · ] Interest rate interven-
tions for exchange rate reasons associated with output concerns but
not inflation target concerns would be empirical evidence of Fear of
Floating.10
This is, in my opinion, an overly restrictive hypothesis, since it has been
acknowledged (Svensson (2000), Gali and Monacelli (2005)) that strict CPI
Inflation Targeting results in higher output variability, which can be hardly
socially acceptable, with respect to flexible IT, and IT Central Banks gener-
ally have output stabilization among their declared objectives (for example,
in Sweden, U.K. and Australia, to name but a few).
Equation (1.6) for a country that engages in honest flexible CPI inflation
targeting has γq > 0, and therefore becomes:
i =r + pi + γpi
[




F − αr(r − r) + αq∆q
] (1.8)
From the above rule, we can see that indeed a honest inflation targeter will
react to exchange rate changes, because the exchange rate is a predictor of
10Ball, Reyes (2008), p. 313.
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inflation; in particular, the change in the interest rate following a deprecia-
tion in the (trade-weighted) currency is:
∂iIT
∂q
= γpiξδ + γxαq > 0 (1.9)
The responsiveness of the policy interest rate to (nominal effective) exchange
rate movements depends on the weight on inflation in the policy rule, γpi ,
the level of openness as described by ξ, the degree of exchange rate pass-
through to inflation, δ, and the impact of the exchange rate changes on
output. In this framework, I define an IT country of the ”Fear of Floating”
(FF) type, using Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) terminology, as one that is
pursuing exchange rate objectives separate from its official policy targets,
as in Ball and Reyes (2008), with ∆q > 0 and therefore
∂iFF
∂q




Interest rates variability is therefore higher than in honest IT; it must be
noted, however, that one more element characterizes FF episodes: if the
(implicit) target value of the currency is defined in nominal terms of one
reference currency rather than a basket or a trade-weighted index, then the
nominal exchange rate should enter the policy function, and the central
banks would react to changes in that exchange rate, which makes the pol-
icy more similar to that of an exchange rate targeter. For a strict floater,
monetary policy can be described here by a standard forward-looking Taylor
Rule with weight placed on domestic inflation, rather than CPI inflation, as
in the original Taylor Rule, and therefore (1.6) becomes:
i = r + pi + γpi [pi − pi] + γx
[
αxx
F − αr(r − r) + αq∆q
]
(1.11)
and thus, even in the case of the most committed floaters, the interest rate








In sum, policy interest rate variability is highest in pegs, managed floats
and fear of floating episodes, lower for IT and floating regimes. Moreover,
the correlation between the real interest rate and the nominal exchange rate
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is higher the lower the de facto degree of flexibility (see Ball and Reyes,
2008). While, from a descriptive point of view, this simple framework could
allow us to classify exchange rate regimes based on interest rate volatility
and the correlation of the policy interest rate with inflation and the nomi-
nal exchange rate, it would be hard to do it in practice. In fact, as it was
pointed out by Svensson (1996), Taylor Rule coefficients cannot be inter-
preted structurally, because they are convolutions of structural parameters,
i.e. parameters that depend on the structure of the economy, and the pa-
rameters describing the preferences of the Central Bank. For this reason,
using the above analysis we cannot infer the weight actually attached by
the Central Bank on the exchange rate unless we first identify the struc-
tural parameters. In Chapter 2 I propose an approach for the estimation
of Central Bank preferences in a Small Open Economy, starting from the
optimization problem of the Central Bank, that takes into account the case
of fear of floating as a separate regime.
Thus, we will go back to interest rate rules there. In this Chapter, in-
stead, we will focus on the other source of exchange rate stabilization we out-
lined at the beginning of this section: foreign exchange intervention through
international reserves. Central Banks use foreign exchange reserves, as well
as other hidden channels like credit lines to maintain the desired value of
the currency with respect to one or more reference currencies. In theory,
foreign exchange reserves should never change in case of committed floaters,
and variability should be higher the less flexible the exchange rate and in
particular in situations of financial turbulence (for example, speculative at-
tacks). In reality, this is not the case: reserves change even for the most
committed floaters, and also for reasons other than exchange rate stabiliza-
tion . Indeed, Taylor (2001) and Edwards (2006) claim that if the Central
Bank took exchange rate movements into account in setting the policy in-
terest rate, this would result in excessive interest variability, which is not
observed in practice. If a Central Bank is actually pursuing an IT strategy
but also has a separate exchange rate smoothing objective, therefore, it is
likely to use instruments different from the policy interest rate to that end.
To discuss this point, I sketch a monetary model of exchange rate determi-
nation (Frenkel, 1976). In the monetary approach the value of a currency
depends, as for any asset, on supply and demand of the currency itself. The
level of interest rates will influence demand through international financial
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inflows/outflows. Central Banks can, however, use foreign exchange reserves
to affect supply and demand of the domestic currency. Suppose again you
only have two countries, a home and a foreign (F) country. Total demand
for real-money holdings in each country is determined by the private sector
demand. Private sector demand is determined by: (i) transaction purposes,
where, for simplicity, only home country goods are demanded; (ii) invest-
ment / speculative purposes, depending on the level of domestic interest






And the same holds for the foreign country. Purchasing power parity is
assumed to hold:
PF = S · P
Taking logs, we can define the exchange rate as clearing the differences in
relative demand and supply of domestic and foreign currency (lower case
letter indicate the log of the corresponding variable):
s = a(xF − x) + b(iF − i) + (mF −m) (1.13)
Equation (1.13) states the well-known result of the monetary approach, that
the level of the exchange rate tends to fall (the currency appreciates) when
domestic interest rates are higher than foreign rates, when there is an ex-
pansion in domestic monetary base relative to foreign monetary base, and
it also depends on relative output.
If a Central Bank is targeting the exchange rate, when it sees an undesired
change in the exchange rate (for example, an increase), it can either change
the interest rate to a level higher than the target country, or reduce the
monetary base by increasing its foreign exchange reserves, or a mix of the
two. By using monetary instruments, the Central Bank can manage, at
least in the short run, to keep the exchange rate stable while maintaining
an independent interest rate policy.
The models outlined in this section, albeit very stylized, allow us to list
some theoretical priors on the volatility of several variables (exchange rates,
reserves and interest rates; the definition of volatility we use will be clarified
in Section 5) in alternative exchange rate regimes. In the empirical part of
this chapter, we will classify regimes combining information coming from
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) on de facto exchange rate regimes with official
regimes as declared by the central banks, and include Inflation Targeting as a
separate regime, in order to avoid, as possible, mixing different regimes. Ta-
ble 1.1 summarizes these priors, where ”high”, ”low” and ”intermediate” are
in relative terms. In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on exchange
rates and reserves. We can identify six regimes: Peg, Limited Flexibility,
Managed Floating, Inflation Targeting, Floating and Freely Falling. Limited
flexibility includes all regimes within the ERM I and II; Managed Floating
collects all flexible forms of exchange rate smoothing (crawling pegs/bands,
narrow bands, basket peg and so on). Freely Falling is included because it
identifies periods of extreme instability of the exchange rate, and this allows







Peg Nil/Low High High
Man. Float
Low High HighLtd. Flex.
Fear of Floating
Freely Falling High High High
Infl. Targeting Interm. Low Low
Float High Low Low
Table 1.1: Classification of exchange rate regimes according to theoretical priors.
The strand of literature that has been discussed so far is aimed at esti-
mating the degree of exchange rate flexibility when we know the relevant -
or possible - anchor currency for the country that is being studied. As we
stated in Section 2, the limit of these approaches is that, on one hand, if a
country is officially a floater or IT, the choice of the bilateral exchange rate
to take into account is, to some extent, arbitrary; on the other hand, the
results may be misleading if the real regime is in fact a (strict or flexible)
basket peg. For this reason, in Section 6 we will employ Frankel and Wei’s




This work applies the regime classification schemes of Calvo and Rein-
hart (2002) and Frankel and Wei (2008) in order to observe the evolution
of European monetary integration and to show the extent to which such
alternative classification schemes provide consistent results. The dataset is
monthly and composed of 19 countries and 47 exchange rate regimes over
1980:01 - 2009:12. It includes 14 European countries and 5 non-European
benchmark floaters. The former group is quite heterogeneous as far as offi-
cial monetary policy and attitude towards the EMU and EU are concerned:
three countries are not EU members (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland), two
are EU members that recently adopted the euro (Slovakia and Estonia),
two are ERM members (Latvia and Denmark, and the latter has opted
out of EMU), two have a currency board (Bulgaria and Lithuania) and the
remaining six are EU members within an IT regime (Sweden, United King-
dom, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania); out of these, the UK
has opted out of EMU. The set of ”benchmark floaters” is made up of New
Zealand, Australia, United States, Canada and Japan. Australia, Canada
and New Zealand are Inflation Targeters. The empirical analysis spans the
1980-2009 period, dividing it in three sub-periods: the ERM era (from 1980
to October 1992), the post-ERM era (November 1992 to 1998), and the Euro
era (1999 to 2009). The rationale for dividing the overall sample period in
three sub-periods is twofold: first, to separately apply regime classification
methods to the euro era; second, because international exchange rate and
reserves volatility, aside from regime shifts, might have changed across the
30 years included in the sample, especially in Europe, and this way we are
left with more homogenous periods. Data come from the IMF’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and National Central Banks. Actual reference
sub-periods, however, vary from country to country, depending on shifts in
official exchange rate regimes and data availability. In particular, as far
as Central and Eastern European (CEEC) countries are concerned, due to
data availability the analysis is performed only from 1993 on, and the exact
starting year is different from country to country. The bilateral exchange
rate taken into consideration in both approaches is against the euro (Ger-
man Mark) for the European countries and the USA since (until) 1999, and
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the US dollar for non-European countries, as in CR 11. During the ERM
era, the parities were defined with respect to the European Currency Unit
(ECU); however, it was the Bundesbank which had the leading role in the
system, and the Mark was the main reserve currency in the region and also
had the largest weight in the ECU basket 12.
1.5 Fear of Floating: the Calvo−Reinhart Approach
Given these stylized models, we can introduce CR’s theoretical priors that
should hold over alternative exchange rate regimes. If we take a threshold ω
for the monthly percentage change in a particular variable, then the following
priors should hold:
• lower exchange rate variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs
with respect to free floats and inflation targeting:
P (∆s < ω|Peg, FF ) > P (∆s < ω|Float, IT ) (1.14)
• higher reserve variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs with
respect to free floats and inflation targeting:
P (∆F < ω|Peg, FF ) < P (∆F < ω|Float, IT ) (1.15)
What (1.14) says is that the probability that the monthly percentage
change (in absolute value) in the exchange rate is lower than some threshold
ω (for example, 2.5% in CR) for pegs / managed floats / fear of floating is
lower than the probability that the change in the exchange rate lies within
such bands in a floating regime or IT. In other words, exchange rate variabil-
ity is higher in floating regimes than in de facto pegs and managed floats.
Inequality (1.15) states that the probability that the monthly percentage
change (in absolute value) in foreign exchange reserves is lower than some
threshold (in CR’s paper 2.5%) in case of a peg or fear of floating episode
is higher than the probability that the change in foreign exchange reserves
lies within such narrow bands in the case of a floating regime. The reason
is that if a country is trying to manage the exchange rate in order to reduce
11Actually, CR use only the bilateral exchange rate against the DM for European coun-
tries because their dataset is entirely pre-euro, while BR use first the DM and then the
euro.
12As a robustness check, the empirical analysis in both approaches was also done using
the ECU in place of the DEM and the FFR, and results were consistent.
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its volatility using foreign reserves, then we should observe a high volatility
in the latter. Freely falling regimes are an outlier in this sense, since they
should present at the same time high exchange rate volatility and high re-
serves volatility. Both CR and BR also use a prior similar to (1.14) and
(1.15) for the interest rate, using a 4% (400 basis points) threshold. Such
prior, in the present analysis, would not be informative since interest rate
variability is much lower than that in the CR sample 13. As discussed in
Section 3, in an exchange rate arrangement different from a free float, the
volatility of the exchange rate should be low. As pointed out by prior (1.14),
the probability that the monthly percentage change in the exchange rate is
lower, in absolute terms, than some threshold ω should be higher when there
is some form of exchange rate smoothing with respect to a pure float. We
estimate this probability as the mean probability over 2-year rolling win-
dows. In this Section we observe the empirical distribution of the monthly
percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate, ∆s, using two thresholds:
1%, as in CR and Ball and Reyes (2008) and 2.25%, as when ERM was in
place. The 1% threshold is also used by Reinhart and Rogoff to identify de
facto pegs or crawling pegs.
Figure 1.1 pictures the exchange rate and reserves volatility as defined
here for the six regimes in our sample. From a visual inspection, on average,
our priors are confirmed, and we notice that Managed Floats, with respect to
Limited Flexibility, are characterized by higher exchange rate and reserves
volatility, and are thus, in a sense, more costly, as if maintaining the parity
required, on average, larger reserve intervention.
Tables 1.2-1.4 present the results of the Calvo-Reinhart approach on
exchange rate volatility over the three subperiods introduced in section 4;
tables 1.5-1.7 concentrate on foreign exchange reserves volatility.In each ta-
ble, the countries are grouped according to their exchange rate regime, using
the criteria outlined in Section 3. This classification allows us to test the
validity of priors (1.14) and (1.15) on two dimensions: first, to see whether,
on an aggregate level, theoretical priors on the behaviour of exchange rates
and reserves over different regimes hold. Second, we will test whether they
hold for each country, in order to detect fear of floating episodes.
13The only occasion when the change in the interest rate was higher than 4% within a
month was in September - October 1992, during the speculative attacks that led to the
collapse of the ERM.
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Figure 1.1: Summary results of the Calvo-Reinhart Approach.
Table 1.2 shows the relevant figures in the sample during the ERM era;
for each country/regime, the sample period is also indicated. The results
in Table 1.2 confirm prior (1.14); countries with a floating regime system-
atically exhibit higher bilateral exchange rate volatility, except for Canada,
with respect to countries that adopted a managed float. Later in this sec-
tion, tests on the difference of the means are performed in order to test
whether such difference is statistically significant. Table 1.3 summarizes the
results for the 1992:11-1998:12 period. After the crisis in the fall of 1992,
Sweden, Norway and the UK abandoned the limited flexibility arrangement.
While Sweden and the UK never went back to limited flexibility, and rather
moved to Inflation Targeting, Norway left its currency free to float only un-
til the end of 1994, when a managed float vis a` vis a basket of currencies
was adopted. Again, the prediction of prior (1.14) is fulfilled, although a
test on the means will be needed to state the significance of the differences.
Countries that were listed as in a pure float or Inflation Targeting exhibit a
higher volatility of the nominal exchange rate.
The story shown in Table 1.4, that is after the introduction of the euro
is, at first, quite puzzling. The figures for Pegs, Managed Floating and Lim-
ited Flexibility arrangement are quite similar to each other, as expected. As
far as inflation targeters are concerned, we notice that during the ten years
after the introduction of the euro, bilateral exchange rates vis a` vis the euro
have exhibited remarkable stability. European Inflation Targeters, except
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Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change falls
within ±1%band within ±2.25% band
Floaters
Australia 01.1984-10.1992 32.4% 67.3%
Japan 01.1980-10.1992 30.5% 59.3%
New Zealand 03.1985-12.1989 35.9% 70.7%
United States 01.1980-10.1992 18.4% 53.5%
Canada 01.1980-12.1990 79.6% 98.9%
Ltd. Flex.
Norway 01.1980-10.1992 56.5% 90.1%
Denmark 10.1980-09.1992 93.4% 98.6%
Switzerland 01.1980-10.1992 64.3% 94.2%
Sweden 06.1985-10.1992 74.2% 99.4%
United Kingdom 10.1990-09.1992 58.3% 95.8%
United Kingdom 01.1980-09.1990 42.1% 71.0%
Table 1.2: Exchange Rate Volatility during the ERM years.
Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change falls
within ±1%band within ±2.25% band
Floaters
Japan 01.1984-10.1992 32.4% 67.3%
United States 01.1980-10.1992 30.5% 59.3%
Inf.Targ.
New Zealand 11.1992-12.1998 53.7% 85.4%
Australia 01.1993-12.1998 39.5% 78.9%
Canada 11.1992-12.1998 66.5% 98.8%
Sweden 01.1993-12.1998 40.5% 78.4%
United Kingdom 11.1992-12.1998 43.2% 83.8%
Ltd.Flex.
Denmark 10.1990-09.1992 90.5% 98.6%
Switzerland 11.1992-12.1998 64.9% 98.6%
Man.Float
Norway 01.1993-12.1998 77.4% 97.3%
Bulgaria 01.1997-12.1998 93.4% 98.6%
Czech Rep. 01.1993-12.1998 64.3% 94.2%
Hungary 01.1993-12.1998 45.8% 78.7%
Poland 05.1993-12.1998 34.3% 75.6%
Slovak Rep. 01.1993-12.1998 53.8% 88.5%
Peg
Estonia 01.1993-12.1998 100% 100%
Latvia 01.1993-12.1998 99.9% 100%
Lithuania 01.1995-12.1998 99.8% 99.8%
Free Fall
Bulgaria 01.1994-12.1996 30.5% 44.8%
Lithuania 01.1993-12.1994 0% 0%
Table 1.3: Exchange Rate Volatility after the collapse of ERM.
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Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change falls
within ±1%band within ±2.25% band
Floaters
Japan 01.1999-12.2009 35.0% 66.2%
United States 01.1999-12.2009 29.6% 66.6%
Infl.Targ.
Australia 01.1999-12.2009 27.5% 61.8%
New Zealand 01.1999-12.2009 27.2% 61.4%
Canada 01.1999-12.2009 79.6% 82.1%
Sweden 01.1999-12.2009 68.0% 97.3%
United Kingdom 01.1999-12.2009 56.6% 88.2%
Norway 03.2001-12.2009 51.5% 84.2%
Switzerland 01.1999-12.2009 80.5% 98.4%
Czech Rep. 01.1999-12.2009 59.0% 94.8%
Poland 01.1999-12.2009 35.8% 66.4%
Hungary 08.2001-12.2009 54.0% 87.0%
Romania 01.2005-12.2009 44.5% 74.9%
Iceland 01.2001-12.2009 38.6% 69.4%
Man.Float
Romania 04.2001-12.2004 25.2% 65.2%
Slovak Rep. 01.1999-10.2005 66.5% 91.0%
Hungary 01.1999-07.2001 87.0% 96.9%
Norway 01.1999-02.2001 71.9% 99.0%
Ltd.Flex.
Denmark 01.2009-12.2009 100% 100%
Slovak Rep. 11.2005-12.2008 39.6% 83.3%
Latvia 01.2005-12.2009 96.4% 100%
Peg
Bulgaria 01.1999-12.2009 91.3% 92.3%
Estonia 01.1999-12.2009 100% 100%
Lithuania/1 01.1999-01.2002 100% 100%
Lithuania/2 02.2002-12.2009 100% 100%
Latvia/1 01.1999-12.2004 95.1% 100%
Free Fall Romania 01.1999-03.2001 32.3% 66.5%
Table 1.4: Exchange Rate Volatility after the introduction of the euro.
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for Poland and Romania, present figures that are closer to those of peggers
than to other IT countries. This is true in particular for Sweden, Switzer-
land and the Czech Republic. The case of Norway is interesting: after the
basket peg was abandoned in march 2001, the euro exchange rate of the
kroner became more volatile, but still remained within the range of what
Reinhart and Rogoff would classify as a ”de facto narrow band”. However,
this is not enough to state that the countries under consideration are in a
de facto Fear of Floating regime, and further analyses are necessary.
We now move to the analysis of foreign exchange reserves volatility, that
is prior (1.15) above. Interpreting the path of foreign exchange interven-
tions is, however, less easy. In theory, in a pure float the change in foreign
exchange reserves should be zero. However, this is not the case in reality.
First of all, foreign exchange reserves vary due to valuation changes and
interest earnings. Second, they are not only used for exchange rate stabi-
lization purposes, as pointed out also by CR. This is true, in particular, for
New Zealand, which in our case is especially interesting since it moved from
managed float to a free float in 1985, and to Inflation Targeting in 1990.
In the case of New Zealand, reserves fluctuate due to the Treasury’s man-
agement of its overseas currency debt rather than foreign exchange market
intervention 14. Third, in order to manage the exchange rate, countries also
engage in hidden foreign exchange transactions: credit lines were widely
used by ERM countries during speculative attacks. Finally, countries may
rely a lot on interest rate interventions as well, as it was the case during the
ERM crisis in 1992 or in the managed float of Norway which started in 1995.
Nevertheless, the path of foreign exchange reserves can be a good indicator
of the actual exchange rate policy that is being pursued and is taken into
consideration in most of the exchange rate regime classification literature.
Moreover, we corrected reserves to take valuation changes and interest earn-
ings into account following the assumptions made in Frankel and Wei (2008).
Tables 1.5-1.7 show the results of prior (1.15) in our dataset, divided
by country and over the three sub-periods introduced above. In this case,
the prior is not systematically fulfilled: during the first period (see Table
1.5) there is no clear difference between reserves volatility in floating coun-
14See Calvo, Reinhart (2002) p. 388.
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Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change




New Zealand 03.1985-12.1989 19.8%
Canada 01.1980-10.1992 16.4%
United States 01.1980-12.1990 33.3%
Ltd.Flex.
Sweden 06.1985-10.1992 35.1%




Man.Float United Kingdom 01.1980-09.1992 48.7%
Table 1.5: Reserves Volatility during the ERM years.
Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change
falls within ±2.5% band
Floaters
Japan 11.1992-12.1998 79.7%
United States 11.1992-12.1998 66.5%
Inf.Targ.












Czech Rep. 01.1993-12.1998 29.4%
Poland 05.1993-12.1998 46.9%








Table 1.6: Reserves Volatility after the collapse of ERM.
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Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change
falls within ±2.5% band
Floaters
Japan 01.1999-12.2009 87.1%
United States 01.1999-12.2009 74.9%
Inf.Targ.





























Table 1.7: Reserves Volatility after the introduction of the euro.
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tries and in ERM countries: with the exception of Japan and the United
Kingdom (the latter in its short-lasting ERM experience), the probability
of the monthly percentage change exceeding 2.5% was always below 50%.
In the second and third period, however, reserves volatility is systemati-
cally lower in the benchmark floater countries, Japan and the US, as well
as Canada, but still higher for New Zealand and Australia. Besides, for
countries that went through a regime switch and moved toward higher flex-
ibility, reserve volatility has indeed fallen, although it remained at a level
higher than benchmark floaters, but further statistical analysis would be
needed. On average, however, prior (1.15) holds: official floaters have the
most stable foreign reserves (i.e. the highest probabilities), IT countries
have a quite higher reserves volatility, and is highest for limited flexibility,
managed floats, pegs and, in particular, freely falling. So far, we have found
several empirical regularities that can be summarized as follows: (i) during
the ERM era, volatility of exchange rates in Europe was lower than that ex-
hibited by countries listed as ”benchmark floaters”, as we expected a priori;
(ii) After the collapse of the ERM, while Denmark remained in a limited
flexibility arrangement, joining ERM II, the other western European coun-
tries moved, with different timing, to Inflation Targeting, while the CEEC
went through a period of exchange rate instability, which appears in our ap-
proach as massive foreign exchange reserves intervention that was, however,
not successful in keeping the exchange rate stable, as it is shown in Tables
1.3 and 1.6; (iii) Between 1999 and 2009, 9 European countries were in a
regime of Inflation Targeting, but, at the same time, we observe, in tables
1.4 and 1.7, a remarkable stabilization of euro exchange rates and a relative
increase in reserves volatility with respect to benchmark floaters. The U.K.
and, in particular, Czech Republic, Sweden and Switzerland present values
of exchange rate volatility that are closer to those of a de facto pegger as
Denmark than to other IT countries. Similar conclusions can be drawn by
looking at the variability of foreign exchange reserves, when the benchmark
country is either Japan or the United States.
However, we notice that, in most of the cases, adoption of inflation tar-
geting (from either LF or MF) was associated with a fall in both exchange
rate and reserves volatility. In order to check the validity of priors (1.14) and
(1.15) we then performed hypothesis testing. First of all, as far as exchange
26 Chapter 1
Benchmark: Official Regime - 1980-1998 Official Regime - 1999-2009
FR MF Peg LF IT FR MF Peg LF IT
USA 0% 66.7% 100% 100% 50% 0% 80% 100% 66.7% 66.7%
Japan 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 80% 100% 100% 66.7%
Canada 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 60% 66.7% 44.4%
Australia 0% 83.3% 100% 83.3% 0% 0% 80% 100% 100% 66.7%
New Zealand 0% 50% 100% 83.3% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 66.7%
No. of cases 2 6 3 6 2 1 5 5 3 9
Table 1.8: T-tests. Proportion of cases where P ( ≤ |2.25%|) is significantly higher than
the benchmark
Benchmark: Official Regime - 1980-1998 Official Regime - 1999-2009
FR MF Peg LF IT FR MF Peg LF IT
USA 100% 100% 100% 66.7% 50% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100%
Japan 100% 100% 100% 83.3% 50% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Canada 50% 33.3% 0% 16.7% 0% 100% 80% 100% 100% 88.9%
Australia 100% 66.7% 33.3% 50% 50% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
No. of cases 2 6 3 6 2 1 5 5 3 9
Table 1.9: F-tests. Proportion of cases where P ( ≤ |2.5%|) is significantly lower than
the benchmark
rates variability is concerned, t-tests on the equality of means of the prior
(1.14) are presented in Table 1.8. Second, in Table 1.9 the results of F tests
on the equality of variance in foreign exchange reserves are shown15. We
ran F-tests instead of t-tests on prior (1.15) because in the case of reserves,
unlike exchange rates, the variance is a good measure of variability since it
is less affected by periodic devaluations 16. We start from the tests on the
mean value of the probability that the exchange rate change is lower than
2.25% in absolute value. As I stated above, our prior expectation is that this
probability is highest for limited flexibility regimes and managed floating,
lowest for free floaters, with inflation targeters in the middle.
The null hypothesis is that the mean probability (1.14) of country i is
equal to the mean probability of benchmark floater j, while the alternative
is Pi < Pj . Table 1.8 summarizes the results of this test, divided by regime
and before/after the adoption of the euro. We do this because it allows us
to see also whether European IT regimes are similar, from the point of view
of exchange rate volatility, to non-European floating and IT regimes, and
15New Zealand does not appear among the benchmark countries because, as stated
above, its reserves fluctuate because of the Treasury’s management of its overseas currency
debt, and thus test results would be misleading.
16See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), p. 400.
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whether the euro era was peculiar from the point of view of exchange rate
and reserves volatility.
As we expected, MF and LF regimes are significantly (at a 5%level) dif-
ferent from free floats (USA and Japan), as far as exchange rate volatility is
concerned. Moreover, they are significantly different from the benchmark IT
regimes, Australia and New Zealand, although in a lower number of cases.
This proves that IT regimes are characterized by a lower exchange rate vari-
ability than free floats, and listing them as floaters might be misleading, as
Ball and Reyes (2008) point out. In particular, before 1999, Canada had an
extremely stable exchange rate vis a` vis the U.S. Dollar; since the volatility
of reserves was quite high, this might be evidence of fear of floating, while it
was much less active since 1999, as the figures in Table 7 confirm. Therefore,
at least for the first two sub-periods, it is not a good benchmark.
Since 1999, Inflation Targeters in Europe all presented significantly lower
exchange rate variability than benchmark floaters, and in almost half of the
tests (16 out of 33) exchange rate variability is significantly lower than that
of the benchmark IT countries. The only European IT that showed ex-
change rate variability during the last 10 years comparable with that of the
benchmark are Poland, Romania and Iceland; Sweden, the U.K., Norway
and Switzerland had more stable exchange rates than all IT countries.
In sum, European currencies, regardless of the monetary policy regime,
exhibited lower exchange rate volatility than non-European currencies; the
Euro era, which was characterized by a move towards greater de jure flex-
ibility 17 actually shows a stabilization of exchange rates. However, the
increased stability of exchange rates might be the result of more synchro-
nized business cycles, rather than active exchange rate policy. In order to
get some insight on this point, I conducted F tests of the null hypothesis
of the equality of variances of the monthly percentage change in foreign ex-
change reserves. The tests were run for each single country and (official)
exchange rate arrangement with the above specified subperiods. There-
fore, in each test, the null hypothesis is that the variance of reserves for a
non-benchmark floater (European countries), σ2EU , is equal to that of the
benchmark, σ2B, while the alternative hypothesis is that the European coun-
17Seven Countries abandoned regimes of managed floating to adopt Inflation Targeting,
while none which was previously float / IT moved to managed float or entered the EMU.
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try is not a committed floater/inflation targeter, and therefore σ2EU > σ
2
B.
When the benchmark is the US or Japan, which are free floaters, if the
regime of the European country is either the null hypothesis is either peg,
limited flexibility, managed float or freely falling, the null is rejected at 5%
in 58 out of 62 cases, and this is in agreement with our theoretical prior.
When the benchmark is Canada or Australia, these figures are much lower;
in particular, Australia appears to have engaged in large foreign exchange
interventions since 1999, a result that will be confirmed in section 6. More
interestingly, if we consider IT regimes, after 1999 the null is always rejected
if the benchmark is Japan or the U.S., while it is rejected in 8 cases out of
9 when it is Canada. Therefore, regardless of the official monetary policy
strategy, European countries intervene on foreign exchange markets more
than committed floaters. Overall, we can state that IT regimes, in partic-
ular in Europe, exhibit remarkable exchange rate stability and seem to be
very active on the foreign exchange market, contrary to what we would ex-
pect a priori. The motivation behind such interventions are not clear, and
it may be evidence of fear of floating, in particular for Norway, Switzer-
land, Hungary, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, the U.K. In order to have
a ”flexibility index” showing which countries were floating the most, and
the relative importance of international reserve currencies, we perform an
alternative approach in the next section.
1.6 Estimating currency weights: the Frankel-Wei
Approach
As we discussed in Sections 2 and 3, the Calvo-Reinhart approach can be
misleading when the relevant de facto anchor currency is not clear or known
or the country has a (de jure or de facto) basket peg. For this reason, we
now move to merging the Fear of Floating approach with the Frankel and
Wei (1994, 2008) approach for estimating weights in currency baskets. The
idea of this methodology is the following: when a country adopts a basket
peg, it seldom announces which currencies are included in the basket and
their weights; thus, if we regress the change in the value of a currency on
the change in the value of some international reserve currencies, we can
derive the implicit weights that country has attached to alternative reserve
currencies in its basket. In case of a strict peg, OLS regression is especially
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appropriate since the model is linear and yields an almost perfect fit. In this
case, the regression equation would be:
∆st = c+
∑N
i=1 ωi∆Xi,t + ut
Where s is the (log) value of the currency of interest and X is the value
of the N currencies that form the (potential) basket (Euro, US Dollar,. . .).
However, this approach is less reliable if the basket peg allows for some
flexibility. In order to merge the techniques to infer exchange rate flexibility
and those to estimate the weights in a currency basket, Frankel (2008) and
Frankel and Wei (2008) (henceforth FW) extended their original approach.
They run the following regression to estimate both the weights in a currency




ωi∆Xi,t + κ(∆empt) + ut (1.16)
where emp is the change in the ”exchange market pressure index”, and it is
defined as:
∆empt = ∆st + ∆Ft (1.17)
and F is the (log) value of Foreign Exchange Reserves, appropriately cor-
rected in order to take valuation changes and interest rate earnings into
account 18. The expression for emp is given in (1.17); as noted by FW,
however, the percentage change in reserves might not be a good indicator
of central bank intervention when a country holds a relatively low level of
reserves, since a change that is small in absolute terms may show up like a
large intervention in percentage terms : therefore, when needed, I will also
estimate equation (1.18) with emp defined as:




The ωi coefficients capture the de facto weights on the constituent currencies
(after we restrict their sum to 1), and the market pressure index is defined
so that we should have κ = 0 when there is a strict peg (since ∆st =
0, ∆empt = ∆Ft), κ = 1 in the case of a pure float (since ∆Ft = 0,
∆empt = ∆st). However, as acknowledged by FW, this correspondence
18The full statistics of the regressions, as well as the codes are readily available on
request.
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would be perfect if countries used foreign exchange reserves only to intervene
on the exchange market, and therefore the stock of reserves did not change
otherwise. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and therefore countries will
all lie in the [0,1] interval with the more committed floaters showing a higher
coefficient. Countries with a higher degree of flexibility will also show lower
R2.19 The vector X of foreign currencies includes the U.S. Dollar (USD), the
Japanese Yen (JPY), the U.K. Pound (UKP), the German Mark (DEM)and
the French Franc (FFR) until 1998:12, then the euro replaces the DEM and
the FFR. From the list of countries for which the regression is performed, we
omit here the U.S. and Japan, because the USD and he JPY have such an
important role in world markets that one cannot reasonably take the value
of other major currencies as exogenous.




i=1 ωi (∆Xi −∆UKPt) + κ(∆empt) + ut 21
and the weight of the UK Pound can be recovered subtracting the sum of the
weights on other countries from 1. In order to reduce as much as possible
the problem of parameter instability, since the weight attached to alternative
reference currencies can change quite frequently, but still maintain a suffi-
cient amount of degrees of freedom, each subperiod was further divided into
samples of 3-5 years, and in case of official regime shifts within the period
the exact dates were taken into account. In Table 1.1122, which is reported
in Appendix 2, I report the results by country, using both definitions of emp
when data on the monetary base were available.
Broadly speaking, the results of this approach are the following: first,
since its introduction, the Euro seems to have gained a role as a refer-
ence currency which outweighs that of its main constituent currencies before
1999, and it has replaced the U.S. Dollar as a reference currency in Europe.
Second, official fixed exchange rate regimes, in particular since 1999, have
19There may be a problem of endogeneity of ∆emp, as highlighted by Frankel and Wei
(2008)20. In the case of so-called commodity currencies, i.e. the currency of countries
that are specialized in the production of one or more commodities, so that international
demand of their currency is highly related to the demand of that commodity, we can
instrument emp using the relevant commodity price. Using this argument, I performed
an IV regression for Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Norway and it yielded similar
results as the OLS reported here.
21In the case of the U.K., I used the Swiss Franc to constrain the sum to 1.
22*** denotes significance at 1%;** at 5%;* at 10%.
Chapter 1 31
remained stable and consistent with official announcements. Third, overall,
the move to Inflation Targeting in non-euro Europe seems to have brought
about higher exchange rate flexibility (i.e. a higher κ coefficient), but up
to a level which, in particular in Sweden, Switzerland and Hungary, is not
comparable to that of the benchmark inflation targeters. In other words,
there seems to have been some activity in exchange rate management vis a`
vis the euro.
The benchmark countries Australia, Canada, and New Zealand hold a
low amount of reserves relative to the monetary base, and therefore using
(1.17) for emp might be misleading; in general, they show significant and
increasing κ coefficients, with the exception of Australia in the third sub-
period, suggesting that they all were ”honest” inflation targeters, with the
coefficient on emp approaching 1 in the case of Canada after 1999 when emp
is defined using (1.18), i.e. perfect flexibility. They also seem to have put
some weight on the U.S. Dollar, but after 1999 the euro earned an important
role.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all had strict pegs during the
whole sample period. The estimates confirm the official fixed exchange rate
regimes as listed in Appendix 1. In particular, Estonia pegged to the Ger-
man Mark first, then the Euro; Latvia to the SDR (and interestingly the
estimated coefficients approximate the weights of the constituent currencies
of the SDR) until 2004:12, then the Euro, and Lithuania had a peg to the
U.S. Dollar until 2002:01, then to the Euro. The same holds for Denmark,
which has been a member of ERM for the whole sample period. Before the
ERM crisis, it seems to have had a de facto strict peg to the DM, but then
apparently put a larger weight on the franc. Since the introduction of the
euro, however, it had a de facto peg to the latter with a weight not signifi-
cantly different from 1.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have adopted IT in January
1999 (Poland and the Czech Republic) and August 2001 (Hungary), respec-
tively. Before moving to IT, they put a large weight on the Dollar, but
after the introduction of the euro the latter became the main implicit ref-
erence currency. κ is positive and significant after the introduction of IT,
and larger for the Czech Republic and Poland (with κ = 0.261 and 0.368,
respectively). Notice that up to 1999 the Czech Koruna was officially tied to
the ECU, the Hungarian Fiorint to the German Mark and the Polish Zloty
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to a basket of DEM and USD. Our results confirm these official regimes,
except in the case of the Czech Republic where the USD had a significant
weight, too. Romania had a de facto freely falling regime until 1998:12, as
shown in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and indeed the estimation using the
Frankel-Wei approach here is not precise, with a low R2. It has put a larger
weight on the euro since 1999, and κ became significant after 2005, when IT
was adopted.
Iceland officially pegged to a basket of currencies until 2001:04, and
gradually decreased the weight put on the USD while increasing that on
European currencies. After 2001:04, κ is positive and significant but quite
low (around 0.08). The sample is interrupted at 2008:09 because, due to
the financial crisis that occurred in october 2008 and the capital controls
introduced, the convertibility of the Krona was suspended. According to
our estimates, Norway pegged to a basket of currencies (DM, FFR, USD)
until the adoption of inflation targeting in march 2001. Then the coefficient
on emp increased and the euro became the only implicit reference currency.
Sweden and Switzerland adopted IT in 1995 and 2001, respectively. In
both cases, κ is significant in the euro era only at 10% and it is the lowest
among all IT sample countries, (0.073 and 0.083, respectively, and lower us-
ing (18)). Moreover, the euro had a large weight, reaching 0.9 in the case of
Switzerland. United Kingdom adopted Inflation Targeting after the end of
the ERM, which it had joined only from 1990 until September 1992. While
there is no evidence of fear of floating in this case, over the whole sample
period it seems to have put some weight on the stabilization of the bilat-
eral exchange rate with the Dollar, but since 1999.01 the euro acquired a
significant role too.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper discussed the issue of exchange rate flexibility in European
countries than are not in the EMU using two approaches recently developed
by the literature on exchange rate regime classification, namely Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) and Frankel and Wei (2008). The starting point was the
observation that official regimes, from the point of view of exchange rate
management, are moving towards a polarization: either free floats, coupled
with Inflation Targeting, or pegs. Europe is no exception in this sense.
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However, several empirical works in the so-called fear of floating literature
proved this is not the case, and the official label of the regime is not always
an accurate description of what countries do in practice. Our objective was
to see whether this is the case also in Europe, especially since the creation
of a large, neighboring currency union might have provided, for this group
of small open economies, a natural anchor.
The results obtained by the CR and the FW approaches in this paper
are generally consistent, and the conclusions are quite mixed. Fixed ex-
change rate arrangements have shown substantial stability across countries
and, in particular, during the euro era. In some cases, however, when the
euro is the formal anchor, we can see that indeed some weight on the US
Dollar is present (for example, in Latvia after it joined ERMII). Inflation
Targeting regimes in Europe appear to have brought about an increase in
exchange rate flexibility, although generally not to a level comparable to
that of the benchmark floaters; however, some weight on euro exchange rate
stabilization seems to have remained in place: first of all, bilateral exchange
rate volatility is significantly lower than that which has been observed for
benchmark floaters and for non-European IT regimes. This is true, in partic-
ular, for Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, the Czech Republic and, to a lesser
extent, the U.K. Second, European IT countries all made extensive use of
foreign exchange reserves, more than both free floaters like the USA and
Japan, and also more than an Inflation Targeter as Canada. However, all
IT regimes seem to have intervened a lot in the foreign exchange market,
contrary to what one would expect. This result seems to contradict the
statement (see Svensson (2003), Taylor (2001) and Ball and Reyes (2008),
for example) that Inflation Targeting regimes should not, and do not, have
exchange rate objectives separate from that of inflation control. Since it is
not clear why the Central Bank of an IT country would make such extensive
use of foreign exchange reserves, the interpretation of this result should be
further explored.
There may be evidence of fear of floating in Sweden, Switzerland and
Hungary. While they have kept some exchange rate flexibility, they seem to
have been active in exchange rate management vis a` vis the euro. Moreover,
even for the most committed floaters in Europe, the euro has been the most
important (in some cases the only) informal reference currency.
In general, the euro era was characterized by higher exchange rate sta-
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bility than the previous periods, confirming the findings of Van Dijk et al.
(2011) who found that the correlation between the US Dollar exchange rate
of the Swedish Krona, the Swiss Franc, the U.K. Pound and the Norwegian
Krone and the euro has increased both after the launch of the euro at the
end of 1996 and its formal introduction in 1999. Following this result, the
authors state that ”non-euro countries may wish to gain maximum positive
spill-over effects by keeping their currencies more in line with the euro”.
Our findings, for what concerns the Swiss Franc and the Swedish Krona, go
in the same direction. Limited Flexibility - ERM membership appears to
be a more credible commitment to exchange rate management than man-
aged floats, since - at least in this sample - it was characterized by both
lower foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate volatility. Of course,
this particular conclusion is subject to some caveats: the two regimes are
not perfectly comparable, since the countries involved and the exchange rate
targets are not identical; however, it is nevertheless interesting, and it is con-
firmed by the fact that we can observe this in countries that went through
both regimes (for example, Switzerland, Norway and the U.K.). The euro
has gained a relevant role as a reference currency since its introduction, even
outside Europe, as its weight in the informal basket of European and non-
european countries included in our sample was significantly larger than that
of its main constituent currencies. Finally, in order to observe the evolution
of both exchange rate flexibility and the weights given to foreign currencies
over the sample period when structural breaks are not present, I also esti-
mated the FW regressions for IT countries using 2-year rolling windows. As
far as Europe is concerned, the results show both a stable exchange rate flex-
ibility index and a high weight on the euro which, in most of the cases, was
not statistically different from unity. Towards the end of the sample, when
the financial instability that characterized the last months of 2008 increased
the pressure on small currencies, we can witness a drop in the ”weight” of
the euro and - except for Hungary - a higher flexibility coefficient towards
the end of the sample, suggesting that exchange rate stabilization was not a
primary concern of Central Banks in this context. Rather, they might have
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1.9 Appendix 1. Chronology of Exchange regimes
Table 1.10: Exchange rate regimes in 1980-2009 using a
mixed de jure - de facto criterion
Country Period Regime Anchor currency
Australia 01.1984-12.1992 Floating
01.1993-present Infl. Targeting





Czech Republic 01.1993-12.1998 Managed Floating DEM
01.1999-present Infl. Targeting
Denmark 01.1980-12.1998 Ltd. Flexibility DEM
01.1999-present Ltd. Flexibility Euro
Estonia 01.1993-12.1998 Peg DEM
01.1999-12.2010 Peg Euro
Hungary 01.1993-12.1998 Managed Floating DEM
01.1999-07.2001 Managed Floating Euro
08.2001-present Infl. Targeting
Japan 01.1980-present Floating
Iceland 01.1980-12.2000 Managed Floating Basket
01.2001-09.2008 Infl. Targeting
Latvia 01.1993-12.2004 Peg SDR
01.2005-present Ltd. Flexibility Euro
Lithuania 01.1993-12.1994 Freely Falling
01.1995-02.2001 Peg USD
03.2001-present Peg Euro
New Zealand 01.1980-02.1985 Managed Floating
03.1985-12.1989 Floating
01.1990-present Infl. Targeting
Norway 01.1980-11.1992 Managed Floating Basket
12.1992-12.1994 Floating
Continues in next page
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Continues from previous page
Country Period Regime Anchor currency
01.1995-02.2001 Managed Floating Basket
03.2001-present Infl. Targeting
Poland 05.1993-12.1998 Managed Floating DEM
01.1999-present Infl. Targeting
Romania 01.1999-03.2001 Freely Falling
04.2001-12.2004 Managed Floating Euro
01.2005-present Infl. Targeting
Slovak Republic 01.1993-12.1998 Managed Floating DEM
01.1999-11.2005 Managed Floating Euro
12.2005-12.2008 Ltd. Flexibility Euro
Sweden 06.1985-09.1992 Ltd. Flexibility DEM
10.1992-12.1994 Floating
01.1995-present Infl. Targeting
Switzerland 01.1980-12.1999 Managed Floating DEM
01.2000-present Infl. Targeting
United Kingdom 01.1980-09.1990 Managed Floating DEM
10.1990-09.1992 Ltd. Flexibility DEM
10.1992-present Infl. Targeting
United States 01.1980-present Floating
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1.10 Appendix 2. Frankel-Wei approach.
Table 1.11: Results of the Frankel-Wei Approach
Australia
1.17 1.18
84.01-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12 84.01-92.12 93.01-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem -0.814 -0.308 -0.704 -0.189
(0.589) (0.305) (0.592) (0.266)
ffr 0.693 0.149 0.556 0.109
(0.595) (0.321) (0.591) (0.286)
eur 0.613*** 0.614***
(0.110) (0.110)
usd 0.764*** 0.838*** 0.108 0.744*** 0.761*** 0.112
(0.110) (0.135) (0.128) (0.107) (0.121) (0.128)
jpy 0.055 0.127 -0.057 0.076 0.134* -0.065
(0.133) (0.085) (0.099) (0.132) (0.070) (0.100)
emp 0.078 0.174*** 0.048* 0.200** 0.306*** 0.046*
(0.055) (0.054) (0.025) (0.079) (0.079) (0.024)
c 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.517 0.562 0.270 0.545 0.642 0.270
Canada
1.17 1.18
80.01-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12 84.01-92.12 93.01-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem -0.059 0.295 0.192** 0.097
(0.131) (0.192) (0.075) (0.158)
ffr 0.100 -0.379* 0.071 0.042
(0.151) (0.201) (0.052) (0.169)
eur 0208** 0.296***
(0.082) (0.027)
usd 0.921*** 1.010*** 0.659*** 0.527*** 0.606*** 0.440***
(0.039) (0.048) (0.089) (0.056) (0.065) (0.021)
jpy -0.027 -0.009 -0.018 0.106*** 0.097*** 0.137***
(0.039) (0.043) (0.079) (0.039) (0.032) (0.017)
emp -0.026*** -0.060*** 0.377*** 0.663*** 0.708*** 0.986***
(0.006) (0.017) (0.072) (0.089) (0.082) (0.020)
c 0.000 0.003** -0.003** -0.001 0.000 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)




85.04-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12 85.04-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem -1.082 -0.215 -1.011 -0.259
(0.976) (0.285) (0.981) (0.272)
ffr 0.906 0.290 0.852 0.336
(1.040) (0.299) (1.045) (0.284)
eur 0.580*** 0.462***
(0.131) (0.117)
usd 0.538*** 0.759*** 0.052 0.538*** 0.751*** 0.055
(0.168) (0.076) (0.112) (0.170) (0.076) (0.103)
jpy 0.211 0.188*** -0.037 0.208 0.192*** 0.010
(0.218) (0.053) (0.085) (0.224) (0.052) (0.077)
emp 0.028 0.035 0.071** 0.053 0.098** 0.247***
(0.041) (0.023) (0.035) (0.052) (0.041) (0.079)
c -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)

























usd 0.407*** -0.030 -0.143
(0.093) (0.096) (0.087)
jpy -0.079 -0.014 -0.048
(0.119) (0.051) (0.076)
emp -0.009 0.261** 0.050
(0.021) (0.113) (0.044)
c 0.002 -0.004*** -0.004**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
R2 0.677 0.693 0.598
Denmark
1.17 1.18
80.01-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem 0.735*** 0.351 0.329
(0.077) (0.274) (0.285)




usd 0.021 0.017 -0.016 0.051* -0.006
(0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.030) (0.011)
jpy 0.010 0.022 0.004 0.031 0.009
(0.018) (0.023) (0.011) (0.026) (0.010)
emp -0.004 -0.008 0.002 0.020 0.037*
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.022) (0.018)
c 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)











usd -0.011 -0.023 -0.010 -0.024
(0.046) (0.016) (0.046) (0.016)
jpy 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.001
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
emp -0.017 0.001 -0.015 0.000
(0.013) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
R2 0.939 0.978 0.939 0.978
Hungary
1.17 1.18





eur 0.918*** 1.215*** 0.932*** 1.264***
(0.094) (0.182) (0.086) (0.200)
usd 0.511*** 0.214 -0.171* 0.137 -0.186*
(0.113) (0.148) (0.095) (0.154) (0.099)
jpy -0.056 -0.027 -0.134 -0.021 -0.162
(0.072) (0.115) (0.092) (0.118) (0.099)
emp 0.094** 0.119 0.141*** 0.016 0.078**
(0.037) (0.077) (0.053) (0.036) (0.032)
c 0.010*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)




83.07-86.08 86.09-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-01.03 01.04-08.09
dem 1.742* 0.630* 0.691***
(0.865) (0.384) (0.248)




usd 0.572*** 0.275*** 0.213* 0.157 0.425**
(0.103) (0.058) (0.120) (0.120) (0.207)
jpy -0.115 -0.014 -0.024 0.222*** -0.613***
(0.127) (0.078) (0.062) (0.068) (0.204)
emp 0.112 0.046 -0.005 0.008 0.083**
(0.072) (0.032) (0.010) (0.031) (0.039)
c 0.011 0.006*** 0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
R2 0.681 0.560 0.581 0.739 0.225
Latvia
1.17 1.18





eur 0.212*** 0.904*** 0.267*** 0.904***
(0.024) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044)
usd 0.446*** 0.443*** -0.022 0.463*** -0.024
(0.023) (0.024) (0.067) (0.030) (0.067)
jpy 0.168*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.073*** -0.115***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042)
emp 0.010 0.003 -0.012 0.013 -0.011
(0.010) (0.008) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010)
c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)









eur 0.003* 0.904*** 0.003 0.866***
(0.002) (0.045) (0.002) (0.054)
usd 0.996*** 1.004*** -0.022 1.005*** -0.015
(0.003) (0.002) (0.067) (0.002) (0.047)
jpy 0.000 -0.002 0.115*** -0.002 0.079*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.042) (0.002) (0.041)
emp 0.001 0.002** -0.012 0.001** 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) (0.011)
c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
R2 0.999 0.999 0.877 0.999 0.878
Norway
1.17







usd 0.159*** 0.152* 0.221 0.099
(0.032) (0.085) (0.142) (0.087)
jpy 0.048 -0.080 0.018 -0.089
(0.033) (0.038) (0.086) (0.081)
emp 0.023* -0.018 0.083*** 0.147***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.031)
c 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)











usd 0.531*** 0.170 0.612** 0.246**
(0.150) (0.123) (0.243) (0.101)
jpy 0.017 -0.142 0.039 -0.074
(0.088) (0.092) (0.017) (0.070)
emp 0.192* 0.368*** 0.256* 0.563***
(0.094) (0.063) (0.144) (0.064)
c 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)










usd 0.062 0.361** 0.042
(0.579) (0.178) (0.128)
jpy -0.221 -0.008 -0.093
(0.159) (0.100) (0.126)
emp 0.281*** 0.014 0.344***
(0.082) (0.042) (0.105)
c 0.026*** 0.014*** -0.006**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003)









eur 0.697*** 0.959*** 0.604*** 0.864***
(0.096) (0.061) (0.135) (0.099)
usd 0.407*** -0.007 0.025 0.084 0.119
(0.084) (0.088) (0.119) (0.087) (0.122)
jpy -0.060 0.010 -0.016 -0.071 0.003
(0.044) (0.056) (0.088) (0.072) (0.069)
emp 0.023 -0.000 0.050 0.125** 0.290
(0.015) (0.016) (0.093) (0.062) (0.206)
c 0.002 -0.001 -0.007** -0.003* -0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.689 0.497 0.720 0.480 0.777
Sweden
1.17 1.18
86.01-92.10 92.11-94.12 95.01-98.12 99.01-09.12 95.01-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem 0.283*** 0.185 0.537 0.523
(0.099) (0.648) (0.452) (0.444)
ffr 0.289*** 0.464 0.097 0.082
(0.103) (0.715) (0.462) (0.453)
eur 0.783*** 1.166***
(0.085) (0.075)
usd 0.204*** -0.651 0.286* -0.131 0.305* -0.053
(0.028) (0.490) (0.157) (0.091) (0.155) (0.078)
jpy -0.006 0.027 -0.016 0.074 -0.013 -0.068
(0.027) (0.210) (0.063) (0.081) (0.063) (0.054)
emp 0.004 -0.013 0.015 0.073*** -0.002 0.029*
(0.007) (0.119) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.016)
c -0.000 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)




80.01-92.10 92.11-98.12 00.01-09.12 80.01-92.10 92.11-98.12 00.01-09.12
dem 0.926*** 0.679*** 0.948*** 0.694***
(0.119) (0.197) (0.120) (0.201)
ffr -0.057 0.343 -0.056 0.343
(0.126) (0.210) (0.127) (0.213)
eur 0.908*** 0.919***
(0.078) (0.080)
usd -0.050 -0.096 0.012 -0.050 -0.110 -0.006
(0.042) (0.079) (0.060) (0.044) (0.077) (0.059)
jpy 0.145*** 0.104*** 0.176*** 0.120** 0.102*** 0.181***
(0.049) (0.036) (0.057) (0.048) (0.036) (0.058)
emp 0.019 0.049* 0.083* 0.024 0.029 0.058*
(0.013) (0.027) (0.044) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030)
c 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
R2 0.777 0.843 0.841 0.787 0.839 0.835
United Kingdom
1.17 1.18
80.01-90.09 90.10-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12 90.10-92.10 92.11-98.12 99.01-09.12
dem 0.022 0.809 0.146 0.788 0.143
(0.263) (0.843) (0.258) (0.975) (0.259)
ffr 0.373* 0.504 0.385 0.572 0.370
(0.209) (1.055) (0.226) (0.686) (0.229)
eur 0.650*** 0.302**
(0.220) (0.134)
usd 0.218*** 0.320 0.444*** 0.487*** 0.286 0.438*** 0.413***
(0.083) (0.215) (0.070) (0.100) (0.249) (0.067) (0.068)
jpy 0.188* -0.069 0.017 0.030 -0.075 0.029 0.121*
(0.109) (0.257) (0.052) (0.071) (0.198) (0.051) (0.067)
emp 0.080** 0.373* 0.271*** 0.130*** 0.309 0.308*** 0.266***
(0.040) (0.216) (0.068) (0.040) (0.248) (0.067) (0.078)
c 0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)






Interest rate rules are often estimated as simple reaction functions a`
la Taylor (1993) rule linking the policy interest rate to variables such as
future expected inflation and the output gap. However, it has been shown
by Svensson (1997) that the coefficients estimated with this approach are
convolutions of structural and preference parameters and thus are subject
to the Lucas (1976) critique. In this chapter, I propose an approach to
estimate Central Bank preferences starting from the Central Bank’s opti-
mization problem within a small open economy, extending previous work by
Favero and Rovelli (2003). When we consider open economies that are in a
regime of Inflation Targeting, the issue of the role of the exchange rate in
the Monetary Policy rule becomes relevant. In particular, it is still widely
debated whether Inflation Targeting Central Banks should, or do, limit ex-
change rate flexibility. During the last decade, a large body of empirical
literature has investigated the tendency of Central Banks to adopt de facto
policies which are in conflict with the official statements, in particular with
respect to the exchange rate regime. While, on one hand, there has been a
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tendency to move towards flexible exchange rates 1 , on the other hand it
has been shown 2 that countries still engage in active exchange rate man-
agement. The literature on so-called ”Fear of Floating”, which we have
discussed in Chapter 1, has documented on many countries, in particular,
lower nominal exchange rate volatility and higher foreign exchange reserves
volatility with respect to some benchmark floater.
Out of the 27 member states of the EU, only 16 have adopted the euro; six
have floating exchange rates and an Inflation Targeting regime, while the
remaining ones adopted some sort of exchange rate arrangement vis-a`-vis
the euro. Nevertheless, the bilateral exchange rates of inflation targeters
with the euro have remained quite stable over the last decade, and this has
raised the question of whether they have been - whether voluntarily or not
- following the ECB policy with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate 3.
When the country of interest has adopted an Inflation Targeting regime, the
results obtained using exchange rate regime classification techniques might
be misleading. Exchange rate smoothing can come as a side product when
the Central Bank targets CPI inflation, and this will depend on the de-
gree of exchange rate pass-through and the share of imported final goods.
Moreover, exchange rate stabilization can come as the result of increased
economic integration and business cycle synchronization, as suggested by
the theory of endogenous optimum currency areas (see Frankel and Rose
(1998)).
The objective of this chapter is therefore threefold. First of all, it aims
at bridging the gap between the literature on exchange rate regime classifi-
cation and that on monetary policy rules estimation. This, as it was stated
above, is done by suggesting an approach for the estimation of Monetary
Policy Rules and the identification of Central Bank preferences in a small
open economy that builds on previous work by Favero and Rovelli (2003)
and Collins and Siklos (2004). Rather than limiting ourselves to the estima-
tion of Taylor rules, we take the Lucas (1976) critique seriously by identify-
ing separately the parameters describing the structure of the economy and
those describing Central Bank preferences, explicitly considering exchange
1See Reinhard and Rogoff (2001).
2See the discussion in Chapter 1 and, for example, Calvo and Reinhard (2002), Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), (2005) and (2007), Frankel and Wei (2008).
3See Van Dijk et al. (2005) and Reade and Volz (2009).
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rate smoothing or ”Fear of Floating” as one possible regime. The second ob-
jective is to show, through a simple and stylized theoretical model, how the
speed at which the real exchange rate converges to the PPP can influence its
role in the monetary policy rule, an aspect which has not been considered in
the literature on monetary policy rules estimation, even when the exchange
rate is included as a regressor. Third, by using Central Bank forecasts, I
explicitly address the critique by Orphanides (2001) and Molodsova et al.
(2008) who suggested that estimation of policy rules should be run on real
time rather than revised data.
The subject of the empirical analysis is Sweden. While, officially, it has been
on an Inflation Targeting regime since 1995, Sweden exhibited - at least until
the economic crisis that started at the end of 2008, which put small curren-
cies through a lot of stress - a remarkable stability of the bilateral exchange
rate of its currency, the Krona, with the Euro. For these reasons, it is an
obvious candidate to study how to discern between ”honest” Inflation Tar-
geting which has exchange rate stabilization as a side product, and ”Fear of
Floating”.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the posi-
tion of Sweden with respect to the Euro as well as some stylized facts on the
Swedish and Euro Area economy during the last 15 years. Section 3 presents
a brief review of the related literature. Section 4 introduces a simple model
for the derivation of interest rate rules in an open economy. In Section 5, a
parsimonious structural model of the Swedish economy is estimated, which
is the empirical counterpart of the theoretical model in section 4. In Section
6 we estimate Central Bank preferences corresponding to alternative mone-
tary policy rules, to see which one fits the behavior of the Swedish Riksbank
best. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Sweden and the euro
After the collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism at the end of 1992,
Sweden entered a floating exchange rate regime and then formally adopted
Inflation Targeting in January 1995. The introduction of the euro in 1999
created a huge debate in Sweden, concerning the adoption of the common
currency; the Government decided that the country would not be part of
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the leading group of the Monetary Union, because of both political and
economic considerations. The political considerations mainly dealt with the
fact that Sweden had joined the EU only a few years earlier (in 1995) and
the population was supposed not to be ”ready” to give up their national
currency yet. The economic considerations were the result of the report of
the Calmfors Commission, which had been appointed by the Government
to evaluate the costs and benefits of joining the Monetary Union for Swe-
den. In the end, the government decided that a national referendum had
to be held in order to let the people decide on the adoption of the euro. In
September 2003 the referendum was held, where the 56% of voters rejected
the proposal of joining the EMU, and since then it has not been clear what
Sweden is going to do with the euro. In theory, it has to join the Monetary
Union sooner or later. In fact, the Maastricht Treaty only considers the
opt-out possibility for Denmark and the UK, while other countries and new
member states have to join the EMU as soon as they fulfill the convergence
criteria. In the last few years Sweden has fulfilled four of the five criteria,
and manages to stay out by not joining ERM II 4. One might ask to which
extent the conduct of monetary policy in european countries that have not
adopted the euro is constrained or influenced by shocks originating in the
EMU, with which they are highly integrated, and whether they are actually
setting their monetary policy in step with the ECB, regardless of official
policy statements, i.e. whether there is some evidence of ”Fear of Floating”
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). By looking at the graph of the exchange rate
of the Swedish Krona vis a` vis the Euro, one can notice that the latter has
remained very stable since the adoption of inflation targeting in Sweden in
1995, and even more so between january 2002 and september 2008, that is,
after the euro banknotes and coins were finally introduced 5 .
4The Maastricht Treaty requires that a country that wants to join the EMU has been
a member of ERMII without realignments of the central parity of the last two years.
5During the last quarter of 2008 the bilateral exchange rate experienced a large increase
in volatility, and the Krona suffered a depreciation of over 15%. The last months of 2008
were characterized by a sharp depreciation of minor currencies, and this was aknowledged
also by the Riksbank in its Monetary Policy report of October 23rd 2008: ”The krona has
weakened agains almost all of the largest currencies since September. It is unclear exactly
what this weakening is due to, but in times of great anxiety, small countries’ currencies are
usually regarded as uncertain and they weaken. The krona weakened, for instance, after
the crises in 1997-98 and [. . .] in September 2001. This is clear, for instance, from the
krona’s position against the euro [. . .]. The weakening of the trade-weighted krona , which
is largely assumed to be due to the current crisis, is expected to persist for the remainder
of the year [. . .]. After that, the krona will return to more normal levels. [. . .] A weakening
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Figure 2.1: The business cycle in Sweden and the Euro Area
Not only has variability been low, but the bilateral exchange rate re-
mained within a band of ±2.50% around a mean of 9.22 krona per euro
(See Figure 2.1, panel (a)). It is also interesting to observe the evolution
of the variables describing the Swedish and EMU business cycles, namely
inflation, output and interest rates. Figure 2.1, panels (b)-(d) shows that,
since the introduction of flexible exchange rates in 1993, the CPI inflation,
output gap, and policy interest rates in Sweden and the EMU tended to
move quite closely together. This is clear also from Table 2.1, which reports
some correlations on the same variables and also shows how exchange rate
volatility6 has decreased in the last part of the period, while the other cor-
relations have remained quite stable.
The natural question that arises is therefore the following: what was the
source of the stabilization of the SEK/Euro exchange rate? Has the Riks-
of the exchange rate usually has a positive effect on exports in Sweden”. The Riksbank’s
report highlights two elements: first, the krona is expected to appreciate when the crisis is
over; second, the Riksbank is not going to intervene to defend the currency: in a situation
of falling inflation and falling output, a depreciation of the currency is nothing but good
in order to overcome the crisis.
6Defined as in prior 1.15 in Chapter 1.
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bank actually been limiting the SEK/Euro exchange rate flexibility, despite
its official claims of being an inflation targeter, or is such an exchange rate
stabilization endogenous, i.e. the result of an increasing convergence of
EMU and Swedish business cycles, so that ”faced with similar data, the
Riksbank and ECB tend to synchronize their interest rate decisions: this
helps explaining why the exchange rate has been so stable” 7 ? Apart
from alternative exchange rate regimes and arrangements, we can identify
four possible sources of exchange rate stabilization: two are voluntary and
two involuntary. Exchange rate volatility can be reduced through direct
intervention using foreign exchange reserves or credit lines; alternatively,
the central bank can stabilize the exchange rate through the policy interest
rate, changing it in step with the anchor country (an example in this sense
is Denmark). Alternatively, exchange rate stabilization can be the result of
a synchronization of monetary policy interventions that is due to the con-
vergence of business cycles, as suggested by Giavazzi and Mishkin (2005)
for the case of Sweden. Finally, Reade and Volz (2009) suggest that Sweden
might be unable to run a monetary policy that is independent from that
of the EMU. The authors investigated this issue by looking at interbank
interest rates in a Cointegrated VAR framework and concluded that the two
interest rates are cointegrated with only the Swedish rate adjusting, and
this indicates that the Riksbank is, ”de facto, not a master in its house” 8.
In other words, since the two Central Banks behave similarly, it should not









Output gaps correl. 0.69 0.84 0.81 0.88
Inflation rates correl. -0.71 0.71 0.79 0.70
Policy rates correl. 0.94 0.82 0.87 0.84
Exchange rate stability 0.667 0.865 0.945 0.996
Table 2.1: The business cycle in Sweden and the EMU, 1993-2008.
7Giavazzi and Mishkin, 2007 p. 54.
8Reade and Volz (2009), p. 26.
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2.3 Review of related literature
Since the seminal paper by Taylor (1993), which introduced the use of
simple interest rate rules for the analysis of monetary policy, a lot of theo-
retical and empirical research has been developed on the issue. According
to the ”Taylor Rule”, in each period the Central Bank sets the interest rate
to respond to deviations of inflation from a pre−specified target (in his pa-
per, 2%) and of output growth from the long−run growth rate of output.
The original interest rate rule by Taylor has been modified in following em-
pirical and theoretical works. In particular, it has been noticed (see, for
example, Clarida et al.,1998) that Central Banks respond to forecasts of
inflation rather than current inflation, due to time lags in the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Moreover, interest rates show a high degree of persis-
tence, and the fit of estimated interest rate rules can be improved a lot by
augmenting the Taylor Rule with the lagged policy rate. In this sense, the
observed interest rate can be interpreted as a weighted average of the target
rate and the rate in the previous period; this behaviour has been termed
interest rate smoothing and the theoretical justification would be that Cen-
tral Banks change their policy rates gradually in order to avoid generating
excessive macroeconomic volatility.
However, the role of the lagged interest rate in the monetary policy
rule has been challenged in several works (see Cecchetti (2000), Rudebusch
(2002), English (2003), Castelnuovo (2007)), suggesting that the persistence
of the policy rate might be due to serially correlated errors rather than
optimal partial adjustment. From a theoretical point of view, Cecchetti
(2000) criticizes interest rate smoothing (as well as exchange rate smoothing)
as an explicit objective of monetary policy, while it could be an instrument of
the optimal policy. Recently, Consolo and Favero (2009) have shown that the
observed inertia in monetary policy, resulting in very high (generally between
0.8 and 0.9) coefficients on the lagged policy rate, might be the consequence
of a weak instrument problem in the GMM estimations performed.
The empirical literature has generally estimated monetary policy reac-
tion functions (in the form of forward-looking Taylor (1993) rules) using a
GMM approach (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1998 and 2000) 9; however,
9To be precise, the GMM approach is used when official forecasts for the inflation
rate are not available, and therefore least squares estimation of a forward-looking Taylor
Rule setting pit+k|t = pit+k would result in an endogenous error term. When the Central
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as it was pointed out in Favero and Rovelli (2003), since Euler equations
are the natural object of the GMM approach, it would be more natural
to use first order conditions, derived from the Central Bank’s optimization
problem, to estimate the policy rule. Favero and Rovelli (2003) apply this
approach for the estimation of Central Bank preferences to the U.S. A sim-
ilar attempt was done by Collins and Siklos (2004) who estimate Central
Bank preferences for Australia, New Zealand and Canada. However, their
approach suffers from several limitations: first, their empirical analysis heav-
ily relies on HP filters; second, they solve an infinite-horizon optimization
problem which, although more realistic than the finite-horizon approach we
adopt in sections 5 and 7, yields results which are less comparable to previous
works that estimated simple interest rate rules. We believe that the finite-
time approach adopted here is not an excessive simplification; moreover, it
allows us to derive an analytical solution to the Central Bank’s optimization
problem which would not be possible otherwise. Finally, unlike them, we
adopt an agnostic approach here estimating the structural model from a very
general system, rather than relying on previously existing country-specific
models as in Collins and Siklos, and is therefore this approach is more gen-
eral for a small open economy. Cecchetti et al. (2002) estimate the Central
Bank’s preferences within a similar framework, but with a different method-
ological approach 10. However, they do not attempt to estimate an optimal
weight for interest rate smoothing and disregard exchange rate smoothing
as well, which, however, is quite surprising given that the countries in their
sample maintained a policy of limited exchange rate flexibility within (most
of) the sample period.
An issue which is not solved is related to the role of the exchange rate in
the monetary policy rule of inflation targeting Central Banks. According to
Svensson (2003) there are no good reasons for separate - real or nominal -
exchange rate objectives, under flexible inflation targeting, at least for ad-
vanced economies, while exchange rate smoothing would be more motivated
for developing countries, which typically have foreign currency-denominated
Bank’s inflation forecasts are available, however, nonlinear least squares are suited for the
estimation of a forward-looking Taylor Rule with interest rate smoothing (see Castelnuovo,
2007, and De Aurelio, 2005).
10Given their model, they estimate the relative weights on output and inflation variabil-
ity in the objective function that minimize the distance between estimated and optimal
interest rate response to structural economic shocks; such structural shocks, in turn, are
identified within a four- (or five- , depending on the country at hand) variable SVAR.
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debt as well as other financial stability-related problems. At the same time,
Svensson (1997) states that exchange rate targeting, as well as money growth
targeting, would be better than inflation forecast targeting as a means to
curb inflation only in the case they are sufficient statistics for future infla-
tion; if they are not, as it generally happens, then exchange rate and money
growth targeting lead to worse outcomes 11 with respect to inflation forecast
targeting. The most widespread view in the literature is that the (real) ex-
change rate, therefore, would indeed play a role in the monetary policy rule
when the central bank targets CPI inflation, but only indirectly, since it is a
predictor of future inflation and it also affects the output gap; domestic infla-
tion targeting presents worse outcomes in terms of output stabilization (see,
for example, Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Svensson (2000)). Moreover,
Taylor (2003) and Edwards (2006) discuss that if Central Banks responded
directly to exchange rate changes by changing the policy interest rate, this
would result in excessive interest rate volatility, which is not observed in
practice. The model outlined in Section 5 will be on the same line, suggest-
ing that, indeed, relatively high interest rate variability might be evidence
of ”fear of floating”, in line with what suggested, in a different framework,
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).
A country that is officially on a flexible exchange rate regime but actively
intervenes to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate is said to have Fear of
Floating (see Chapter 1). A large body of literature has recently introduced
measures of exchange rate flexibility , but only one paper, namely Ball and
Reyes (2008), has focused on the challenges for exchange rate classification
schemes when they are applied to IT countries. However, Ball and Reyes
(2008) present two main limits in the analysis of inflation targeting regimes:
on the theoretical side, they only compare simple instrument rules rather
than deriving the policy function from an optimizing behaviour of the Cen-
tral Bank; this limited approach influences their empirical analysis, since
they only focus on how the real interest rate responds differently to current
and lagged inflation and changes in exchange rate under different official
regimes, rather than estimating a policy rule.
11In particular, higher inflation and output variability.
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2.4 Inflation Targeting in a Small Open Economy
Inflation Targeting (henceforth IT) is defined as a monetary policy regime
characterized by: (i) an explicit inflation target (normally around 2%, with
the possibility of some tolerance bands around the target); (ii) a framework
for policy decisions called inflation-forecast targeting, which uses an inflation
forecast produced by the Central Bank, and made public, as an intermediate
target for Monetary Policy; and finally, (iii) a high degree of transparency
and accountability (see Svensson, 1996). Starting from the end of the 1980s,
an increasing number of countries , generally small open economies, have
adopted IT as the official monetary policy regime 12. Adopting IT does not
rule out the possibility that additional objectives, other than inflation stabi-
lization, be pursued by the Central Bank, as long as these do not jeopardize
the achievement of the inflation target. The presence of such additional
objectives - for example, output stabilization and interest rate smoothing -
allows us to distinguish between strict and flexible IT. Official statements by
the main IT Central Banks make it natural to regard IT, using Svensson’s
(2003) words, as a targeting rule. The Monetary Policy objective of the
Bank of England is to
[. . .] deliver price stability - low inflation - and, subject to that,
to support the Government’s economic objectives including those for
growth and employment. Price stability is defined by the Government’s
inflation target of 2%. [. . .] The Monetary Policy Committee’s aim is
to set interest rates so that inflation can be brought back to target
within a reasonable time period without creating undue instability in
the economy.
Similarly, in Australia, which adopted inflation targeting in 1993, the
Statement of Conduct of Monetary Policy established that
[. . .] monetary policy’s principal medium-term objective is to con-
trol inflation. [. . .] The appropriate target for monetary policy is to
achieve an inflation rate of 2-3 per cent on average, over the cycle [. . .].
The inflation target is defined as a medium-term average rather than
as a hard-edged target band within which inflation is to be held at all
times. This formulation allows for the inevitable uncertainties that are
12To name a few, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Israel.
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involved in forecasting, and lags in the effects of monetary policy on
the economy. [. . .] The inflation target is, necessarily, forward-looking,
as evidenced by the operation of monetary policy since its introduc-
tion. This approach allows a role for monetary policy in dampening
the fluctuations in output over the course of the business cycle.
Finally, the Swedish Riksbank, which is at the center of the present
analysis 13, has stated that
The Riksbank has specified an explicit inflation target whereby
the annual change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is to be 2 per
cent with a tolerance interval of plus/minus 1 per cent. Monetary
Policy is also guided by various measures of ”underlying inflation”.
There is no single measure of inflation that consistently indicates the
appropriate stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy acts with a lag
and is normally focused on achieving the inflation target within a two-
year period. The two-year time horizon also provides scope for taking
fluctuations in the real economy into consideration. The Riksbank
routinely takes into consideration changes in asset prices and other
variables [. . .].
As it was outlined by Svensson (2003), instrument rules like the Taylor
(1993) rule are not appropriate to describe monetary policy for three main
reasons: first, they are overly simple and mechanic, and therefore deny the
necessary flexibility; second, they do not consider the fact that in reality,
when setting the interest rate, central banks make use of a lot more informa-
tion than just the inflation rate and the output gap; finally, the parameters
of instrument rules estimated using for example the approach in Clarida
et al. (1998) are not structural, in the sense that they are convolutions of
structural and preference parameters, and estimation of a simple instrument
rule would leave such parameters unidentified. For the reasons outlined so
far, in order to compare the policy rules coming from alternative monetary
policy frameworks, we will proceed to derive optimal monetary policy reac-
tion functions using the approach introduced by Svensson (1997, 1999, 2000
and 2003) and also applied in Favero and Rovelli (2003) and extend it to the
open economy, with a focus on fear of floating as an alternative to ”honest”
Inflation Targeting.
13The inflation target was formulated in January 1993, when the transition to the new
monetary regime - after the collapse of ERM - began. However, it formally began to apply
in January 1995 (see Giavazzi and Mishkin, 2007).
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In this section we will therefore discuss and derive alternative monetary
policy rules that are suitable for estimation, in order to find which one
characterizes best the behavior of the Sveriges Riksbank. To this end, we
sketch a stylized model of a small open economy similar to Svensson (2000),
but with less complex dynamics, because the dynamics of each equation
will be determined empirically in the next section. Let us assume that the
aggregate demand in a small open economy is given by:
yt+1 = βyyt − βr(it − pit − r) + βqqt + νt+1 (2.1)
where q is the deviation of the real exchange rate, defined as domestic output
per unit of foreign output, from PPP, so that when q = 0 the PPP holds and
when q increases we have a real depreciation; therefore, the coefficient βq is
positive. For simplicity, unlike Svensson (2000), we have assumed that the
foreign output gap does not influence the domestic business cycle. Finally,
νt+1 is a zero-mean i.i.d. demand shock. The Phillips curve is given by:
pit+1 = pit + αyyt + αqqt + ξt+1 (2.2)
where αq > 0; a depreciation of the exchange rate has both a direct infla-
tionary effect, since imported goods become more expensive, and an indirect
effect through resource utilization which kicks with a two-period lag. ξt+1
is a zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock. Since we are dealing with an open
economy, with respect to the previous section we also have to define an equi-
librium relation for the exchange rate. For a small open economy, with free
capital mobility, uncovered interest parity should hold. We can write it for
the nominal exchange rate as:
et = i
f
t − it + et+1|t + φt14 (2.3)
14Notice that here we do not model the dynamics of foreign country variables, i.e. we
do not specify a rule for the foreign interest rate. This, for example, implies that we
disregard the impact of foreign monetary policy on foreign inflation. This choice is due
to the need of keeping things simple so that we can analytically find the interest rate
reaction functions, but the drawback is that it rules out one channel for the transmission
of international shocks. This is evident in the Central Bank of Denmark’s statement
of Monetary Policy: ”The main objective of the monetary policy in the euro area is to
maintain price stability, i.e. to avoid inflation. By keeping the krone stable vis-a`-vis the
euro, a basis for low inflation is also created in Denmark.” (see Danmarks Nationalbank’s
Introduction to Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy ).
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where φ is a stationary i.i.d. disturbance which we will label the risk pre-
mium. The exchange rate tends to be higher (i.e. weaker) when it is ex-
pected to increase in the next period and when foreign interest rates are
higher than domestic interest rates. Notice that the real exchange rate is
defined as:
Qt = et + p
f
t − pt
When the PPP holds, Qt = 1, and thus the deviation from PPP is qt =
Qt − 1. Plugging this in the UIP (2.3) above, we can rewrite it as:
qt = qt+1|t − it + ift − pift + pit − φt (2.4)
which is the real interest parity, expressed in deviation from PPP. Finally,
we make an assumption on the evolution of the real exchange rate. When
PPP holds, the RER is stationary and therefore shocks to this variable do
not have permanent effects. More generally, we can assume that qt gradually
adjusts to the PPP, i.e. it gradually goes to zero, according to the following
rule:
∆qt = −γt−1 + ωt
or, equivalently,
qt = (1− γ)qt−1 + ωt (2.5)
which is a simple auto-regressive mechanism suggesting that, ceteris paribus,
in each period qt converges to PPP (i.e. to its long-run constant value of
0) by γ, where 0 < γ < 1 is the adjustment coefficient. ωt is a zero-mean
i.i.d. disturbance, representing temporary shocks affecting the exchange
rate that disturb its convergence to the long-run equilibrium. The targeting
rules analysis will be applied to four alternative scenarios: (i) exchange rate
targeting; (ii) strict inflation targeting, (iii) flexible inflation targeting and
(iv) ”fear of floating”, that in this case describes a country that is pursuing
inflation targeting with some weight on exchange rate stabilization (here we
do not care whether such exchange rate smoothing happens only de facto or
also in official terms).
2.4.1 Exchange-Rate Targeting
The simplest case is that of pure exchange rate targeting. We can describe
exchange rate targeting in our framework as the central bank choosing the
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[(et − e)2] (2.7)
subject to (2.3): we assume that the central bank manages to keep the ex-
change rate at the announced target and, at the same time, imposes no cap-
ital controls and therefore the UIP holds, up to a stationary risk premium.
We can show that the monetary policy strategy is very straightforward and
intuitive in this case. Since exchange rate stabilization is the only objective
of monetary policy, and the central bank influences the exchange rate im-
mediately by changing the interest rate, while current policy decisions do
not affect future values of the exchange rate (because et+1|t is equal to the
exchange rate target), the first order condition is:
∂Lt
∂it
= −(et − e) = 0⇒ et = e
i.e. in each period, the interest rate has to be set so that the exchange
rate stays at the official target. Therefore, since the exchange rate is fixed,





i.e. the domestic repo rate has to be always equal to the foreign rate (plus
the risk premium). This kind of rule currently characterizes, for example,
the monetary policy of Danmarks Nationalbank:
The monetary policy is designed to keep the krone stable vis-a`-vis
the euro, and other aspects than the exchange rate [. . .] are not consid-
ered in relation to monetary policy.[. . .] Danmarks Nationalbank can
influence the krone rate by changing its monetary policy interest rates.
When the exchange-rate market is stable, DNB normally changes its
interest rates in step with the changes of the European Central Bank’s
minimum bid rate [. . .]. In a situation with upward or downward pres-
sure on the krone or a sustained inflow or outflow of foreign currency,
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DNB indipendently changes its interest rates in order to stabilize the
krone. 15
2.4.2 Strict Inflation Targeting
When the Central Bank pursues strict inflation targeting, its objective is to
reach the target within a pre-specified period, generally 1-2 years. Assume
that t in our model is equal to 3 quarters as in Svensson (2000). We know
from equations (2.1)-(2.4) that, when it changes the interest rate at time t,
the Central Bank immediately affects q; in t + 1 it affects the output gap
via the direct interest rate channel and the real exchange rate channel, and
inflation via the exchange rate pass through (measured by αq ). In t + 2,
the interest rate intervention affects inflation via the output gap. When the








[(pit+j − pi∗)2] (2.8)
In order to keep things simple and obtain an analytical solution for all alter-
native regimes, we will assume, as in Svennson (1999), that the Central Bank
adopts a period-by-period optimization: the monetary authority takes last
year’s policy decision as given, but disregards the fact that today’s instru-
ment setting will affect next year’s loss function. While this simplification
is not free from drawbacks, it allows us to understand how alternative ob-
jective functions translate into different interest rate rules 16. Moreover, if
we want to describe the behavior of an IT central bank such as the Swedish
Riksbank, this hypothesis is not overly restrictive: it is compatible, for ex-
ample, with the Swedish Riksbank’s policy statement that monetary policy
is ”normally focused on achieving the inflation target within two years”. In
sum, in this case the objective function simplifies to:
minitδ
2 1
2 [(pit+2|t − pi∗)2]
Since the target has to be reached within 2 years, and the Central Bank
influences inflation via the repo rate, today’s setting of the interest rate
15Danmarks Nationalbank (2003), Monetary Policy in Denmark, p. 22-24.
16The approach of period-by-period optimization is drawn from Svensson (1999) who
applies it to interest rate smoothing. When the lagged interest rate enters the loss function,
as he argues, the standard linear-quadratic optimal control problem requires a numerical
solution since the number of state variables goes up to three; for the same reason, we will
use this approach also for the anaysis of the other regimes.
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is such that, given the Central Bank’s models to forecast the inflation rate,
constant-interest-rate two-years-ahead expected inflation is equal to the tar-
get, i.e. pit+2|t = pi∗. The FOC with respect to it is simply:
∂L
∂it
= (pit+2|t − pi∗)∂pit+2|t∂it = 0
which becomes:
pit+2|t = pi∗ (2.9)
Rewrite the AS curve in t+ 2 and after substituting we have:
pit+2|t = pit+αy(1+βy)yt+(αq+αyβq)qt−αyβr(it−pit−r)+αqqt+1|t (2.10)
Plugging (2.5) in (2.10) and merging it with FOC (2.9), we obtain the in-
terest rate rule when the central bank pursues strict inflation targeting17:
it =pit + r +
1
αyβr
(pit − pi∗) + 1 + βy
βr
yt+




Equation (2.11) is the policy rule in strict IT: the interest rate is raised when
inflation is above target but, although the actual monetary policy strategy
is strict inflation targeting, the policy rate is also influenced by the output
gap and the real exchange rate deviation from PPP. Therefore, when the
real exchange rate is weak, the central bank increases the repo rate to cool
down the inflationary pressure and bring qt back to its long-run equilibrium
faster than it would otherwise go. We can therefore see that an interest
rate rule for inflation targeting in an open economy has the output gap
and the real exchange rate in it even if the central bank is pursuing strict
inflation targeting. The reason is that both qt and yt are predictors of future
inflation, and therefore their role in the monetary policy rule is ”indirect”.
The coefficient of the real exchange rate in the interest rate rule is higher
the lower the adjustment factor γ, suggesting that when real exchange rate
shocks are persistent the policy rate will exhibit higher variability. Interest
rate rule (2.11) encompasses two extreme cases, that is when shocks to qt
are not absorbed and there is no adjustment to the PPP (i.e. γ = 0 and
17In order to avoid the problem of the endogeneity of q due to its contemporaneity with
i, I substitute q with (2.5)
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qt+1|t = qt) and when shocks are immediately absorbed (i.e. γ = 1 and
qt+1|t = 1). In the former case, equation (2.11) becomes:
it = pit + r +
1
αyβr
(pit − pi∗) + 1 + βy
βr
yt +
(αq(2− γ) + αyβq)
αyβr
qt−1 (2.12)
while, when convergence to PPP occurs within one period, equation (2.11)
becomes:
it = pit + r +
1
αyβr
(pit − pi∗) + 1 + βy
βr
yt (2.13)
The difference with respect to (2.13) is that the policy rate is not sensitive
to exchange rate fluctuations; this result is intuitive: if qt rapidly goes back
to equilibrium, shocks to it will have no effect on future inflation. Within
the simple case of strict IT it is easy to consider the effect of the time
horizion of the monetary authority on the interest rate rule. In particular,
we ask ourselves: what happens if the target horizon of the central bank is
longer? In this case, the more persistent real exchange rate fluctuations, the
higher will be the weight of this variable in the interest rate rule. Let us
assume that the Central Bank wants to reach the target in three periods.




(pit+3|t − pi∗)2 (2.14)




= (pit+3|t − pi∗)∂pit+2|t∂it = 0
which is simply: pit+3|t = pi∗. Three-periods-ahead expected inflation is:
pit+3|t = pit+2|t + αyyt+2|t + αqqt+2|t
If we assume that the RER adjusts to the PPP according to (2.5) and that
forecasts of inflation and output gap are made at a constant interest rate ,
after some algebra we obtain the interest rate reaction function, which we
write as:
it =r + pit +
1
αyβr(2 + βy)








Where a = αq(αyβr+3−γ+(1−γ)2)+αyβq(2−γ+βy) . Notice that, with
respect to equation (2.11), the coefficient on current inflation is lower, the
coefficient on the output gap is lower and the coefficient on qt is higher. The
results stemming from this section are summarized in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 In an open economy, the interest rate rule of a Central Bank
pursuing strict Inflation Targeting will have a role for yt and qt, other than
for (pit−pi∗). Other things equal, the interest rate reactivity to real exchange
rate shocks will be larger when the target horizon is longer, when shocks to
qt are more persistent (i.e. γ → 0) and when the exchange rate pass-through
(captured by αq ) is larger.
2.4.3 Flexible Inflation Targeting
We assume a quite general framework for flexible IT here: the flexibility
comes both from a positive weight on output stabilization and a weight put










+ λi (it − it−1)2 + λr(it − pit − r)2 + λyy2t+j|t
]
(2.16)
subject to (2.1), (2.2), (2.4), where the weight on inflation is normalized
to 1 and λi, λr, λy > 0are respectively the relative weight put on interest
rate smoothing (i.e. the central bank wants to avoid excessive interest rate
variability), on interest rate stabilization around the target real rate, and
on output stabilization. Assuming a period-by-period optimization as in the




δ2[(pit+2|t− pi∗)2 + λi(it− it−1)2 + λr(it− pit− r)2 + λyy2t+1|t] (2.17)
and thus the monetary authority takes last year’s policy decision as given,
but disregards the fact that today’s instrument setting will affect next year’s
loss function. When λi = λr = λy = 0, this problem is equivalent to the
intertemporal problem analysed for the case of strict inflation targeting.
Notice that in objective function (2.17) the central bank sets the interest
rate to minimize the two-period-ahead inflation gap and the one-period-
ahead output gap. In principle, there is no fundamental reason why the
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time horizon for the output gap and inflation gap objectives should be the
same; in (2.17) the difference is due to the fact that, given the dynamical
structure of our simple model, the central bank can affect output via the
policy rate after one period, while it takes two periods for inflation to be
influenced by monetary policy. In any case, even if the output gap appeared
in t+2, the results would qualitatively be the same. Minimizing (2.17) with
respect to it yields the following FOC:
− (pit − pi∗)(αq(2− γ) + αy(βr + βq))− λy(βr + βq)yt+1|t+
λi(it − it−1) + λr(it − pit − r) = 0
(2.18)
This is the targeting rule of the central bank, showing that when the policy
rule is flexible inflation targeting, with respect to strict IT, the adjustment
towards the target will be slower due to interest rate smoothing. After some
algebra, the interest rate rule is:
it =
λi
λi + λr + b2βr
it−1 +
b2βr + λr + b1αyβr




λi + λr + b2βr
(pit − pi∗) + b1αy(1 + βy + b2βy)
λi + λr + b2βr
yt+
(b2βq + b1(αq(2− γ) + αyβq))(1− γ)
λi + λr + b2βr
qt
(2.19)
where b1 = αq(2 − γ) + αy(βr + βq) and b2 = λy(βr + βq). Two things are
worth noticing. First of all, as in the strict IT case, although the monetary
authority does not have a target for the real exchange rate, it will respond to
its fluctuations since it affects expected inflation and the expected output
gap. The second result which is worth noticing is that the coefficients of
the ”Taylor Rule” (2.19) are convolutions of structural parameters and the
preference parameters λi, λr, λy. When λi and λr are different from zero,
interest rate variability is lower with respect to the case of strict IT.Finally,
when λy > 0, the monetary authority’s reaction to output and real exchange
rate fluctuations will be larger, and that to inflation smaller, than in strict
IT. The results on flexible inflation targeting are summarized in Proposition
2.
Proposition 2 The interest rate rule of a Central Bank pursuing flexible
Inflation Targeting will have coefficients on (pit − pi∗) , yt and qt that are
convolutions of structural parameters and the preference parameters λx =
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[λy, λi, λr]. If lambdax = 0 we go back to the strict IT case. Other things
equal, the larger any element in λx , the lower the response to inflation
fluctuations, and the larger the response to fluctuations in yt and qt . As in
strict IT, other things equal, the interest rate reactivity to shocks to qt will
be larger when γ → 0.
2.4.4 Fear of Floating
Let us now move to the case of ”Fear of Floating” or exchange rate smooth-
ing. In order to concentrate on the role of the exchange rate, we will assume
here that the weight on interest rate smoothing and output stabilization is
zero, i.e. λi = λi = λi = 0. The period loss function will be:
Lt =
1
2 [(pit − pi∗)2 + λe(et − et−1)2]
and thus we allow for a weight λe > 0 for exchange rate smoothing, that
is, for a separate exchange rate objective in the monetary policy. In order
to keep things simple, as it was stated above (see fn. 16) we will assume
here that the Central Bank adopts a period-by-period optimization as we
did above. This, other than being an acceptable restriction as we explained
in section 2.4.1, will simplify matters and we will not have to resort to a
numerical solution, while still being able to understand the consequences
of fear of floating on the interest rate rule. The objective function of the




[(pit − pi∗)2 + λe(et − et−1)2] (2.20)
subject to: pit+2 = pit+1 + αyyt+1 + αqqt+1 + ξt+2. Recall that expected
two-period-ahead inflation was written in (5.9) as:
pit+2|t = pit + αy(1 + βy)yt + (αq + αyβq)qt − αyβr(it − pit − r) + αqqt+1|t
The FOC for minimizing (2.20) with respect to the repo rate is:
pit = pi
∗ − λe
δ2(αyβy + αq(2− γ) + αyβr)(et − et−1) (2.21)
We can compare (2.21) with the FOC in the strict IT case: with fear of
floating, expected inflation two periods ahead is equal to the target only if
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the exchange rate is stable. If the exchange rate in the current period is
weak compared to the previous period, i.e. et > et−1 , then the interest rate
is kept at a level higher than what would ensure that the inflation target is
reached in t + 2, and therefore pit+2|t < pi∗. The opposite holds when the
exchange rate is falling. The deviation from the target will be higher the
larger is γ, that is, the faster the real exchange rate tends to converge to
PPP. In other words, when PPP holds it is harder to control the exchange
rate via interest rate intervention and thus more costly in terms of deviation
of inflation from the Central Bank’s target. After some algebra, the interest














where c1 = δ
2(αyβq + αq(2− γ) + αyβr).













;c3 = (αq(2 − γ) + αyβq)(1 − γ) + λeγc1 . Apart from the ana-
lytical complexity of the coefficients, we can see from (2.23) that, with fear
of floating, the interest rate response to shocks to inflation and the real ex-
change rate will be stronger than in strict and flexible inflation targeting,
since b1 is positive. Moreover, as in the previous case, the lower the adjust-
ment coefficient γ, the stronger its role in the interest rate rule. The results
of the case of Fear of Floating are summarized in Proposition 3 below. The
results obtained in sections 2.4.1−2.4.4 are summarized in Table 2.2, which
classifies the policy rules according to the interest rate reactivity to shocks
of different nature.
Proposition 3 The interest rate rule of a Central Bank with fear of floating
and zero weight on output stabilization will feature larger reaction coefficients
for shocks to pit and qt with respect to strict and flexible IT. Such coefficients
are convolutions of structural parameters and the preference parameter λe.
The interest rate response to exchange rate fluctuations will be larger when
γ → 0. All other conclusions drawn in Proposition 1 are confirmed.
70 Chapter 2
The definitions ”low”, ”medium” and ”high” should be interpreted as
relative with respect to the other three regimes included in the analysis; in
order to say anything on the magnitude of the coefficients, we need param-
eter values from the structural model.
pi y q if
Exchange Rate Targeting Nil Nil High High
Strict Inflation Targeting High Low Low Low
Flexible Inflation Targeting Low Medium Medium Low
Fear of Floating High Medium High High
Table 2.2: Interest Rate reaction to different shocks.
2.5 A stylized model of the Swedish economy
The first step in the empirical analysis is the estimation of a small
model for the Swedish economy. This will allow us to obtain the empirical
counterparts of the theoretical model in Section 5. Depending on the cho-
sen specification18 , the literature seems to have reached a consensus on the
minimal set of variables that should be present in an empirical model aimed
at representing aggregate demand and supply in a small open economy; this
includes domestic and foreign output (gap), price level (or inflation), short-
term interest rates, the (nominal or real) exchange rate and possibly some
commodity price index 19. In our case, the ”rest of the world” is proxied by
the euro area, and the exchange rate is therefore the bilateral rate. This as-
sumption is not overly restrictive; almost 60% of Swedish international trade
is with the euro area, and a similar assumption is quite common in the liter-
ature on small open economies20. As far as the sample period is concerned,
we only consider data from the inflation targeting era, i.e. from 1995 on.
This will help us to avoid the risk of including different regimes while main-
taining a sufficient number of observations: in fact, Sweden was a member
18i.e., whether the one at hand is a model with stationary or cointegrated variables.
19See, for example, Eichembaum and Evans (1995), Jacobson et al. (2001); Kim and
Roubini (1997) also include a commodity price index, while Betts et al. (1996) and
Camarero et al. (2002) augment the system with a (domestic and foreign) monetary
aggregate.
20Betts et al. (1996), for example, in a Cointegration analysis for Canada, use the U.S.
as a proxy for the rest of the world.
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of the ERM from 1986 to 1992, then abandoned it because of speculative
attacks to the Krona. Between 1992:4 and 1994:4, Sweden suffered from a
severe economic downturn and financial crisis, while on the other hand, the
inflation targeting regime, coupled with a flexible exchange rate, was being
put in place. Inflation targeting was not, however, adopted officially until
January 1995; moreover, Sweden entered the European Union in the same
month and, although its economy was already well integrated with the rest
of Europe, it is plausible that this fostered further economic integration. For
this reason, we will restrict ourselves to the period from 1995 to 2008, using
quarterly data. There are several alternative empirical strategies to identify
a set of equations that could be interpreted as a small structural model for
the Swedish economy. Two alternative approaches are VAR (Vector Autore-
gressive) models and structural econometric models. VAR models are the
most general, a-theoretical models to describe the macroeconomy. Once the
choice on the set of variables and the number of lags (on the basis of infor-
mation criteria and likelihood ratio tests) is made, the researcher ”lets the
data speak” and, given an empirically congruent representation of the DGP,
imposes restrictions to identify long-run (in Cointegrated VARs, CVARs)
relations among the variables or structural shocks (in Structural VARs -
SVARs). The main drawback of VARs, however, is that they are very de-
manding in terms of data needed. As the number of variables and lags
increases, the number of parameters increases quickly, raising the so-called
problem of ”vanishing degrees of freedom” of VARs, not to mention the fact
that, in the case of CVARs, tables for the rank test have been developed
only for models with up to 11 variables 21. On the other hand, structural
econometric models are identified by imposing restrictions on the parameters
of the models; they are more parsimonious than VARs and therefore more
reliable when the number of observations is limited; finally, all restrictions
imposed on the system are testable, while the same is not true for SVARs,
identified using recursive and/or sign restrictions. For these reasons, we
will stick to structural econometric models. Since we do not know what
the ”true” data generating process (DGP) is, we will start from specifying
a statistical model which should be general enough to deliver a congruent
representation of the true DGP. In other words, in the first stage we will
estimate regression equations similar to (2.1) - (2.4) specified as general
21For a discussion, see Johnston, DiNardo (1997), Chp. 9.
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polynomial lags models 22:






qt = g0 + g1(L)qt−1 + 
q
t (2.26)
Equations (2.24) − (2.26) represent our empirical model; the identification
assumptions embodied in this model are quite standard in the literature and
resemble the (simpler) theoretical model in section 5: first, Monetary Policy
cannot affect output and prices immediately; the setting of interest rates
affects the real exchange rate immediately and output with some lag; this
will, in turn, affect inflation. Second, the foreign (i.e. ”large”) economy vari-
ables and commodity inflation are exogenous; thus, shocks originating in the
domestic economy (Sweden) have no impact on Europe and on commodity
prices. Equation (2.24) is an Aggregate Demand equation normalized on the
domestic output gap; output depends on its past values, on the real interest
rate, the growth in world demand (proxied by euro area output growth, ∆w
) and the real exchange rate. The presence of the contemporaneous foreign
growth rate allows for synchronized shocks to output. Equation (2.25) is an
aggregate supply equation, where inflation is determined by past inflation,
imported inflation (i.e. the euro area inflation rate), resource utilization (the
past output gap), convergence to the purchasing power parity and commod-
ity price inflation, ∆C4. Equation (2.26) is just a more general represen-
tation of (2.5) and shows how the real exchange rate corrects to the PPP;
when
∑L
l=1 g1l < 1the real exchange rate is stationary. We will further test
the validity of the real interest parity, that was included in the theoretical
model of section 5. The RIP shows how q is immediately affected by mone-
tary policy shocks (i.e. changes in the interest rate). The first step will be
to estimate the model equation by equation, in order to impose restrictions
on the dynamics of each regression. Equations (2.24) to (2.26) are thus esti-
mated by OLS . Once each equation is estimated and passes all specification
tests, we simplify the dynamic structure by dropping the parameters which
are not significant at 5%, following a limited information approach and mak-
22The empirical model here is similar to Golinelli and Rovelli (2005), although unlike
them we do not include a Taylor Rule, since it will be estimated separately in the next
section.
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ing sure that the parsimonious model residuals are white noise. Finally, we
re-estimate the simultaneous equations model, with further restrictions, by
Constrained Full Information Maximum Likelihood (CFIML). Inflation is
measured as the annual change in the CPI ; the real exchange rate is de-
fined as: qt = et + p
f
t − pt where p is the (log) swedish price level and pf
is the european CPI; e is the nominal bilateral SEK/Euro exchange rate;
commodity prices are measured using the IMF index for all commodities;
finally, the output gap is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook23. Data
are seasonally and working day adjusted. As a starting point, we chose
L = 3 lags for each equation (2.24) - (2.26). Table 2.3 shows specification
tests for the three equations; notice that the restricted regression equations
are well specified as the residuals are white noise24. Moreover, even when
the variables included in the system are nonstationary, regression is valid as
long as the regressors are cointegrated (see Hsiao, 1997). Nonstationarity of
interest rates and inflation is an issue in the present dataset; the fact that
these variables have a unit root might be disturbing from a theoretical point
of view but it has been widely discussed in the empirical literature 25.
y pi q
Normality 0.783 0.589 0.320
Autocorr. Ljung−Box(4) 0.504 0.111 0.246
ARCH LM(4) 0.995 0.501 0.330
output gap inflation Real E.R.
R2 0.939 0.848 0.999
Table 2.3: Specification tests.
qt = qt+1|t − it + ift − pift + pit + φt where φt = 0.003+?0.645aφt−1 + φt
ADF test on φ τ = -2.01 ; p-value 0.04
Table 2.4: Real interest parity.
23The OECD measures the output gap using the production function approach. The
estimation was robust to the use of a different measure of output gap (obtained using the
HP filter), although the coefficient on y was larger.
24Further single-equation tests were performed which are not reported here and show
that the model is well-specified and no parameter instability seems to be present.
25The argument that inflation is I(1) and therefore prices are I(2), which leads to the
empirical finding of the failure of the PPP and the UIP to hold, has been thoroughly
investigated and discussed, for example, by Juselius (2006) and Johansen et a. (2009).
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The AD curve shows that the real interest rate affects output with three
lags; output also responds to real exchange rate changes and foreign output
growth26:
yt =− 0.002b + 0.803ayt−1 − 0.079b(it−3 − pit−2|t−3)+
+ 0.043b(qt−2 − qt−3) + 0.215b∆wt + yt
(2.27)
The negative (and significant) constant is in line with Hjelm and Jo¨nsson
(2010) who state that an estimation of the Swedish output gap starting in the
beginning of the 1990s necessarily yields an output gap which is negative on
average due to the consequences of the financial crisis of the ’90s. Moreover,
the same authors state that when prices, as well as wages, react more to
positive gaps than to negative gaps, as it is the case for Sweden 27, the
output gap will be negative on average. The Aggregate Supply curve shows
that the inflation rate is positively affected by past inflation, the output gap
two periods before, commodity price inflation and the real exchange rate:
pit = pit−1 + 0.112ayt−2 + 0.085a(qt−1 − qt−3) + 0.018a(∆Ct −∆Ct−1) + pit
(2.28)
The coefficient on inflation was restricted to 1, and this restriction, together
with the restrictions on the coefficients on q and ∆C could not be rejected
with a p-value of 0.104. The restriction on past inflation is also present in
theoretical macro models that have been cited in the present work such
as Svensson (1997). This is equivalent to finding that expectations are
backward-looking and therefore, in the Phillips Curve, piet|t−1 = pit−1
28; thus
we can re-write (2.28) as:
∆pit = 0.112
ayt−2 + 0.085a(qt−1− qt−3) + 0.018a(∆Ct−∆Ct−1) + pit (2.29)
Finally, the real exchange rate is represented here as an AR(1) process: if
the real exchange rate is stationary, as it should occur if purchasing power
parity holds, then it should be mean-reverting and its coefficient significantly
lower than one. In our case, we have:
qt = 1.00qt−1 + 
q
t (2.30)
26a= significant at 1%, b = significant at 5%.
27See also Eliasson (2001).
28See Bagliano et al. (2001), Taylor (1999) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
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The real exchange rate was found to be nonstationary, i.e. purchasing power
parity does not hold The restriction that g1 = 1 could not be rejected with
a p-value of 0.510. While this might sound puzzling from a theoretical
point of view, the fact that the PPP does not hold (if not over very long
time horizons) has been documented in many empirical works29. In other
words, since the coefficient on qt−1 is exactly equal to 1, γ = 0 in (2.5)
and the real exchange rate exhibits a unit root. We have also checked for
possible level shifts at significant dates which might have determined the
nonstationarity of qt but no significant break was found. Apparently, qt
has been steadily depreciating over the sample period, since Sweden had a
lower average inflation rate than the Euro Area, with the nominal exchange
rate not correcting for the imbalance. The overidentified structure of the
system could not be rejected, with a p-value of 0.06530. Table 6.2 shows
the real interest parity equation, which was estimated by 2SLS, and the risk
premium. As it is clear from the table, the risk premium is stationary, with
a positive but insignificant contant term. Summing up, monetary policy
affects inflation indirectly, through different channels: the real exchange
rate channel, with a lag of 1 quarter, and the interest rate channel via the
output gap, after 5 quarters, i.e. 1 year and three months.
2.6 The identification of Central Bank Preferences
We can identify Central Bank preferences by assigning the Central Bank
a loss function to be minimized, as we did in the theoretical model of Section
4, subject to the constraint given by the structure of the economy that was
estimated in Section 5. Once the relevant first order conditions have been
derived, we will estimate them and compare the results we obtain under
alternative policy regimes like those we outlined in Section 4 with the actual
policy adopted by the Riksbank. The general problem is the following. The
29See for example Juselius and McDonald (2004 and 2007) and Juselius (2006) who have
thoroughly investigated the so-called PPP puzzle using a Cointegrated VAR approach.
The failure of PPP to hold has instead been challenged by Rey et al. (2005) who estimate
the half life of PPP to be between 7 and 11 months, using an intersectoral price dataset
issued by Eurostat.
30The complete statistics as well as vector specification tests are available on request.
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δk[λpi(pit+k − pi∗)2 + λyy2t+k + λi(it+k − it+k−1)2+
+ λr(it+k − pit+k − r)2 + λe(et − et−1)2]
(2.31)
Where λx, x = [pi, y, i, r, e] are the weights attached to the various goals of
monetary policy in the present setup; the terms (it − it−1) and (it − pit − r)
as in Section 4 allow for the case of interest rate stabilization and smoothing
31. The loss function is minimized with respect to it subject to the structure
of the economy:
pit = pit−1 + α1yt−2 + α2qt−1 − α3qt−3 + α4∆Ct − α5∆Ct−1 + pit (2.32)
yt = β0 + β1yt−2 − β2(it−3 − pit−3) + β3(qt−2 − qt−3) + β4∆wt + yt (2.33)
qt = qt+1|t − it + ift − pift + pit + φt (2.34)
qt+1|t = (1− γ)qt + qt+1 (2.35)
The structure defined in equations (2.32) - (2.35) is derived from the em-
pirical model estimated in Section 5; the estimated αi and βi coefficients
are reported in table 2.5. Notice that, given the model in Section 5, real
interest parity holds, up to a stationary risk premium; qt is a random walk,
since γ = 0. The five alternative monetary policy strategies are defined by
different weights λx as described in table 2.6: these are precisely the coeffi-
cients we want to estimate within out framework. To this end, we also set
a numerical value for the discount factor. In particular, we set δ = 0.984
which corresponds to a discount rate of around 1.6%; this figure is equal to
the average real interest rate in Sweden over the period we are considering.
The cited works of Favero and Rovelli (2003) and Collins and Siklos (2004)
adopted different approaches to defining δ. The former sets δ = 0.975, while
the latter chooses, for each country, a level of δ consistent with the aver-
age interest rate over the sample period. We therefore follow Collins and
Siklos; however, our results are robust to a (marginally) different choice of
δ. As in Section 4, rather than assuming a ”timeless perspective” for the
central bank, we consider a finite-time horizon, so that we are able to derive
31See also Svensson (1997).
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analytically the first order conditions for all regimes. As far as the length
of the horizon k is concerned, that depends on the monetary policy regime.
In the case of exchange rate targeting, we know from Section 5 that it is
optimal for the Central Bank to passively follow foreign monetary policy,
so the horizon is one period. Within strict inflation targeting, the Central
Bank only has the concern of stabilizing inflation at its target; since, in the
present case, we have seen that the interest rate channel kicks in after 5
quarters, then k = 5. The remaining three regimes are extensions of strict
inflation targeting where the Central Bank wants to minimize fluctuations
in output, the interest rate and/or the exchange rate. Here we set k = 8 to
be consistent with the monetary policy statement of the Riksbank :
[. . .] Monetary Policy is normally focused on achieving the inflation
target within two years. One reason for that is that the effects of mon-
etary policy appear with a lag. Another reason is that the Riksbank,
by aiming at this horizon, can contribute to dampening fluctuations in
the real economy [. . .].
It has been discussed (see Svensson, 1999) that by smoothing the inter-
est rate, the Central Bank might also stabilize output, as a side product. In
other words, when forecasted inflation is above target, rather than imme-
diately setting i to the level that brings inflation back to target as soon as
possible given policy lags, the Central Bank gradually changes the interest
rate, and in this way it minimizes output fluctuations. For this reason, the
time horizon in regimes 3 to 5 is equal to 8 quarters, consistent with the
Riksbank’s official statements. With a horizon of 8 periods and the dynam-
ics given in (2.32) − (2.35), the first order conditions for regimes 2 to 5 of
Table 2.6 would be particularly complicated, with many collinear terms; this
collinearity is an increasing function of the length of the horizon 32.
To obtain a manageable solution we consider for those regimes a period-
by-period optimization, as discussed in Section 5. This, however, is not an
overly strong simplifying assumption as it appears consistent with official
Central Bank statements. Moreover, this approach has the advantage, on
the empirical side, that it allows us to estimate policy rules relying only
on official forecasts of inflation 33 . The availability of official forecasts is
32See Favero and Rovelli (2003).
33Over the whole sample, only forecasts at t, t+4 and t+8 are available. If we adopted
a finite-time horizon, also pit+1|t,· · · , pit+7|t and yt+1|t,. . ., yt+7|t would appear in the FOC
and they would need to be instrumented.
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a serious advantage of the present analysis. Real-time forecasts are very
attractive because they can be considered predetermined variables in period
t, and consistent parameter estimates can be computed running least squares
regression. In fact, since the actual forecast rather than a proxy is available,
the former can be used as a regressor, and one does not need to revert
to instrumental variable estimation. Empirical Taylor rules generally put a
very high coefficient on monetary policy inertia and this appears to be due to
a weak instrument problem (see Consolo and Favero, 2009). By using real-
time forecasts we can circumvent this limitation of monetary policy rules
estimation, and this is another strength of the present empirical analysis.
α0 1.000 α4 0.018 β2 0.079
α1 0.112 α5 0.018 β3 0.043
α2 0.085 β0 -0.002 β4 0.215
α3 0.085 β1 0.803 γ 0
Table 2.5: Estimated structural coefficients
Regimes weightsλpi λy λi λr λe
1. Exchange Rate Targ. 0 0 0 0 1
2. Strict Inflation Targ. 1 0 0 0 0
3. Interest Rate Smoothing 1 0 > 0 > 0 0
4. Flexible Inflation Targ. 1 > 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0
5. Fear of Floating 1 ≥ ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0
Table 2.6: Preference parameters and monetary policy regimes.
2.6.1 Exchange Rate Targeting
In the case of Exchange Rate Targeting, the policy rule to be estimated is:
it = κ1i
f
t + ψt (2.36)
where we should have κ1 = 1 and ψt should be stationary. The results are
presented in Table 2.7. The restriction to 1 is rejected at all significance
levels, and residuals are nonstationary; thus, while the two interest rates
have been moving closely, a ”strict exchange rate targeting” policy cannot
well mirror swedish monetary policy in the last 14 years. This is not a
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surprise: while there is a doubt that the Riksbank might have put some
weight on exchange rate stabilization, it is clear from both official statements
and its actions that in several occasions it actually pursued an interest rate
policy that did not always follow that of the ECB.
Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat. P-Value
κ1 1.262 0.071 17.70 0.000
Restriction: κ1 = 1 F (1, 55) = 13.506 p− value : 0.001
R2 = 0.851 S.E. Of Regression:0.0166 Mean of Dep. Var.: 0.0391
ψ ADF (with const): τ = -1.526 p-val:0.119 ψt = −0.001 + 0.941ψat−1
Estimation method: OLS. Standard Errors are HAC. a = significant at 1%.
Table 2.7: Exchange rate targeting estimation results.
2.6.2 Strict Inflation Targeting
As anticipated above, in order to have a manageable solution we will assume
a period-by-period optimization as discussed in Section 4. We know from
Section 5 that, in Sweden, it takes 5 quarters for monetary policy to affect
the inflation rate via the interest rate channel. Minimizing equation (2.31)





+ r + pit +
1
α1β2







The corresponding unrestricted equation is:
it = k0 + r + k1pit + k2(pit+4|t − pi∗) + k3yt+2|t + k4∆wt+5|t (2.38)
Notice from (2.37) that, due to the structure of the economy, the real ex-
change rate and the commodity price index are cancelled from the interest
rate rule, since α2 = α3 and α4 = α5. In the present case, with strict infla-
tion targeting, when the central bank is responding to forecasted inflation
and output gap, the coefficients on q and commodity price inflation should
thus be zero, as q and ∆C only have a role as predictors of future inflation.
If the Riksbank has indeed been following strict inflation targeting, the ac-
tual and optimal interest rate reaction functions should not be too different
from each other; by imposing the appropriate restrictions we should there-
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fore reconcile (2.37) with (2.38). That is, the following restrictions should










Table 2.8, column 3 reports the results of the strict IT case. A Wald
Test on the above restrictions rejected them at all significance levels. The
estimated interest rate rule would imply a higher interest rate variability
than what is observed in practice, but still it can capture the behaviour of
the Swedish policy interest rates moderately well; a strict inflation targeting
rule with optimal coefficients as derived from our structural model estimated
in the previous section, instead, does not predict correctly the magnitude
of the coefficients. Indeed, the optimal coefficients if the Riksbank had
actually been pursuing strict IT would have been much larger, and the
interest rate variability extremely high. This result is in line with those in
Favero and Rovelli (2003) and Collins and Siklos (2004) and the prediction
of the theoretical model by Svensson (2000).
2.6.3 Interest rate stabilization and smoothing
In the case of interest rate stabilization and smoothing, we set λy and λe
equal to zero in (2.31) and k = 8; minimizing the loss function with respect
to it we obtain the following first order condition:
δ8(pit+8|t − pi∗)
(
(−2α2 − α1β2)(1 + β1 + β21 + β31)
)
+ λi(it − it−1) + λr(it −
pit − r) = 0













(pit+8|t − pi∗) (2.39)




1). Two things are worth
noticing: first, output does not appear in the first order condition, i.e. the
central bank responds to output only as an indicator of forecasted inflation.
In other words, they are included in the forecast pit+8|t produced by the
Central Bank. The problem with (2.39) is that the coefficients are not
uniquely identified. In order to achieve identification, we have to impose
further restrictions, either on the target real interest rate, that we have
assumed to be constant 34, or on k1. We choose the latter option, imposing
34Collins and Siklos (2004), within a different macroeconomic framework - do not assume
a constant target real interest rate and take it to be given by the trend from an HP filter
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1), where α1, α2, β1 and
β2 are those given in Table 2.6, while leaving the constant r unrestricted and
then check if the estimated equation is meaningful and able to replicate the
observed path of policy interest rates. We estimated equation (2.39) by NLS
and the estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2.8. The results suggest
that the Riksbank might have been pursuing interest rate stabilization and
smoothing. Given that the weight on expected inflation is normalized to
1, we estimate that the relative weight on interest rate smoothing was over
41% and the weight on interest rate stabilization close to 8%. The target
real rate over the sample period was 1.46. With respect to the previous case,
the fit of the regression has largely improved, with the adjusted R2 going
from 0.35 to 0.97.
2.6.4 Flexible Inflation Targeting
In the empirical counterpart of Section 2.4.3 we minimize (2.31) with respect
to it setting λe = 0 and k = 8. The interest rate rule resulting when we
























1(β1β3 + β2). Again, the
real exchange rate as well as foreign output and commodity inflation do not
play a direct role in the Euler Equation but, being themselves predictors of
inflation and, in particular, the output gap (which is endogenous in (2.40)),
they should be included as instruments. As in the previous case, in order to
achieve identification, we restrict k1 and k2 using the parameters estimated
in the structural model, and limit ourselves to the estimation of the λ’s and
the target real rate. Column 5 in Table 2.8 shows the results for flexible
inflation targeting. According to our estimates, the Riksbank has not been
following flexible IT. The coefficient on the expected output gap is positive
but not significant and this result was robust to a different choice of the
time horizon for output (in particular, setting the target for the output gap
of the observed real rate. In this case, we would have to impose the restriction that
the coefficients on the (time−varying) r and on current inflation are equal. We have
already discussed in Section 6 the pitfalls related to the use of HP filters; moreover, it
is not unreasonable to imagine that, when there are no regime shifts or major policy or
structural changes, the target real interest rate is constant.
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to be one year). The estimated target real interest rate is up to 2This result
suggests that the objective of ”dampening fluctuations in the real economy”
as stated in the Riksbank’s monetary policy statement has probably been
fulfilled by smoothing the interest rate and, at the same time, choosing a
horizon for the inflation target which is longer than necessary, rather than by
directly responding to the output gap. Moreover, this result is consistent to
what was obtained by Favero and Rovelli (2003) on the U.S. and Collins and
Siklos (2004) on Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Finally, interestingly
this confirms the results in Cecchetti et al. (2002). In fact, in their model
the loss function of the Central Bank features only inflation and output
and, in the case of Sweden (although within a different time period) and the
dynamic estimate suggests a 97% weight on inflation and 3% on output.
2.6.5 Fear of Floating
The case of Fear of Floating is analyzed minimizing (2.31) with respect to it
while leaving all λx unrestricted and setting k = 8. Rearranging, and using
(2.35) to get rid of the endogenous contemporaneous nominal exchange rate,






















where k5 and k6 are the same as in (2.40). Column 7 in Table 2.8 shows the
results of the GMM estimation of (2.41) when we assume that the objective
function of the Central Bank is (2.31); since, in the previous section, we
estimated λy to be insignificant, we also estimated (2.41) with λy = 0 and
Column 8 shows the results for this alternative rule. The GMM estimation
suggests that the Riksbank might indeed have put some weight on exchange
rate stabilization; the relative weight in the objective function is quite small
(2.6%) but significant at all levels. However, this result is not robust to
the specification of the interest rate rule with λy = 0, since λe becomes
insignificant. We can therefore conclude that ”Fear of Floating” (at least
via the policy interest rate) cannot describe the preferences of the Riksbank
between 1995 and 2008 well, and thus the sources of the SEK/euro exchange















































































R2 0.385 0.967 0.958 0.953 0.953
Reg. SE 1.3847 0.325 0.361 0.382 0.382
D.W.Stat. 1.065 1.063
J-stat. 0.1642 0.201 0.238
GMM NLS GMM GMM NLS
HAC S.E. in Parenthesis. Instruments in GMM: first four lags of pi, y,i, ∆w, ∆C, ∆e
Table 2.8: Estimation of Central Bank Preferences: Results.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed an approach to estimate Central Bank
preferences within a small open economy starting from the monetary author-
ity’s optimization problem. When the official regime is Inflation Targeting,
the issue of the role played by the exchange rate in the policy rule becomes
relevant, and yet it has not received a definite answer so far. On one hand,
the literature on inflation targeting suggests that the exchange rate can
only play an indirect role in the interest rate rule as a predictor of inflation,
because responding directly to exchange rate fluctuations would result in
excessive interest rate fluctuations. On the other hand, the literature on
exchange rate regimes classification has shown that as far as the exchange
rate policy is concerned, (small open economies) Central Banks’ de facto
policies often deviate from the de jure regime, and this ends up in a situa-
tion, for many countries with flexible exchange rates, of implicit exchange
rate smoothing, that has been termed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ”Fear
of Floating”. A CPI Inflation targeting regime can, as a side product, con-
tribute to the stabilization of the exchange rate and therefore it can be hard
to distinguish it from a Fear of Floating regime just using the techniques
suggested by the literature on exchange rate classification.
By estimating Central Bank preferences using the approach suggested by
Favero and Rovelli (2003) and Collins and Siklos (2004), we were able to
bridge the gap between exchange rate regime classification schemes and the
literature on the estimation of monetary policy rules including explicitly
exchange rate smoothing in the Central Bank’s objective function. At the
same time, we could overcome a well-known critique on Taylor rule coeffi-
cients: since they are a convolution of structural and preference parameters,
they cannot be given a structural interpretation.
Sweden was the object of the empirical analysis for two main reasons: it
has a history of 15 years of Inflation Targeting and the exchange rate of its
currency with the euro has shown a substantial stability in the recent years,
raising the doubt that some sort of exchange rate smoothing could have
been in place. The results suggest that the Riksbank has been following a
policy of Inflation Targeting with interest rate stabilization and smoothing,
but not Fear of Floating.
The stabilization of the Krona/euro exchange rate, therefore, does not seem
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to have come through interest rate setting. This result does not conflict with
Edwards (2006) who states that direct stabilization of the exchange rate via
the policy interest rate, in a regime of inflation targeting, would result in ex-
cessive interest rate volatility, which is not observed in practice. Therefore,
the decrease in the SEK/euro exchange rate volatility might have come only
through the reserves channel, as suggested in Chapter 1, or be the result of
the convergence of the business cycles in the two regions, which made sure
that the ECB and the Riksbank have been synchronizing their interest rate
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sectors in Eastern Europe
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to study the interactions and spillovers in wage
determination across different macro sectors. In particular, we analyze this
interplay in three broad sectors: the open (internationally traded) sector,
the closed or sheltered sector, which can also be called the market non-
traded sector, and the public sector, also called the non-market, non-traded
sector. The focus of this work is on Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC) that have joined the European Union during the last decade.
This issue is relevant for several reasons. First, public sector employ-
ment is large and relevant: in the OECD, around 25% of the work force is
employed in the public sector. Second, wage spillovers across sectors may
lead to wage costs growing faster than productivity and this may affect the
international cost competitiveness of the country’s tradable goods sector.
In particular, theoretical models generally assume that the traded sector is
leader in wage determination and there is free mobility of labor across sec-
tors which, in turn, ensures wage equalization. This is assumed, for example,
by the Froot and Rogoff (1995) model of the Balassa-Samuelson (henceforth
B-S) effect, and the so-called Scandinavian Model of wage determination
(Aukrust (1970), see Section 3). If these assumptions hold, during the pro-
cess of catching-up excess inflation will be witnessed and the real exchange
rate will appreciate, but, on the other hand, only wages in the non-traded
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sector should grow faster than productivity, and therefore competitiveness
should not be harmed. However, it can also happen that wage bargaining
in the non-traded sector, which is not subject to international competition,
and/or in the public sector, which is influenced by political rather than pro-
ductivity considerations, may lead to higher outcomes and, in turn, push
traded sector wages up. A large strand of empirical literature that has tried
to measure the B-S effect has found that it can only account for a small part
of the excess inflation observed in Central and Eastern European Countries
1, while other factors like the switch to consumption of higher quality goods
might be at play 2. This paper, by rigorously testing whether the hypoth-
esis of wage leadership of the traded sector is valid, studies an additional
potential source of fallacy of the B-S hypothesis 3. Further, testing wage
leadership in the case of Central and Eastern European transition Countries
is important because they are in the process of catching up: entry in the
EU, which also fostered international labor mobility, may have influenced
wage determination in these countries, so that prices and wages converge
to the western European level faster than productivity, thus leaving room
for competitiveness loss. As long as the leader in wage setting is the traded
sector, the problem is not relevant. But if this is not the case, increased
labor mobility together with union pressures might lead to a decoupling of
real and nominal convergence, i.e. price convergence occurring faster than
productivity convergence. From a policy perspective, this would be worrying
since we would expect catching-up to occur at the cost of large international
imbalances. The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, while there is
limited existing literature on public/private wage spillovers, no empirical
work to date, to our knowledge, studies the issue from the three-sector per-
spective that is adopted here. Second, this is the first work on the topic
which focuses on transition countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
wage spillovers across the public and private sector. Section 3 presents three
alternative models of wage determination and causality. Section 4 outlines
1See, for example, Mihaljek and Klau (2003), Egert (2003,2007).
2See Egert (2010).
3Empirical models testing the size of the B-S effect in CEECs often estimate a regression
equation having CPI inflation differential as dependent variable and dual productivity
growth differential (productivity growth in tradeables vs. non-tradeables) as explanatory
variable. This is the result of assuming that wages in T grow in step with productivity.
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the empirical model, a Cointegrated VAR; section 5 describes the data set
and presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature on wage spillovers
While this is not a paper on wage setting models, the literature on wage
setting is indeed relevant for the topic. In particular, since we are dealing
with the issue of externalities in wage determination, we are interested in
models studying the impact of centralization of wage setting and its impact
on the overall macroeconomic performance. In principle, we can imagine
different degrees of centralization in wage setting, ranging from firm-level
bargaining (no centralization) to national bargaining. The outcome of the
bargaining process will therefore depend, among other things, on how much
wage setting is centralized. According to the Calmfors - Driffill hypothesis
(Calmfors and Driffil, 1988) both firm-level bargaining and national bargain-
ing are likely to produce wage moderation, while industry-level bargaining
tends to produce higher real wages. In other words, the relationship be-
tween the real wage and the extent of centralization is a hump-shaped curve
(see Figure 3.1). The reason for this is that in the case of no centralization,
with perfect competition, firms will not increase wages above productivity
because they are price takers, and thus cannot increase prices when the real
consumption wage is raised by the firm and not elsewhere in the sector.
However, such wage moderation is restrained if firms have market power.
On the other hand, with national bargaining, firms and unions internalize
the negative externalities produced by aggregate real wage increases 4 and
thus the outcome will be a lower wage level. Other things equal, however,
when the economy is open the employment and profit losses due to real wage
increases are dampened in centralized systems (which therefore tend to have
higher wages), but this will in any case depend on the degree of competition
between domestic and foreign producers (Calmfors, 1993).
4There are several kinds of externalities in this sense: Consumer price externalities,
since prices will increase (Layard et al. [1991]); Input price externalities, since the price
of inputs will go up; fiscal externalities due to higher unemployment benefits that have to
be paid since higher wages reduce employment (Blanchard and Summers (1987), Calmfors
and Driffill (1988); envy externalities, if the welfare of an agent depends on the wage of
other agents, and thus we have forms of social comparisons (Oswald (1979) and others).
For a broader discussion, see Calmfors (1993).
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Figure 3.1: The relationship between centralization and the aggregate real wage.
The literature on inter-sectoral wage spillovers, in particular private and
public wages, is quite scarce. Theoretical models generally assume that
public wages are exogenous or follow the same pattern as private wages
(Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Ardagna (2007)). Demekas and Kontolemis
(2000), instead, in a static model show that public wages can affect pri-
vate sector wages through the labor supply channel: when public wages
increase, workers move to that sector, and private firms are forced to in-
crease wages too. As far as the direction of causality is concerned, the main
theoretical reference is the so-called Scandinavian model of wage determi-
nation (Aukrust, 1970). This model assumes that the sector that is open to
international competition is the leader in wage setting, since productivity
should increase faster in the traded goods sector and firms there cannot in-
crease wages above productivity, because they would otherwise become less
competitive 5. In this sense, also public sector wages should be led by pri-
vate sector wages. Evidence in favor the Scandinavian Model was found by
Aukrust for Norway, the U.S. and France, while Bemmels and Zaidi (1990)
successfully applied it to Canada. However, this model has been found
to be at odds with more recent data. Ultimately, the results seem to be
country-dependent. Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) find weak exogeneity
of government wages over private wages. Jacobsson and Ohlsson (1994), in
5An outline of this model is presented in the next section.
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a Vector Error Correction Model for Sweden, find long-run wage leadership
of the private sector, thus confirming the predictions of the Scandinavian
model, but Friberg (2007), using a broader sectoral decomposition 6 does not
find evidence of the Scandinavian model for Sweden. Christou et al. (2007)
show a bidirectional causality relationship between private and public sector
wages in Romania using monthly wages over the period 1993-2006. Lamo
et al. (2008) used several empirical methods to study the co-movement and
causality relationship between private and public wages using annual data
for 18 OECD countries (plus the Euro Area as a whole), finding that private
and public wages generally do not decouple and the former seem to exert a
stronger influence on the latter than the reverse; moreover, they find that
prices seem to play an important role in the transmission of wage leadership.
None of the cited works is applied to transition countries (with the excep-
tion of Christou et al.), and, more importantly, none decomposes the private
sector into a traded and non-traded sector, which is relevant when we want
to understand the role of wage spillovers in affecting competitiveness. In
fact, as we will see in the next section, not only a leading role of public
sector wages but also of non-traded goods sector wages can lead to traded
sector wages growing faster than productivity and thus harm the country’s
international competitiveness.
3.3 Three competing theories of wage determina-
tion
When dealing with inter-sectoral wage spillovers, theoretical models gen-
erally assume that the leader in wage determination is the sector that is
exposed to international competition, i.e. the traded sector. However, as
it was outlined in the previous section, the results obtained by the empiri-
cal literature are often at odds with this hypothesis. Alternative models of
inter-sectoral wage linkages can therefore be imagined.
In this section we will outline three alternative theories of wage determina-
tion and inter-sectoral wage spillovers. This will allow us to come up with
testable hypotheses that will be taken to the data. The first model is the
6In particular, he distinguishes between private sector, manufacturing sector, construc-
tion, wholesale and retail trade, financial sector, central government and county/municipal
government.
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main theoretical reference as far as inter-sectoral wage linkages and expected
causality is concerned, and it is the so-called ”Scandinavian Model” of in-
flation, which was first developed by Aukrust (1970) 7. The Scandinavian
Model rests on three fundamental assumptions: (1) the different sectors in
the economy can be classified as either traded (exposed) sectors or non-
traded (sheltered) sectors; (2) wage increases in the traded sectors can be
expected to be transmitted to wage increases in the non-traded sectors of
the economy, and therefore wage decisions are not taken simultaneously;
(3) the exchange rate is fixed. In the original model we have two sectors
(traded, T, and nontraded, N) and two countries (home, H, and foreign, F).
We add the public sector as a non-traded, non-market sector and label it P.
The timing structure of the model is pictured in figure 3.2, panel (a).
Figure 3.2: Three models of wage spillovers.
In this highly stylized model, nominal wages in the traded sector are
determined by the productivity in that sector and the prices obtainable
7Aukrust (1970) first developed this model to describe price dynamics in Norway, and
tested it on that country. However, Aukrust’s model was applied to other countries’ data to
test for inter-sectoral wage linkages: France, USA and Australia (Aukrust, 1977), Canada
(Bemmels and Zaidi, 1990), Sweden (Friberg et al. (2004), Friberg (2007), Jacobson and
Ohlsson (1994)).
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internationally for the output of those firms 8:
wT,t = pT,t + cT,t + ηT,t (3.1)
where cT,t is productivity, pT are prices and ηT represents stationary devia-
tions from this long-run equilibrium relation. Labor is mobile across sectors;
for this reason wage equalization occurs:
wN,t = µN.1 + θN.1 · wT,t + ηN,t (3.2)
wP,t = µP.1 + θP.1 · wT,t + ηP,t (3.3)
where θi.1 ≥ 0, i = N,P are parameters describing the degree of wage
adaptability across sectors. The Scandinavian model concludes that not
only should wages in different sectors co-move, but the transmission of wage
shocks should be one to one, a testable hypothesis that we will term ”full
wage adaptability”. In other words, according to the Scandinavian Model
the deviations from equilibrium, ηj , j = N,P, T should be stationary, µN.1 =
µP.1 = 0 and θN.1 = θP.1 = 1. Finally, firms in the non-traded sector set the
prices for their goods and services accordingly, in order to avoid losses 9, so
that
pN,t = wN,t − cN,t + ηPN ,t (3.4)
As a result, non-traded goods prices will increase more than traded goods
prices, a result which is in line with the so-called ”internal version” of the
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. A peculiar argument may be relevant for
transition countries that have entered the European Union. The catching
up process of transition countries, in terms of productivity and price level,
has been documented in many studies on the Balassa-Samuelson effect 10.
However, when a country joins the European Union, the liberalization of
labor mobility across countries could itself foster wage convergence with the
8The model outlined here heavily draws on Aukrust (1977).
9One additional assumption that we have left implicit is that productivity growth is
higher in the traded sector than in the non-traded sector. This assumption, which is
empirically sound, is also at the basis of the so-called Baumol-Bowen effect that the price
wedge between non-tradables and tradables should be co-moving with productivity. If this
assumption did not hold, then we could either have pN growing more than pT (if firms in
N set prices under mark-up pricing) or less than pT (if there is pricing-to-market in N).
10A small subset includes Mihaljek and Klau (2001), Egert (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2007),
Fischer (2004), Dobrinsky (2006) and Staher (2010).
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Union. This, in turn, can be due to convergence in productivity, but also to
migration of labor to countries with higher wage levels or increased union
pressures for wage raises. In the latter two cases, wage increases can harm
the competitiveness of the country if they are above productivity growth. In
the B-S hypothesis, instead, labor is assumed to be internationally immobile.
As long as the traded sector is the leader in wage determination, pres-
sures due to international competition will avoid wage increases in excess of
productivity. However, alternative models of inter-sectoral wage spillovers
might be in place, and the empirical analysis in the next section will prove
that this is indeed the case. As it was pointed out by Friberg (2007), non-
traded sector firms operate in a less competitive environment, since they
are not subject to international competition: therefore, wage bargaining in
non-traded sectors may lead to higher outcomes, ceteris paribus. This is not
the only issue, since in the present paper we further distinguish, within non-
traded sector wages, market non-traded and from non-market non-traded
(public) sector wages. Theoretical models of public sector wage setting gen-
erally assume that wages for public employees are set exogenously or, as in
Demekas and Kontolemis (2000), that the government maximizes an objec-
tive function in public goods provision and public wages (a form of political
patronage). In this sense, also wage bargaining in the public sector may
lead to higher outcomes, depending on the political pressure that public
employees are able to exert on the government. If the mobility of labor
across sectors is high and therefore wages tend to equalize, a leading role in
wage setting of either the public sector or the non-traded sector can harm
international competitiveness. We can sketch models of wage determination
which are parallel to the Scandinavian model for these two cases.
A model with the non-traded sector leading is pictured in figure 3.2,
panel (b). For practical reasons, we will call it the ”wage mark-up model”.
Nominal wages in the non-traded sector are set according to productivity in
that sector, the prices that firms can obtain on the internal market, and the
mark-up on productivity that unions are able to extract from employers, m:
wN,t = pN,t + cN,t +mN,t + ηN,t (3.5)
Pressures for wage equalization across sectors due to free intersectoral
labor mobility, as in the previous case, will make sure that wages in T and
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P adjust to wN:
wT,t = µT.2 + θT.2 · wN,t + ηT,t (3.6)
wP,t = µP.2 + θP.2 · wN,t + ηP,t (3.7)
where again µT.2 = µP.2 = 0 and θT.2 = θP.2 = 1 if full wage adaptability
holds and ηj , j = N,P, T are stationary i.i.d. disturbances. The firms in
the traded sector, then, will set the prices of their goods according to the
level of wages and the productivity in the sector:
pT,t = wT,t − cT,t + ηpT ,t 11
and this in turn causes real appreciation. Thus, unless a nominal exchange
rate depreciation occurs, it will lead to the country’s firms becoming less
competitive on the international markets 12. In this case, the presence of low
wage adaptability ( θT.2 < 1 ) might offset (at least partially) the negative
effect of public sector wages on competitiveness. Finally, Figure 3.2, panel
(c) pictures the case of the public sector leading the other two. We will call
this the ”envy-effect model” (Friberg (2007), Strom (1995)).In this case, we
assume (following Ardagna (2007) and Quadrini and Trigari (2007)) that
the public sector wages are predetermined:
wP,t = w (3.8)
where w > ci,t, i = N,T , i.e. public wages lead wage determination and
they also grow faster than productivity in the other sectors. In fact, while in
the private sector the argument of competition between different production
units (either different firms in the same sector, or domestic vs. foreign firms)
producing wage restraint holds, this is not true for the public sector. Fiscal
discipline itself may not be sufficient to produce wage restraint in the public
sector, in particular under centralized wage bargaining, because in that case
the (central) government would be bargaining with a large share of the
11The implicit assumption here is that cN,t +mN,t > cT,t.
12In order to avoid losing market share, firms in T might keep prices unchanged for
some time, but this strategy would not be sustainable since it will generate losses. Alter-
natively, they might reduce employment and/or try to push productivity up, for example
by eliminating previous slack in the work process (see, for example, Juselius and Ordonez
(2009)). However, in order to be able to account for this we would need a more general
theoretical and empirical model which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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electorate (Calmfors et al., 1985 and 1988). As in the previous cases, wage
equalization occurs due to free inter-sectoral labor mobility and/or envy
externalities:
wT,t = µT.3 + θT.3 · wP,t + ηT,t (3.9)
wN,t = µN.3 + θN.3 · wP,t + ηN,t (3.10)
Again, full wage adaptability holds if θi.3 = 1, i = N,T . As in the previous
case, the consequences for the domestic firms’ international competitiveness
might be serious due to traded goods prices growing faster than productiv-
ity. Moreover, since wages in both market sectors (N and T) will be growing
ahead of productivity, in this latter case the impact on CPI inflation will be
larger than in the previous cases. The envy-effect framework, thus, intro-
duces an additional negative fiscal externality of wage increases: when the
public sector is the leader in wage setting, the overall level of the real wage
will be higher, resulting in higher prices and/or lower employment.
Albeit highly stylized, these models give us an idea of the scenarios we
are likely to find in an empirical analysis of wage spillovers and leave us with
clear testable hypotheses to find out which model fits best in describing the
spillovers in wage determination in a specific country.
3.4 The empirical model
The ideal empirical model to test the assumptions embedded in the the-
oretical models sketched in the previous section, for reasons that will be
clarified shortly, is a Cointegrated VAR (Johansen 1988, 1995). The main
advantage of the CVAR is that it is a data-driven approach, and can there-
fore challenge - as it has been proved in several recent works13 - theoretical
macro models which have often been proved to fail to explain many empirical
facts. Instead of pre-specifying the correct economic model from the outset,
by using the CVAR we ”let the data speak”. One drawback of VAR models
is that they are quite data-demanding, which can be a problem when we
deal with transition countries, given the limited data availability. However,
in this specific case, the dimension of the VAR (three variables) and the
characteristics of the series (see next section) make this problem less rele-
vant. In particular, the cointegration should occur much faster than within
13See, for example, Juselius and Franchi (2007).
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other business cycle models, and this is confirmed by the Impulse-Response
analysis. Moreover, in order to save on degrees of freedom, each model was
re-estimated gradually restricting to zero all insignificant coefficients in the
short-run matrices, starting from the one with the highest p-value, following
a general-to-specific approach (Juselius, 2006). This left us with parsimo-
nious models where the problem of the overparameterization of VARs was
greatly reduced. Suppose we have a vector of p variables in time series.
When the p variables, in levels, are nonstationary and integrated of order
1, I(1), their first difference will be I(0). Moreover, if two or more variables
are I(1) but their linear combination is I(0), they are said to be cointegrated
(CI(1,0)). The CVAR, as we will see, has the variables in first differences
as dependent variables but is simply a reparametrization of the VAR (see
Juselius, 2006, Chp.2). Therefore, the value of the likelihood is the same and
there is no information loss in moving from the VAR to the Cointegrated (or
Vector Error Correction) counterpart. A Cointegrated VAR model of order
n with p variables is defined as:
∆xt = Πx˜t−1 + Γ1∆xt−1 + · · ·+ Γn∆xt−n + φDt + µ+ t; t ∼ Niid(0,Ω)
(3.11)
where D is a vector of dummy variables (seasonals and other unrestricted
dummies), µ is a vector of constant terms and Ω is the (p × p) covariance
matrix of (white noise) residuals. Γj , j = 1, . . . , n are the matrices of the
short-run coefficients. When variables are I(1) and cointegrated, the matrix
Π will be of rank r < p, where r is the number of (long-run) cointegration
relations. Therefore, Π can be decomposed as:
Π = αβ˜′; β˜ =
[












where the elements in β˜ are r× 1 vectors, 1 represents a constant restricted
to lie in the cointegration relation, Ds are dummies capturing shocks that
do not cancel in the cointegration relations and t is a linear trend. The β˜’s
are called the cointegration relations while the α’s are the loadings. In other
terms, the long run (stationary) relations that characterize the variables are
the β˜’s, while the α’s show how each variable adjusts to disequilibria in the
corresponding long-run relation. When we decompose Π, the coefficients in
the α and β˜ matrices will not be, in general, identified (i.e. we have an
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infinite number of matrices α and β˜ that, if multiplied, are equal to Π);
therefore, in order to achieve identification, we will need to impose restric-
tions on β˜: a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a Cointegrated
VAR model to be empirically identified is that r−1 restrictions are imposed
on each long-run relation. If the number of restrictions is larger, the model
is overidentified and such restrictions are testable. Including a linear term
(the time trend t ) in the cointegration relations is useful when variables
in the system are trending and trends do not cancel in the cointegrating
relations; the constant, instead, allows for a non-zero mean in the relations.
The CVAR (3.11), in sum, says that the changes in the variables in each
period are explained by adjustments to equilibrium relations and the effect
of past changes in the variables of the system, plus some deterministics; all
contemporaneous effects are in the covariance matrix, i.e. it is a reduced
form model. Moreover, the CVAR classifies the variables in r long-run re-
lations by which the system is pulled and p-r common stochastic trends,
by which the system is pushed. In other words, when the rank is r, the
shocks in the equations of the VAR can be rewritten as r transitory shocks
(i.e. shocks that cause disequilibria which are gradually absorbed through
adjustment to the long-run relations) and p− r permanent shocks. We can




(i + µ0 + φ1Dpi) + C
◦(L)(νt + µ0 + µ1t) + X˜0 (3.12)
where Dp are permanent (shift) dummies, ν are the transitory shocks,
X˜0 the initial values and
C = β⊥(α⊥Γβ⊥)−1α′⊥ = β˜⊥α
′
⊥
where α⊥ and β⊥ are the p × (p − r) orthogonal complements of α and β
describing the common stochastic trends, α⊥
∑
, and their loadings. If a
variable is found to be weakly exogenous, i.e. it does not adjust to any
cointegrating relation14 , then shocks to that variable are identified as one
of the common stochastic trends of the system. In other words, the weakly
exogenous variable ”causes” movements in the other variables.
It should now be clear why the Cointegrated VAR model is a natu-
ral candidate to test empirically the predictions of the theoretical model
14This amounts to testing that the corresponding row in the matrix is zero.
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sketched in the previous section. Theoretical models of wage determina-
tion make precise statements on the long-run relations as well as the causal
links between wages in different sectors. The Scandinavian Model and the
Froot and Rogoff (1995) model of the Balassa-Samuelson effect state that
the open sector should be the driving force of the system, since on one hand
productivity grows faster in this sector (as it has been empirically observed),
and on the other hand it faces international competitiveness and therefore
wages should increase in step with productivity to make sure that prices to
not grow and there is no competitiveness loss. Free mobility of labor across
sectors, then, makes sure that wages are equalized. The hypothesis of wage
equalization (or, more precisely, constancy of the wage ratio)15 implies that
in a model including wages in the three sectors (industry, services and pub-
lic administration) we should be able to find two cointegrating ( long-run )
relations and one common trend16 and the coefficients in the cointegration
relations should satisfy long-run homogeneity, (i.e. we should find one-to-
one long-run relations and the constant in the cointegration vectors should
be zero). Finally, in the Scandinavian Model, the common trend should
be identified with shocks to industry wages, i.e. industry wages should be
weakly exogenous. On the other hand, if the hypothesis of one-to-one rela-
tions (coefficients in the β - vector equal to 1) is rejected, this is interpreted
as low wage adaptability between the sectors considered (see Friberg, 2007).
If less than two cointegration relations are found, this means that there is
more than one common trend affecting the wages: in other words, a weaker
form of our three theoretical models holds. For example, if both N and T
are found to be weakly exogenous, with public sector wages adjusting, this
would imply that the (market) traded and non-traded sector wages are sub-
ject to different kinds of shocks (i.e. bargaining processes), and also a lower
mobility of labour across sectors is present. By classifying the model into
pulling and pushing forces, we will be able to identify how the wage shocks
load into the three sectors. If the weak exogeneity of traded sector wages
does not hold, the empirical model suggests that the Scandinavian model is
15Since we have wage indexes, when testing the hypothesis of wage adaptability we
will actually test the constancy of the wage ratio, rather than equality of wages, which
a weaker hypothesis but it is more realistic and, on the other hand, it is the assumption
actually made by the empirical literature on the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
16Moreover, the model should be specified with an unrestricted constant and and no
trend, since the presence of a trend in the cointegrating relation would imply that one
sector has been gaining purchasing power with respect to the others.
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not a good approximation of wage dynamics in the country under analysis,
and the hypotheses at the basis of the Balassa-Samuelson effect do not hold.
Put it another way, absence of weak exogeneity of wT would imply that
the traded sector has not been a driving force in wage determination, and
rather it has been influenced by shocks to the other sectors, leaving room for
competitiveness loss if wages have grown more than productivity. Equation
(3.11), where we omitted, for simplicity, the trend and the constant from
the cointegration relations, before any restrictions are imposed and making
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Table 3.1 summarizes the hypotheses embedded in the theoretical models
outlined in Section 3 and the corresponding testable restrictions within the
Cointegrated VAR framework.
Model Rank Leader Identifying
Restrictions





















αiP = 0 β1P = β2P =
−1
Table 3.1: Testable assumptions on wage spillovers.
3.5 The data and empirical results
Our dataset contains quarterly data from 2000Q1 until 2010Q3 for ten
Central and Eastern European Countries that have joined the European
Union in either of the two waves of 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia). The time sample was chosen in order to make sure we had data
for all countries, as well as excluding data from the very first years after the
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fall of Communism which might be less reliable or, for what concerns the
consumer price index, depend heavily on price administration.
There are three wage series for each country: Industry (proxying the
traded sector), Services (proxying the market non-traded sector) and Public
Administration (the non-market, non-traded sector)17. While the definition
of the Public Sector (wages in public administration, defence and compulsory
social security) is not really debatable, some assumptions had to be done
in order to define the traded and non-traded sector. To this end, we have
followed a common practice in the literature on the Balassa-Samuelson effect
by identifying the traded sector with industry (excluding construction, which
is not unanimously treated in the literature) and the market non-traded
sector with ”Services of the business economy”18. Agriculture is excluded
from the sample as agricultural prices heavily rely on state support and
price administration, and are influenced by policies as the CAP in the EU.
Finally, the wage indexes are deflated using the Harmonized CPI index.
This is done in order to concentrate on the relationship between real wages,
excluding price shocks from the model. Most of the empirical works on this
issue define wages as compensation per employee in the corresponding sector,
calculated as compensation of employees divided by the number of workers
in that sector; however, these data are only available on an annual basis and
the available time series for transition countries are too short to use annual
data19. The dimension of the VARs estimated in this paper makes the
use of quarterly data suitable; moreover, unlike other long-run equilibrium
relations, deviations from a long-run equilibrium of wage series should be
less persistent, and therefore 11 years represent a long enough time span to
detect cointegration. Finally, we prefer using quarterly data to annual data
because the latter can be misleading - or at least less informative - if inter-
sectoral wage spillovers occur within the year, i.e. with a frequency which is
higher than that of the sample. As we will show through impulse response
17The exact definition of the series and the sources is given in Appendix 1.
18The literature generally identifies the open sector with industry and the sheltered sec-
tor with services or ”all the rest”. For example, Egert (2002, 2003a, 2003b) and Golinelli
and Orsi (2002) define Industry as the Open sector and the rest as the closed sector.
Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) include respectively Industry and Services, and exclude con-
struction from the latter. Agriculture is excluded in Coricelli and Jazbec (2004). Nenovsky
and Dimitrova (2002) include also construction in the open sector.
19For example, Lamo et al. (2008) and Demekas and Kontolemis (2000). Friberg (2007)
uses average monthly wages.
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analysis, indeed, disequilibria in the wage relations are generally absorbed
within the year. As already stated, the empirical model is a Vector Error
Correction Model in three variables: (real) wages in Industry, wT , Services,
wN , and Public Administration, wP . Since the wage series, from a graphical
inspection, seem to exhibit a deterministic trend, we also include a linear
term in the baseline VAR. As a result, the corresponding VECM can either
have an unrestricted constant and no trend (if the trend cancels out in the
cointegrating relations), or an unrestricted constant and a restricted trend,
in the case the latter does not cancel out in the cointegration relations20 21.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the cointegration rank tests. As it is common
in the literature, we do not limit ourselves to looking at the results of the
trace test but combine it with information on the largest unrestricted root of
the characteristic polynomial, the significance of the adjustment coefficients
in the corresponding row of the α-matrix, and a graphical inspection of
the cointegration relations. We do this in order to make sure that, by
excluding a cointegration relation, albeit persistent, we are not throwing
away potentially important information. These criteria need not (and in
general, do not) suggest the same rank, as it is the case in Table 3.2, and
in this sense some room for judgment is left. Table 3.2 reports the results
of the trace test and the modulus of the largest unrestricted root of the
characteristic polynomial. As a rule of thumb, when using quarterly data
the chosen rank should not leave out roots larger than 0.83-0.84 (Juselius
[2006], chp. 8). The trace test suggested no cointegration in the case of
Lithuania and Slovenia, but this was not supported by the other criteria we
have listed above, and therefore we opted for r = 1. Only for three countries
out of ten (Estonia, Romania and Slovakia) we could not reject the null of r
= 2. In the other cases, the rank is 1. This might suggest low intersectoral
mobility across sectors, so that the wage series do not share a single common
trend but two different trends.
We can now move to testing restrictions on the cointegration vectors,
i.e. the β matrices, in order to find out the degree of wage adaptability; on
the other hand, by testing restrictions on α (i.e. testing for weak exogene-
20See Juselius [2006], Chp. 6. A linear term in the cointegration vector here would
imply that wages one sector have been gaining purchasing power with respect to wages in
the other sector(s)
21The exact specification of the deterministic part and the order of the underlying VARs
is given in Appendix 2.
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ity) we will be able to classify the variables in the system in pushing and
pulling forces, i.e. variables that drove the system out of equilibrium and
variables which brought the system back to equilibrium, adjusting to the
cointegration relations. Then, we will employ Granger non-causality tests
(Granger, 1969) to test for wage leadership. The process of adjustment of
the variables after a shock to other sectors will be investigated by means of
impulse response analysis.
Tables 3.3−3.5 report the results of the empirical model. Table 3.3 pro-
vides the null hypothesis, the imposed restrictions and normalization on the
β-vectors and the likelihood ratio test results. If we have, for example, two
cointegration relations and the null hypothesis of one-to-one relations (i.e.
long-run homogeneity) can be rejected at the 10% level, then we interpret
this as a signal of low wage adaptability (see Friberg, 2007). In order to
achieve economic identification, i.e. making the cointegration vectors inter-
pretable as equilibrium relations, the vectors in Table 3.3 were normalized
to the variable which is significantly adjusting to the corresponding cointe-
gration relation.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the weak exogeneity tests and Table 3.5
shows the common trends representation of the model, where the coefficients
to the stochastic trends of the system are reported. We can now comment
on the results by country.
Bulgaria shows only one cointegration relation and Industry and Services
are weakly exogenous. The joint hypothesis of weak exogeneity could not
be rejected with a fairly high p-value, and since there is only one cointe-
gration vector, the model is identified without having to impose restrictions
on β. Looking at the common trends representation, we see that shocks
to industry wages had a significant permanent effect only on the industry
sector, while shocks to the services sector significantly affected the services
and public sector. In other words, we can label the two permanent shocks a
”traded sector wage shock” and a ”sheltered sector shock”. Overall, a weak
version of the Scandinavian Model therefore holds for Bulgaria.
The Czech Republic exhibits one cointegration vector; the two closed sec-
tor wages, wN and wP , are found to be weakly exogenous and the joint
weak exogeneity could not be rejected with a p-value of 0.170. Wages in
T, therefore, have been adjusting, and table 3.4 shows that the sector that
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r=0 0.030 r = 1 0.748
r=1r ≤ 1 0.433 r = 2 0.911
r ≤ 2 0.898 r = 3 1.045
Czech Republic
r=0 0.021 r = 1 0.428
r=1r ≤ 1 0.060 r = 2 0.935
r ≤ 2 0.204 r = 3 0.916
Estonia
r=0 0.025 r = 1 0.712
r=2r ≤ 1 0.061 r = 2 0.789
r ≤ 2 0.201 r = 3 0.959
Hungary
r=0 0.001 r = 1 0.689
r=1r ≤ 1 0.027 r = 2 0.956
r ≤ 2 0.767 r = 3 0.960
Latvia
r=0 0.005 r = 1 0.654
r=1r ≤ 1 0.066 r = 2 0.847
r ≤ 2 0.077 r = 3 1.005
Lithuania
r=0 0.278 r = 1 0.844
r=1r ≤ 1 0.497 r = 2 0.919
r ≤ 2 0.177 r = 3 0.971
Poland
r=0 0.022 r = 1 0.720
r=1r ≤ 1 0.496 r = 2 0.973
r ≤ 2 0.916 r = 3 0.985
Romania
r=0 0.017 r = 1 0.436
r=2r ≤ 1 0.535 r = 2 0.735
r ≤ 2 0.890 r = 3 0.822
Slovak Rep.
r=0 0.001 r = 1 0.326
r=2r ≤ 1 0.018 r = 2 0.650
r ≤ 2 0.159 r = 3 0.954
Slovenia
r=0 0.665 r = 1 0.712
r=1r ≤ 1 0.692 r = 2 0.728
r ≤ 2 0.933 r = 3 0.997
Table 3.2: The choice of the cointegration rank.
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has been leading on T was the public sector. Wages in N were found to
be long-run excludable, and full wage adaptability between T and P was
rejected. This structure of wage spillovers is consistent with a weak version
of our ”Envy-effect model” and shows a potential for wage costs increasing
more than productivity and competitiveness loss in the Czech Republic.
Estonia has two cointegration relations; however, there is not full wage
adaptability since the hypothesis of long-run homogeneity is rejected at all
significance levels. On the other hand, industry wages are weakly exogenous
(though only at 1%) and shocks to this sectors load significantly on the other
sectors.
In the case of Hungary only one cointegration vector was found; wP and wN
are weakly exogenous and wT is adjusting to a cointegration relation with
non-traded sector wages. In other terms, wP is long-run excludable and
therefore public wages have been following a separate pattern. The wage
mark-up model is therefore a good approximation of inter-sectoral wage
spillovers in Hungary.
Latvia has one cointegration relation with the Traded sector adjusting, while
the Public and Non-traded sector are weakly exogenous. Moreover, public
sector wages are long-run excludable but shocks to wP are the only ones
that significantly affected the three variables in the system in the long run.
Lithuania presents one cointegration relation; wP and wN are weakly exoge-
nous and wT is adjusting. Moreover, from the common trends representation
we can see that shocks to N had a significant long-run effect on that sector
and T, while shocks to the P significantly affected only public sector wages
in the long run.
Poland shows one cointegration relation; wages in T and P are weakly ex-
ogenous but only shocks to wT significantly affect wN in the long run.
Romania presents two cointegration vectors with wages P being weakly ex-
ogenous. Full wage adaptability was rejected.
The Slovak Republic is the only country for which all hypotheses in the
Scandinavian model and were found to hold. There are two cointegration
vectors, full wage adaptability and wT is weakly exogenous and significantly
affects the other sectors in the long run.
Finally, Slovenia has one cointegration relation, where the public sector
wages adjust to a linear combination of Industry and the Services, and
the latter two sectors being jointly weakly exogenous and shocks to these
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variables significantly affecting public sector wages.
Country Restriction 22 LR stat.23 P-value
Bulgaria β̂′ = [β1T β1N 1] N.A. N.A.







Hungary β̂′ = [β1T 1 0] 2.896 0.089
Latvia β̂′ = [1 β1N 0] 0.243 0.622
Lithuania β̂′ = [1 β1Nβ1P ] N.A. N.A.












Slovenia β̂′ = [β1T 1− β1T 1] 1.811 0.612
Table 3.3: Cointegration Vectors and wage adaptability.
In order to test for wage leadership, we follow Tagtstro¨m [2000] and
Friberg [2007] and employ Granger non-causality tests on our VECM model
(3.11). Testing for wage leadership in (3.11) with two cointegration vectors
therefore implies the following null hypotheses:
α1Tβ1P = α2Tβ2P = ΓiT = 0 : wP
not→ wT (3.14)
α1Tβ1N = α2Tβ2N = ΓiT = 0 : wN
not→ wT (3.15)
α1Nβ1P = α2Nβ2P = ΓiN = 0 : wP
not→ wN (3.16)
α1Nβ1T = α2Nβ2T = ΓiN = 0 : wT
not→ wN (3.17)
α1Pβ1T = α2Pβ2T = ΓiP = 0 : wT
not→ wP (3.18)
α1Pβ1N = α2Pβ2N = ΓiP = 0 : wN
not→ wP (3.19)
Where Γij , i = 1, . . . , n; j = P,N, T is the row of the Γ matrix (the matrix
of coefficients of the lagged differences) corresponding to sector j for lag i. In
other words, if (3.14) and (3.15) cannot be rejected, then the traded sector is
wage leader and the Scandinavian model holds. A similar reasoning can be
done for the non-traded and public sector. We have ten countries here, and
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wT , wN :1.166 [0.558]
Czech Republic
1.510 0.339 0.159 wN , wP : 3.539 [0.170]
[0.219] [0.560] [0.690] wN , wT : 3.116[0.213]













wN , wP :0.711 [0.339]
Latvia
2.606 0.006 3.119 wT , wN :12.194 [0.002]
[0.106] [0.939] [0.077] wT , wP :3.359 [0.186]
wN , wP : 1.745 [0.418]
Lithuania 2.524 0.388 2.038 wT , wN :7.012 [0.030]
[0.112] [0.533] [0.153] wT , wP :4.471 [0.107]


























wT , wN : 3.946 [0.139]
Table 3.4: Weak Exogeneity.
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Country Equation T N P Det. Trend
Bulgaria
wT,t 1.124 (2.717) 0.370 (0.697) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.009
wN,t 0.066 (0.155) 1.360 (2.314) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.013
wP,t −0.456 (−1.068) 1.750 (3.191) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.014
Czech R.
wT,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.048 (0.337) 0.645 (2.073) 0.012
wN,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.894 (4.060) 0.251 (0.517) 0.011
wP,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.099 (0.337) 1.346 (2.073) 0.011
Estonia
wT,t 1.316 (1.874) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.014
wN,t 1.316 (1.874) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.011
wP,t 1.316 (1.874) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.013
Hungary
wT,t 0.000 (N.A.) 1.557 (2.314) -0.000 (-0.004) 0.011
wN,t 0.000 (N.A.) 1.750 (2.314) -0.000 (-0.004) 0.012
wP,t 0.000 (N.A.) 2.055 (1.272) 0.783 (5.636) 0.010
Latvia
wT,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.378 (0.920) 0.412 (2.408) 0.012
wN,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.445 (0.920) 0.484 (2.408) 0.014
wP,t 0.000 (N.A.) -1.202 (-0.980) 1.961 (3.840) 0.005
Lithuania
wT,t 0.000 (N.A.) 1.881 (2.054) -0.467 (-1.848) 0.005
wN,t 0.000 (N.A.) 1.915 (2.083) -0.261 (-1.029) 0.005
wP,t 0.000 (N.A.) 1.080 (1.274) 0.447 (1.909) 0.004
Poland
wT,t 0.827 (2.419) 0.000 (N.A.) -0.049 (-0.179) 0.008
wN,t 0.961 (2.623) 0.000 (N.A.) -0.305 (-1.043) 0.007
wP,t 0.009 (0.032) 0.000 (N.A.) 1.025 (4.801) 0.010
Romania
wT,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A) 0.304 (2.489) 0.022
wN,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A) 0.505 (2.489) 0.021
wP,t 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.860 (2.489) 0.036
Slovak Republic
wT,t 0.810 (3.086) 0.000 (N.A) 0.000 (N.A) 0.022
wN,t 0.810 (3.086) 0.000 (N.A) 0.000 (N.A) 0.021
wP,t 0.810 (3.086) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.000 (N.A) 0.036
Slovenia
wT,t 0.431 (2.067) 0.299 (0.777) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.008
wN,t -0.199 (-0.963) 0.938 (2.463) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.005
wP,t -0.760 (-2.943) 1.508 (3.164) 0.000 (N.A.) 0.003
Table 3.5: Common Trends representation.
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not→ wT 4.27 (0.024)
Czech Republic
wN
not→ wT 3.54 (0.068)
wP
not→ wT 4.63 (0.039)
Estonia
wN
not→ wT 3.67 (0.037)
wP
not→ wT 2.02 (0.150)
Hungary
wN
not→ wT 1.09 (0.348)
wP
not→ wT 2.47 (0.100)
Latvia
wN
not→ wT 1.57 (0.225)
wP
not→ wT 5.61 (0.008)
Lithuania
wN
not→ wT 0.77 (0.520)
wP
not→ wT 1.40 (0.264)
Poland
wN
not→ wT 1.42 (0.257)
wP
not→ wT 0.77 (0.469)
Romania
wN
not→ wT 2.45 (0.103)
wP
not→ wT 5.19 (0.011)
Slovak Republic
wN
not→ wT 0.90 (0.349)
wP
not→ wT 0.05 (0.830)
Slovenia
wN
not→ wT 2.04 (0.162)
wP
not→ wT 2.96 (0.094)
Table 3.6: Granger Causality.
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thus the number of tests to be performed is quite high; however, since we are
mainly interested in discussing the role of the Balassa-Samuelson assumption
of traded sector wage leadership in the process of convergence as well as for
brevity, we only report the results of (3.14) and (3.15)24. The leadership
of the Traded sector wages vis a` vis the Public sector (i.e. null hypotheses
(3.14)) is rejected at 5% significance in the case of Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Latvia and Romania and at 10% for Slovenia. The null (3.15) is rejected at
5% for Estonia and Bulgaria, and 10% for Hungary. Therefore, in Bulgaria
and Estonia, while wT was found to be weakly exogenous, the traded sector
was not wage leader, meaning that wP and wN affected it at least in the
short run. In other words, there was bidirectional (Granger) causality.
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI
Model (a) (c) (a) (b) (c) (b) (a) (c) (a) (a)
Table 3.7: Models of wage spillovers.
In order to analyze the adjustment dynamics of the system, in Appendix
3 I plotted the Impulse Response functions for each country. The graphs
of the responses up to 20 quarters ahead confirm the results reported in
Table 3.5; moreover, we notice that, in general, the adjustment to the new
long-run value after a permanent shock is pretty quick, taking in general at
most one year and a half. In the case of Poland, Bulgaria and Estonia the
adjustment requires less than one year. This is interesting since, if most of
the adjustment occurs within the year, previous works on wage spillovers
that use yearly data (for example, Lamo et al. (2008)) might not be able to
capture these feedback effects.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed spillovers in wage determination across macro sectors
in ten european transition countries that joined the European Union within
the last decade. Several previous studies have shown, either with a de-
scriptive approach or using econometric techniques, that wages in different
sectors generally equalize or, more generally, that the wage ratio tends to
be constant.
24Test results of the other tests are available on request.
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However, as it was discussed in Section 3, different frameworks of leads
and lags in wage determination may have different impacts as regards the in-
ternational cost competitiveness of a country’s firms. When wages in sectors
that are not exposed to international competition lead the process of wage
setting, inter-sectoral labor mobility as well as union pressure may cause
the traded sector wages to grow more than productivity, thus harming com-
petitiveness. In this case, the catching up process will be characterized by
wages converging faster than productivity.
The main results of the paper are the following: first of all, in transi-
tion countries (with the exception of Slovakia) we do not find support for
full wage adaptability, and in most cases two common trends are present,
meaning that shocks to wages in the sectors that are found to be leaders
in wage determination are not fully transmitted to the other sectors. Thus,
pushes to wage equalization coming from inter-sectoral labor mobility might
have been low. Moreover, the fact that we have two common trends may
imply separate bargaining processes. Second, the ”right” model to describe
wage interactions is different across countries. In Section 3, we have out-
lined three alternative models of wage spillovers and derived the hypotheses
they implied. Table 3.7 shows which model best describes wage spillovers
in each of the sample countries; in general, we found support for a weaker
form of those models, with the exception of the Slovak Republic, for which
the strict version of the Scandinavian Model holds. In Romania, the Czech
Republic and Latvia public sector wages were found to be weakly exogenous,
”causing” movements in traded and non-traded sector wages. In the case of
Hungary and Lithuania, the non-traded sector has been leading wage deter-
mination. Thus, for these five countries, the process of convergence may be
accompanied by the creation of large international imbalances due to com-
petitiveness loss.
As far as the remaining countries are concerned, while traded sector
wages were weakly exogenous, with the exception of Estonia we found shocks
to wages in N to significantly affect public sector wages in the long run. Thus,
we could find what we called a traded sector wage shock and a non-traded
sector wage shock. In the case of Estonia, Bulgaria and (only at 10% signif-
icance) Slovenia, while model 1 appears to hold, the traded sector was not
wage leader and actually we could observe bidirectional causality.
Finally, Granger ”causality” tests and Impulse Response analysis have
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shown that, in some cases, even when the traded sector is weakly exogenous,
there is bidirectional causality (Bulgaria and Estonia); adjustment after a
shock to wages in the leading sector occurs quite quickly, taking in general
less than six quarters.
As it was stated in the introduction, in principle, when wage setting in
sectors that are not subject to international competition leads that in the
traded sector, there is room for competitiveness loss since wage costs will
grow faster than productivity. At a micro level, firms in the export sector will
either have to increase prices or, to avoid losing market share, reduce profits.
At a country level, excess inflation may be balanced by a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate to re-establish (relative) purchasing power parity.
When the nominal exchange rate is fixed, however, due to an exchange rate
arrangement or entry in a monetary union, nominal depreciation is not an
option. For this reason, in principle, empirical support for the wage mark-
up or the envy-effect model in central and eastern European countries, as it
was found in the present paper, may suggest the potential for accumulating
large current account imbalances when these countries will finally have to
adopt the euro, and this may be the subject of further research.
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3.8 Appendix 1. Data Sources
Variable Source and Definition
Industry Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) - Wages and Salaries. Sea-
sonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days - B-E
(”Industry except construction”). Nominal value.
Services Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) - Wages and Salaries. Sea-
sonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days - G-N
(”Services of the business economy”). Nominal value.
Public Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) - Wages and Salaries. Sea-
sonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days - O
(”Public administration and Defence, compulsory social se-
curity”). Nominal value.
Price Adjustment Eurostat, HICP Overall Index - Seasonally and Working day
adjusted
3.9 Appendix 2. Specification of the empirical
model
Country Order Specification Rank
Bulgaria 2 UC, transitory dummies (2001Q4, 2009Q4) 1
Czech Republic 1 UCRT, shift in 2004Q3 1
Estonia 2 UC 2
Hungary 2 UC 1
Latvia 2 UC, Shift at 2006Q4 1
Lithuania 3 UC 1
Poland 2 UC, blip dummy 2004Q2 restricted in the CV. 1
Romania 2 UCRT. Trend break at 2007Q1 (entrance to EU) 2
Slovak Republic 1 UC 2
Slovenia 1 UC 1
Note: UC = unrestricted constant, no trend; UCRT=unrestricted
constant, restricted trend. Residuals in all models are white noise 25
3.10 Appendix 3. Impulse Response Functions
25Specification tests results are available on request.
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Figure 3.3: Bulgaria.
















The research developed within this doctoral thesis deals with several as-
pects of european economic and monetary integration. Each chapter was
self-contained and strongly policy-related.
The recent literature on Fear of Floating has shown how many coun-
tries that are, officially, in a floating exchange rate regime actually tend to
manage the exchange rate in disguise. On the other hand, countries within
some forms of official exchange rate arrangement with one foreign currency
actually tend to reduce the volatility vis a` vis some other currencies.
When the country we are considering is in a regime of inflation tar-
geting, the economic literature suggests that it should not directly target
the exchange rate, but only respond to its fluctuations as long as they af-
fect (expected) inflation. For countries that are in the European Union, or
strongly integrated with the EMU, the rationale for having a managed float
may be given by the high economic and financial integration with the euro
area. In particular for developing countries, the fact that a large portion of
domestic credit is denominated in a foreign currency reduces the scope for
domestic monetary policy, on one hand, and on the other hand makes the
exchange rate channel stronger. Interest rate pass-through, moreover, may
occur from the foreign money market rate to the domestic one, rather than
through the traditional channel involving the home policy rate. The strong
connection between domestic (of the small open economy) and foreign (the
large economy’s) market interest rate is not, however, an issue that only
involves developing countries. Reade and Volz (2009), for example, have
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shown that the Swedish interbank rate, the Stibor, is cointegrated with the
Euribor and the latter is weakly exogenous. This discussion shows why, in
principle, in EU Countries that have not adopted the euro yet Central Banks
might have been placing some weight in their monetary policy on exchange
rate stabilization.
In Chapter 1 I reviewed two approaches recently developed by the liter-
ature to detect the de facto exchange rate regimes and weights in currency
baskets, the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) approach and the Frankel and Wei
(2008) approach, and applied those techniques to a group of 14 european
countries: 3 non-EU countries (Switzerland, Iceland and Norway), two coun-
tries that recently adopted the euro (Slovakia and Estonia) and nine EU
members. The results obtained from these ountries were compared to those
of five benchmark floaters.
This Chapter, therefore, attempted to merge the technique to detect the
de facto exchange rate regime by Calvo and Reinhart with the Farnkel and
Wei approach for estimating weights in currency baskets, and it was also,
to my knowledge, the first attempt to study systematically the evolution of
de facto exchange rate regimes in Europe comparing the pre-euro and the
post-euro era.
The results of these approaches were interesting on several grounds. First
of all, with no surprise, official regimes of pegging and limited flexibility have
remained fairly stable through the last decade and consistent with the offi-
cial policy.
Second, the introduction of inflation targeting has brought about higher
exchange rate and lower reserves volatility, but up to a level that is not
comparable to benchmark floaters. All Inflation Targeters appear to inter-
vene actively in the foreign exchange market, a fact that is not justified
by their official monetary policy regime. Surprisingly enough, this was the
case for advanced economies with credible central banks like Sweden and
Switzerland, as well as Australia, to a lower extent, rather than for ”youger”
Inflation Targeters like Poland and the Czech Republic, while it is pretty
much common knowledge the Central Bank of Hungary has been pursuing
a mixed approach.
Third, the euro seems to have gained a relevant role as a reference cur-
rency since its introduction, even outside Europe, as its weight in the infor-
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mal basket of European and non-european countries included in our sample
was significantly larger than that of its main constituent currencies. More-
over, even for the most committed floaters in Europe, the euro has been the
most important (in some cases the only) informal reference currency.
In general, the euro era was characterized by higher exchange rate stabil-
ity than the previous periods. Finally, Limited Flexibility (ERM member-
ship) seems to be a more credible commitment to exchange rate management
than managed floating, since - at least in this sample - it was characterized
by both lower foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate volatility.
Chapter 2 was dedicated to the analysis of the Monetary Policy of the
Swedish Central Bank, the Riksbank, by estimating its policy preferences.
Since the introduction of the euro, and in particular between 2002 and 2008,
the exchange rate of Swedish Krona with the euro exhibited a remarkable
stability, and we wanted to understand whether that came through direct
interest rate intervention, i.e. whether the Riksbank put some weight on
exchange rate stabilization in its policy rule. A Taylor Rule would not be a
good approach to that end, since the coefficients in this rule are convolutions
of structural and preference parameters. By means of a stylized theoreti-
cal model, we showed how an observational equivalence between Inflation
Targeting and a form of Fear of Floating may arise if we do not take that
into account. For this reason, rather than estimating a Taylor rule aug-
mented to include the exchange rate, we have derived alternative interest
rate rules from the Central Bank’s optimization problem and estimated sep-
arately the parameters describing the structure of the economy and those
representing the Central Bank preferences under alternative monetry policy
rules, namely Strict Inflation Targeting, Flexible Inflation Targeting, Inter-
est Rate Stabilization and Smoothing, Fear of Floating and Exchange Rate
targeting. The results show that Inflation Targeting with Interest Rate Sta-
bilization and Smoothing can describe the Swedish Monetary Policy of the
last 16 years pretty well, and therefore exchange rate stabilization was not
coming through the interest rate.
Chapter 3 discussed the issue of real and nominal convergence in Cen-
tral and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) from the point of view of
the labor market. The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis states that, during
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the process of catching up, if labor is freely mobile across sectors, since pro-
ductivity grows faster in the traded goods sector, the resulting aggregate
real wage increases will push the price of tradable goods up. This, in turn,
generates structural inflation and a real exchange rate appreciation which,
however, as long as relative PPP holds for tradable goods, should not harm
competitiveness. During the last decade a number of papers has investi-
gated the importance of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in explaining the
real appreciation experienced by CEECs. However, empirical support for
this theory was limited. The limit of this literature is that one fundamental
assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, namely that the traded
goods sector drives wage determination while the other sectors (the non-
traded and the public sector) are following.
In Chapter 3, I first sketched three alternative models of spillovers in
wage determination where the leader is, alternatively, the traded sector (as
in the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and the so-called Scandinavian Model),
the non-traded sector (which holds if unions in that sector have a higher bar-
gaining power and can thus extract a mark-up over productivity), and the
public sector (where wage setting is driven by political rather than pro-
ductivity considerations). In each case, the other two sectors adjust to the
higher wage set in the leading one. Then I tested the assumptions embed-
ded in these three models within a Cointegrated VAR framework for each
country.
The results showed that a large heterogeneity across countries is present.
We did not find support for full wage adaptability, and in most cases two
common trends are present, meaning that shocks to wages in the sectors
that are found to be leaders in wage determination are not fully transmitted
to the other sectors, which may be due to low inter-sectoral labor mobility.
Only in Slovakia full wage adaptability as well as a leading role of the traded
sector (i.e. the assumptions of the B-S hypothesis) were found. In Romania,
the Czech Republic and Latvia public sector wages were found to be weakly
exogenous, ”causing” movements in traded and non-traded sector wages. In
the case of Hungary and Lithuania, the non-traded sector has been leading
wage determination. Thus, for these five countries, the process of conver-
gence may be accompanied by the creation of large international imbalances
due to competitiveness loss.
As far as the remaining countries are concerned, while traded sector
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wages were weakly exogenous, with the exception of Estonia we found shocks
to wages in N to significantly affect public sector wages in the long run. Thus,
we could find what we called a traded sector wage shock and a non-traded
sector wage shock. In the case of Estonia, Bulgaria and (only at 10% signif-
icance) Slovenia, while model 1 appears to hold, the traded sector was not
wage leader (i.e. it did not Granger-cause the other variables) and actually
we could observe bidirectional causality.
These results suggest one potential source of the failure of the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis, that was documented by a large strand of literature
cited in Chapter 3, in explaining excess inflation and real appreciation in
Central and Eastern Europe.
